

MALAYSIA-INDONESIA CONFLICT

CREATION OF MALAYSIA -
INDONESIA'S CONFRONTATION POLICY -
PHILIPPINE AND INDONESIAN CLAIMS -
UN INVOLVEMENT -
INDONESIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM UN -
ROLES OF UK, US, USSR AND CHINA

Edited by

A.G. Mezerik

NEO-COLONIALISM CHARGES, ROLE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN GROUP .
INVOLVEMENT OF UK IN AREA . ROLE OF US TOWARD INDONESIA
AND MALAYSIA . IMPACT OF INDIGENOUS CHINESE IN MALAYSIA .
ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON SINGAPORE OF INDONESIA'S "CRUSH
MALAYSIA" CAMPAIGN . MAPHILINDO . INFLUENCE OF
SINO-SOVIET CONTROVERSY

CHRONOLOGY, APPENDICES AND MAP

Chronology of Events Beginning with Announcement of Malaysia. Appen-
dixes including official documents and statements - Malaysia,
Indonesia, Philippines . Treaties . Communiqués . Summit Meetings .
UN Secretary General's Conclusions, UN Resolutions .
Vital Statistics - Population, Economy, Geography - Map.

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MALAYSIA-INDONESIA

CONFLICT

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Roles of UK, US, USSR and Communist China

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| Contents | Page |
|---|------|
| The Creation of Malaysia | 2 |
| Indonesia and Malaysia View Objectives of Malaysia Differently ... | 2 |
| Malaysia Charges Indonesia with "Blatant Aggression" in the Security Council | 2 |
| Parachute Landings into Malaysia in Security Council Not Denied .. | 3 |
| Malaysia Strengthens UK's Authority, Says Indonesia | 3 |
| Indonesia Claims Malaya was Base Against It | 4 |
| Indonesia Gave Malaya Time to Achieve "Independence" | 4 |
| Common Heritage Cited | 5 |
| Different Paths Toward Independence | 6 |
| Philosophy of Continuing Revolution | 6 |
| Sukarno Stresses Universal Confrontation Struggle | 7 |
| Different Doctrines in Dispute | 7 |
| Malaysia Says Bloody Revolution Not Only Way to Independence | 8 |
| Malaysia Denies Involvement in Indonesian Insurrection | 9 |
| Malaysia Says in 1958 It Prevented Use of its Territory by Indonesian Rebels | 9 |
| Malayan-Indonesian Treaty of Friendship Signed in 1959 | 9 |
| Malaysia Does Not Accept That Indonesia Does Not Have Territorial Ambitions | 10 |
| Indonesia Has Claimed What Is Now Malaysia | 10 |
| Philippines Claim Sabah | 11 |
| Sabah Claim Follows Proposals for Malaysia | 13 |
| Rahman's Proposals for Malaysia First Made in Singapore | 13 |

(Contents continued on next page)

Contents (continued)Page

| | |
|--|----|
| Indonesia Charges Singapore Proposals Were British Inspired | 13 |
| Malaysia Says Its Creation Was Major Act of Decolonization | 14 |
| Independence Methods for Malaysia Same as for Malaya Earlier | 14 |
| Indonesia Said to Have Been Fully Informed of Proposals for Malaysia | 14 |
| Indonesia Says It Was Prepared to Cooperate on Chinese Problem ... | 15 |
| Chinese and Malaya | 15 |
| The Merger Agreement - Parliamentary Make Up | 16 |
| Malaya Compared to Malaysia | 16 |
| Indonesia's Chinese Problem | 16 |
| Indonesia Says Singapore Not Enthusiastic About Malaysia | 17 |
| Malaysia Cites Singapore Referendum | 17 |
| Views Assessed in Sabah and Sarawak | 18 |
| The Case of Brunei | 19 |
| Azahari and the Brunei Rebellion | 19 |
| Azahari Proclaims Himself North Borneo Prime Minister | 20 |
| Indonesian Attitudes Toward Rebellion | 21 |
| Brunei Revolt Supported by Indonesia | 22 |
| Brunei Does Not Join Malaysia | 23 |
| Brunei Opposed to Indonesia | 23 |
| Brunei Cited as Proof of Free Choice | 24 |
| Indonesia Predicts Conflict | 24 |
| The Moves to the Summit | 24 |
| June Foreign Ministers Meeting Proposes UN Assessment in Borneo Territories | 25 |
| Foreign Ministers Also Consider Confederation Proposals | 25 |
| Malaysia Takes Form | 26 |
| Indonesia Proclaims "Crush Malaysia" Before Summit | 26 |
| July Summit Conference Apparently Brings Changed Attitudes | 26 |
| UN Assessment in Borneo is Asked by Summit | 27 |
| UN Experience in Area | 27 |
| Philippines and Indonesia Take Issue with UN Findings | 29 |
| The Dispute on the UN Findings | 29 |

Table of Contents continued on next page

| | |
|--|----|
| Observer Issue Arises | 30 |
| U Thant's Views of the Observer Dispute | 31 |
| Indonesia and Philippines Over-all Objections to UN Handling | 31 |
| U Thant Validates Malaysia as "Self-Government" Process | 32 |
| Renewed Philippine Claim on Sabah | 32 |
| The Base Question Revived | 33 |
| Singapore Base and Malaysia | 34 |
| Malaysia Says Singapore is Part of its Defense | 34 |
| Malaysia Cites Other Bases | 35 |
| Indonesia Says Rahman Breaks Agreements | 35 |
| Malaya Refutes Indonesian Charges | 35 |
| Date an Element of "Misunderstanding" | 36 |
| Malaysia Comes into Being: Indonesia and the Philippines Refuse Recognition | 36 |
| Malaysia Breaks Diplomatic Relations with Indonesia and the Philippines | 37 |
| British Embassy Burned and British Assets Seized in Indonesia | 37 |
| Economic "Confrontation" Begins | 37 |
| US Aid to Indonesia Imperilled | 38 |
| United States and Britain Cut Off Military Aid to Indonesia | 38 |
| Sukarno Tells US "To Hell With Aid" | 39 |
| Guerrilla Activities in North Borneo | 39 |
| Britain Gives Warnings to Indonesia | 40 |
| Support from Commonwealth | 40 |
| New Zealand and Australia Increase Aid | 41 |
| Labour Party Reaffirms Support | 41 |
| US Increases Support for Malaysia | 42 |
| US "Neutral" on Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute | 42 |
| US Wishes Asian Solution | 43 |
| The Kennedy Talks | 43 |
| New Talks on Withdrawal and Cease Fire | 43 |
| Indonesia Announces Reequipment of Borneo Irregulars | 44 |
| Malaysia Calls for Withdrawal of All Indonesian Irregulars | 44 |
| Philippines Attempts Mediation | 45 |

| <u>Contents (continued)</u> | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| The Move Toward A Second Summit | 45 |
| The Question of Pre-conditions | 45 |
| Philippines Wins Indonesia Withdrawal Promise | 46 |
| The One Day Tokyo Summit | 46 |
| Philippines Proposes Afro-Asian Commission | 46 |
| Sukarno Renews Armed Action to Dissolve Malaysia | 47 |
| Intensified Support Sought | 48 |
| Indonesia Says France Supplies Equipment | 48 |
| Peking Aid Important | 48 |
| Fighting Not Far from Declared War | 49 |
| The Cost of the Undeclared War | 49 |
| Economic Deterioration a Danger | 50 |
| Malaysia Dependence on Political Factors | 50 |
| Asian Line Up | 50 |
| Philippines Dilute Support | 50 |
| Relations with African States | 51 |
| Ghana Seeks to Become Mediator | 53 |
| Neo-Colonialism Charges and Answers | 53 |
| Indonesia Leaves UN | 54 |
| Leaves Specialized Agencies Also | 55 |
| Indonesia's Reason for Leaving UN | 55 |
| Charter Applies to Non-Members and Members | 55 |
| First to Leave UN | 56 |
| Peking Endorses Indonesian Withdrawal - Asks Rival Organization ... | 56 |
| Sukarno Calls for International Conference of Emerging Forces | 57 |
| Indonesia as Sixth Atomic Power | 57 |
| UN Continues to Maintain Role | 58 |
| Presence or Observer | 58 |
| References | 59 |
| Chronology | 63 |

Table of Contents continued on next page

| | <u>Page</u> |
|--|-------------|
| APPENDIXES | |
| A. Excerpts from Official Statement of Government of Malaysia on Transition of Malaya into Malaysia -- Also Excerpts from Constitution | 95 |
| B. The Cobbold Commission | 96 |
| C. Treaty of Friendship Between Malaya and Indonesia, 1959 .. | 97 |
| D. Joint Statement of Indonesia and Malaya, 1 June 1963 | 99 |
| E. Report of the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines (The Manila Accord) - 31 July 1963 | 100 |
| F. Manila Summit Statement and Declaration 1963 | 102 |
| G. Final Conclusions of the Secretary-General Regarding Malaysia | 106 |
| H. Description of Defense Agreements Affecting Malaysia | 109 |
| I. Joint Statement of Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno, 11 January 1964, and Malaysia's Reply of 13 January 1964 | 110 |
| J. Joint Communique of the Bangkok Ministerial Meeting, 11 February 1964 | 114 |
| K. The Tokyo Summit Communique and Proposed Malaysian Communique | 115 |
| L. Resolution Introduced by Norway and Vote. Security Council 17 September 1964 | 117 |
| M. Withdrawal from UN, Indonesian Statements, as Reported in Antara, The Official News Agency, 5, 6, 11 January 1964 | 118 |
| MAP | |

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MALAYSIA-INDONESIA CONFLICT

The creation of the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963 evoked a violent and increasingly hostile reaction from neighboring Indonesia. Labeled by President Sukarno as the campaign to "crush Malaysia", Indonesia embarked on a series of actions including guerrilla warfare against North Borneo, economic boycotts of Singapore and all of Malaysia, and invasion by armed forces into Malaysia.

In September 1964 Malaysia came before the United Nations Security Council complaining of Indonesian aggression and violation of its sovereignty. The specific case before the Security Council dealt with an Indonesian army parachute air drop onto the Malaya mainland. Western and Asian-African members of the Council stated their conviction that aggression had been committed by Indonesia. However, UN action was blocked by a veto exercised by the USSR.

The lack of a UN resolution did not change the fact that because of military and diplomatic alliances an intensified conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia carried with it the danger of involving as armed participants all of South East Asia.

The conflict also threatened, at its worst, to involve China, and, at least as the major arms supplier, the USSR, on the side of Indonesia, and on Malaysia's side the United Kingdom directly as well as Australia and New Zealand which through the ANZUS treaty conceivably could bring in the United States.

Seeds of an international war were thus apparent in the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict one year after Malaysia's creation. The danger loomed even larger as Indonesia, on the last day of 1964, announced its withdrawal from the United Nations.

The Creation of Malaysia

Malaysia came into being on 16 September 1963 and is composed of the Federation of Malaya, a former British colony independent since 31 August 1957, and the British colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo) which attained independence when Malaysia was created. Under the original proposal for Malaysia, first officially enunciated in 1961, the British Borneo protectorate of Brunei would have been a constituent part of Malaysia but at the final negotiations in 1963, the Sultan of Brunei decided not to join the new State. (See Appendix A, Statement of Government of Malaysia on transition and excerpts from Constitution)

Indonesia and Malaysia View Objectives of Malaysia Differently

The objective of Malaysia, according to its Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, is to "be an example to the rest of the world, in that so many men of so many racial origins can live at peace and in goodwill with one another. And not only that, but we can work together and build a happy and prosperous and peaceful country." (Reference 1)

This view is the opposite of that voiced by Indonesia. Even before Malaysia was created President Sukarno had said "I declare here openly that we Indonesian people not only disagree with Malaysia but we oppose it at all costs." (Reference 2) The stated reason for this opposition is that "Malaysia was created by the British to encircle Indonesia" and is thus "endangering the Indonesian revolution". (Reference 3)

These different views of the objectives of Malaysia dominated the debate in the Security Council in September 1964.

Malaysia Charges Indonesia with "Blatant Aggression" in the Security Council

The issue when brought before the Security Council was based on a request by Malaysia that the Council take action against Indonesia for "blatant and inexcusable aggression" by "dropping a large group of heavily armed paratroopers estimated in the neighborhood of 30" on the night of 2 September 1964 in South Malaya on the mainland in central Johore, some ten miles northeast of Labis and less than 100 miles from Singapore. (Reference 4)

Parachute Landings into Malaysia in Security Council Not Denied

Although Indonesia had flatly denied the fact of parachute landings originally through a Foreign Office spokesman in Djakarta on 4 September (Reference 5), this denial was not maintained at UN.

Sudjarwo Tjondronegro, Deputy Foreign Minister, refused to confirm or deny the action. In his statement to the Council, he said "I did not deny the charges yet because whether I did so or not, it was, in that statement, irrelevant." (Reference 6) This "irrelevance" exists, it was explained by Indonesia, because the question at issue was not landings on Malaya but whether or not Malaysia is an "independent" state. (Reference 7)

Malaysia Strengthens UK's Authority, Says Indonesia

Indonesia maintains that Malaysia is not truly independent but that it is, unlike its predecessor state of Malaya, a creature of the United Kingdom. In his speech to the Security Council, Dr. Sudjarwo said that the Federation of Malaya had agreed to "give up its own sovereignty and independence (so that) Kuala Lumpur would become the capital and leader of the so-called sovereign, independent Malaysia, a greater Federation." (Reference 8) The result, he said, was that today "In Sabah and Sarawak, where new armed clashes broke out between the forces of freedom and neo-colonialism, British colonial domination remained apparent, now even strengthened. And Kuala Lumpur's authority seems to be only minimal, if not nominal." (Reference 9)

Indonesia held that this "minimal control" of Malaysia's territories by Kuala Lumpur means that the constituent territories of Malaysia today, as in the past, "provide a stronghold, and even a springboard for British colonialist designs in South East Asia and against Indonesia." (Reference 8) The Indonesian position is that it has always been the policy of the United Kingdom to subvert its revolution and Indonesia cited the history of its relations with Britain since 1945 as proof of this. The Indonesian story of these relations goes back to 17 August 1945 when, as Indonesian nationalists proclaimed independence, forces under British command, including re-armed Japanese prisoners, fought against the revolutionaries who were trying to found the new Republic of Indonesia. The first meeting of

the UN Security Council in 1946 was on the question of the presence of British and Japanese forces in Indonesia. (Reference 10)

Indonesia Claims Malaya was Base Against It

While Dr. Sudjarwo did not go over the earlier history in detail, he stressed that the British were consistently thereafter behind actions aimed at destroying Indonesian independence. He said that the British had influenced Malaya, even after it gained independence in 1957, to permit its territory to be used as a base by insurgents in the rebellions against the Djakarta central government.

He said that "... in 1958, the secessionist rebellion broke out in Sumatra with the support of British and other colonial interests (and) this secessionist rebellion, seriously threatening Indonesia's freedom, obtained active support from British colonial interests in Singapore, Malaya and other colonial territories in Northern Borneo, and ... our rebels indeed enjoyed some shelter in the so-called independent State of Malaya ..." (Reference 11)

Indonesia Gave Malaya Time to Achieve "Independence"

Indonesia, according to its representative at the Security Council, had earlier welcomed the emergence of an independent Federation of Malaya. "But alas, soon it appeared that the chains of British colonialism in Malaya, supported by the presence of Britain's powerful military bases in Singapore and elsewhere, had not been weakened much, let alone broken." (Reference 12)

Nevertheless, according to Indonesia, and despite the fact that Malaya "provided not only a shelter but an active base for secessionist rebels against the Republic since 1958", Indonesia had "adopted a tolerant attitude towards this hostile attitude from our neighbor. Rather, we sought to discover the British policy behind all this, a policy with which Kuala Lumpur seemed to have difficulties. We wanted to allow the leaders of Kuala Lumpur time to develop their independence, to develop their national freedom and to overcome their difficulties with the remnants of British colonialism and domination in the area." (Reference 13)

In the end, however, as Dr. Sudjarwo reported it, "our tolerance and brotherly consideration did not pay." (Reference 8)

Speaking of the continuing "brutal colonialist activities" and the acquiescence of Malaya in these actions, Indonesia observed that while it knew what to do about the United Kingdom, it did not know what to do about Malaya. Dr. Sudjarwo asked "What should we do with Malaya, which had been granted sovereignty and independence ..., a Malaya which had its own sovereign Government but whose territory was used by British colonialist policy to subvert and confront our country? It was a difficult situation with regard to a brother nation whose independence we wished so well." (Reference 11)

In spite of the doubts about Malaya, Indonesia told the Security Council that there existed "no conflict between our peoples ... before Malaysia was forced into our midst." (Reference 14)

Common Heritage Cited

Both Malaysia and Indonesia -- as well as the Philippines -- have frequently spoken of the common heritage of ethnic origin, culture and religion, as something which should bind them together and help them to avoid conflict. This common heritage was described to the United Nations.

Dr. Dato Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Minister of Home Affairs and Justice, who represented Malaysia before the Security Council, pointed out that "Indonesia, which surrounds us to the west, the south and the east ... is the home of our ethnic, religious and cultural kin. Some of the islands of Indonesia are within ten miles of Malaysia." (Reference 15)

Indonesia had said "our two peoples are so close, racially as well as culturally, and indeed we can be called brothers within the same family, the family of the great Malay race. We speak the same language, possess the same cultural heritage, inhabit the same home in South East Asia." (Reference 16)

The name Malaysia is itself, in part, a return to the past since that name, until the later colonial period, was used to describe Malaya, the Indonesian islands and the Philippines. Before European colonialization and Chinese and Indian immigration, the peninsula, the 3,000 islands

of Indonesia and the 7,000 islands of the Philippines, were populated by people of the same stock and during successive periods came under the same empires.

While the Philippines under Spanish domination became Catholic, in Indonesia and Malaya, the population adopted the same Muslim religion.

Different Paths Toward Independence

Whatever the ethnic, historical and religious similarities which characterize Indonesia and Malaysia, great differences in evolution of attitude and behavior took place as a result of the colonial period, when the British ruled Malaysia and the Dutch held sway over Indonesia. The British impact on the cultural, economic and institutional pattern of the peoples in its colony was radically different from that of the Dutch in its area. This difference found its ultimate expression in the method used in each country to achieve independence.

In Malaysia, independence was achieved from Britain without violence. Such violence as occurred came after independence in a communist uprising which did not have the support of the majority of the Malay population.

In Indonesia independence came through an armed revolt, supported by the communist party. Today Indonesia has a communist party claiming 3 million members. The resulting situation where an avowed revolutionary country, which won its independence through struggle against its colonial master, neighbors another which came into independence in friendly agreement with its ruler, has proved to have more power to divide than have the natural bonds to unite.

Philosophy of Continuing Revolution

The Indonesian Government has repeatedly expressed its philosophy of continuing revolution. It did so during the Security Council. Mr. Sudjarwo said "I represent a Government and a people who are still in the process of revolution", and he pointed to the "foes which it must face. The goals of our revolution can only be achieved the hard way, by a long and difficult struggle." (Reference 17)

Indonesia claims that its revolution is only a part of what is happening throughout the world and Dr. Sudjarwo said "We live in a rapidly changing world, and what is happening in Indonesia, in our region of South East Asia, is perhaps only a small, though pertinent, part of this stirring present day history." (Reference 17)

Sukarno Stresses Universal Confrontation Struggle

President Sukarno, speaking after the Security Council meeting, addressed, on 6 October, leaders of States and Governments assembled for the Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo. He made explicit this theory of the necessity for continuing struggle.

The confrontation between the New Emerging Forces and the Old Order based on domination still continues today. Although I commented at Belgrade (1961) that 'This is an Era of Emerging Nations and the Breaking of Empires.' Those Empires have not yet disappeared. No. It is true that they have been broken in structure, since many countries have achieved independence, but they have not yet been broken in the substance of their domination. Their power is still felt everywhere.

In this more universal setting, he spoke of Malaysia, saying:

Look, I beg you, look at what is happening now to Cyprus, to Cambodia, to Viet-Nam! Look, too, at what is happening in what they call 'Malaysia,' where foreign bases are used against both the freedom fighters of North Kalimantan and against Indonesia. In all these cases, military bases, and sometimes economic institutions too, which were established by the forces trying to maintain the vested interests of the old order of the world, are being used against developing countries.

How can peaceful co-existence be applied in cases such as these? Ah, no! Peaceful co-existence is not a problem between powers of equal strength. Peaceful co-existence is a problem between powers of unequal strength, especially because the imperialist forces are using their strength to dominate the weaker developing countries. (Reference 18)

Different Doctrines in Dispute

The question of the worth of Indonesian-advocated revolution versus Malaysia's concept of sovereign peaceful development was explored by both sides in the 1964 debate before the Security Council.

When first presenting its case at UN, Malaysia cited as a positive achievement of its doctrine and path that Malaysia's per capita income was the highest in Asia except for Japan. Enlarging on this theme, Malaysia asserted that it needed every cent for development "to fill the forms of political independence with economic well-being, as otherwise independence would remain an empty, high sounding word" (Reference 19) Implying that Indonesia had not been able to fulfil its grandiose promises, Malaysia said that "Indonesia naturally felt something more dramatic and damaging had to be done abroad to sustain its revolutionary image in the eyes of its own people." (Reference 20)

Malaysia Says Bloody Revolution Not Only Way to Independence

Dr. Ismail went further into the history of the Malaysian and Indonesian revolutions and told the Council, "let us not be carried away by the argument that independence achieved only through blood and a bloody revolution is the one and only true form of independence. If that were so then many countries present in this United Nations would have no claim to a place within the community of sovereign and independent nations." (Reference 21) "The Malaysian revolution", he said "is not a romantic revolution, it is a very real revolution, a very dynamic revolution which has brought our people the goods of life, which has built new roads and bridges and schools and hospitals ... It is not a revolution of words, it is a revolution of sweat and effort and organization. It is a revolution to meet the rising expectations of our people, not to divert their rising frustrations ... because we choose to act and not coin facile abbreviations or grandiose slogans, let no one misread the tempo and temper of our revolution ..." (Reference 22)

Pointing to Indonesia's economic difficulties and take-overs and the recent return of Indonesia to relations with the Netherlands, Dr. Ismail said:

We have no need to prove our independence by expropriation without compensation and similar acts. We have profited from (our) policies as our buoyant and dynamic economy shows, so that we have not found ourselves in a situation many years after independence of increasing financial debts to foreign nations and of having to turn to the old colonial masters for assistance. (Reference 22)

Malaysia Denies Involvement in Indonesian Insurrection

While Malaysia derided the lack of economic achievement of Indonesia and criticized the revolutionary stance taken by Indonesia, Malaysia denied any involvement in the Indonesian insurrections of the 1950's. The Malaysian representative said "neither before (the creation of Malaysia) nor after has Malaysia or bases in Malaysia been used to subvert the national independence of Indonesia." (Reference 23) Sir Patrick Dean representing the UK, in the same Security Council debate, and accused by Indonesia as the major actor against it, said he was "authorized by my Government categorically to deny the charge that we have attempted to subvert the Indonesian Government." (Reference 24)

Malaysia Says in 1958 It Prevented Use of its Territory by Indonesian Rebels

Malaysia for its part elaborated, maintaining that in the 1958 rebellion the Malayan Government "was most scrupulous in its efforts to be free from any involvement in the internal affairs of Indonesia." (Reference 25)

As examples of this policy he cited an incident in December 1958 when Malaya had agreed to an Indonesian request that no facilities be granted to holders of passports regarded by Indonesia as invalid due to rebellious activities and another incident in January 1960 when Malaya forced 30 Indonesian-rebels who had landed illegally to leave the country. (Reference 26)

Malayan-Indonesian Treaty of Friendship Signed in 1959

The events prior to 1959 could not have been, according to Malaysia, of a nature to poison relations with Indonesia, for the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship during the rebellion, in April 1959. The first article of the Treaty states that the two countries "shall respect the independence and sovereignty of each other and shall strive to maintain the traditional, cultural and historic ties that have bound them together." (See Appendix C, Treaty of Friendship between Malaya and Indonesia, 1959)

The Treaty of Friendship notwithstanding, Malaysia's assurances and explanations that it had never planned or participated in any subversion attempts with or without the UK were not accepted by Indonesia. Dr. Sudjarwo told the Council:

The British military base in Singapore is used as a spring-board for subversive aggression against our country, as was proved during the rebellion in Sumatra and Celebes. The denial made by the United Kingdom representative was not convincing to us. On the contrary, it was in contradiction with the facts of history." (Reference 27)

Malaysia Does Not Accept That Indonesia Does Not Have Territorial Ambitions

If Indonesia refused to accept Malaysia's protestations of non-interference, Malaysia for its part would not accept Indonesia's assertion that, in spite of guerrilla attacks on Borneo and the parachute drop on Malaya, Indonesia did not have territorial ambitions regarding Malaysia.

Dr. Sudjarwo had said "We have no territorial claims outside the boundary of our own country, which comprises the former Netherlands East Indies. Indonesia is vast enough." (Reference 28)

In reply Dr. Ismail asserted that Malaysia was always conscious of "Indonesia's determination to use its military power for political and territorial aggrandizement..." (Reference 29)

Indonesia Has Claimed What Is Now Malaysia

Indonesia has, in the past, stated its conviction that the will of the people in what is now Malaysia is to join an independent Indonesia. This argument was put forward as early as 1945 by the Indonesian independence movement. This movement decided that the Indonesian State included all the former Dutch East Indies (Indonesia as it exists today), British administered Malaya and North Borneo (the Malaysia of today and Brunei), Australian administered Papua and Portuguese administered Timor.

The Indonesian position was expounded at a meeting of the Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesia's Independence, set up by the Japanese occupation toward the end of the war. At this meeting, Mr. Sukarno, in supporting the adoption of such a decision, declared:

I myself am convinced that the people of Malaya feel themselves as Indonesians, belonging to Indonesia and as one of us. Even if we do not take this reason into account, despite the danger of my being accused as an

imperialist, Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands. If only the west coast of the Straits of Malacca, it will mean a threat to our security. (Reference 30)

On 9 December 1964, President Sukarno gave his current views on this subject. These were reported by the Indonesian Mission to the UN: "What we desire", the President said, "is that the Straits of Malacca shall be controlled by Malayan people, Singapore by Singapore people, North Kalimantan (Borneo) by North Kalimantan people and not as they are now by British neo-colonialism, colonialism and imperialism (NECOLIM)." The President further emphasized that the Indonesian people did not in the least oppose the peoples of those territories, but it opposed the neo-colonialist project of "Malaysia" which was designed to encircle Indonesia and to oppress the peoples of these territories. (Reference 30)

The Straits of Malacca divide Indonesia from the peninsula of Malaya.

Indonesia has not maintained this Sukarno doctrine at all times. In November 1961, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, said "We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies ... but -- more than that -- when Malaya told us of her intentions to merge with the three British Crown Colonies of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that we have no objections and that we wish them success with this merger so that everyone may live in peace and freedom ...". (Reference 31)

Philippines Claim Sabah

While Indonesia has fluctuated in the vigor with which it pushed its territorial claims, the Philippines have not. They claim Sabah in North Borneo. The Philippine claim, which was not put forward officially until June 1962 is based on the contention that the Sultan of Sulu had no right to lease or cede Sabah in 1878 since he owed allegiance to the Philippines. The British rejected this claim, pointing out that the Philippine Constitution defines the territorial limits of the State and those limits do not include Sabah.

The Philippines, however, continued to press their claim, holding that the situation is that Sabah, with its title clouded because of its claim, was annexed by Malaya which, in collusion with the UK, did not permit a free expression of the people of Sabah. Also they want the question of the validity of their claim of ownership of Sabah to go before the International Court of Justice, should no other settlement between the parties be achieved. (Reference 32)

The Philippine Government did not relax its claim after the UN made its assessment, which held that the people of Sabah had joined into Malaysia freely and voluntarily.

Philippine agitation was later reported to be occurring in Sabah, a matter which concerned the Legislative Assembly of Sabah. An emergency session of the State Legislative Assembly of Sabah took place on 2 November 1964. The session unanimously passed a motion on the subject of the "Philippines claim to Sabah". The motion read:

- (1) That this Assembly having taken note of exchanges that have been taking place in recent months regarding sovereignty of this State between the Central Government of Malaysia and the Government of Philippines Republic expresses its concern that, notwithstanding the clear voices in which the people of Sabah in whom alone that sovereignty rests, have on more than one occasion in the past spoken directly and through their elected representatives in this Assembly that they have irrevocably taken decisions to join Malaysia as a Constituent State, these exchanges are permitted by the Central Government to take place;
- (2) That this Assembly now once again places on record its unshakeable conviction that the people of Sabah have already chosen to link their destiny with that of Malaysia and that this decision is irrevocable whatever theoretical claims to sovereignty over Sabah is alleged by any other State to exist in itself;
- (3) That this Assembly further requests the Central Government in Kuala Lumpur not to engage in any talks with any State designed directly or indirectly to modify or nullify this irrevocable decision of the people of Sabah who are sovereign in their own State.

The Philippine attitude, however, remains firm. This unchanging insistence on its claim to Sabah makes the dispute over North Borneo truly

three-cornered. Should the Philippine premise ever be upheld and the area thereby annexed to Manila, Indonesia's claim -- not to speak of Malaysia's -- to the same area would not be thereby abated and conflict between the Philippines and Indonesia might then be a possibility. In any case, the end of Malaysia's embroilment in territorial controversy waits on the reaching of a comprehensive settlement which is now nowhere in sight.

Sabah Claim Follows Proposals for Malaysia

While President Macapagal had voiced his ideas that Sabah was Philippine territory in 1950 when he was a congressman, the official Philippine claim to Sabah came after the enunciation of the idea of creating Malaysia. This was the case also with Indonesian charges that Malaysia is a neo-colonialist creation. The first public statement proposing Malaysia was made in Singapore in May 1961.

Rahman's Proposals for Malaysia First Made in Singapore

On 27 May 1961, speaking before the Foreign Correspondents Association of South East Asia, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, said:

Malaya today as a nation realizes that she cannot stand alone and in isolation. Sooner or later she should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. (Reference 33)

Indonesia Charges Singapore Proposals Were British Inspired

In the Security Council, Indonesia charged that these proposals, although advanced in Singapore, had been British inspired and not an original idea of Malaya. Dr. Sudjarwo told the Council:

The idea of establishing the so-called Federation of Malaya arose, I believe, at the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962, under the slogan of further 'decolonization' of British colonies in the area ... The idea originated in London, and was to be implemented with the cooperation of Kuala Lumpur. (Reference 13)

And, Dr. Sudjarwo said, the reason for this "British idea" was that "The British 'confrontation' policy would not let us alone. Indeed, the contrary was true. This is the story -- the political, not the juridical

or constitutional story -- of the idea of 'Malaysia' as it is connected with the aggressive -- not constitutional -- policy of British colonialism and imperialism in South East Asia." (Reference 34)

Malaysia Says Its Creation Was Major Act of Decolonization

The origins, as related by Malaysia, were not in London and they were anything but subversive. Malaysia maintained that the proposals for the creation of Malaysia were in the interests of all the people of its constituent territories and were designed as a major act of decolonization. Dr. Ismail said "... it was understandable that our brothers and sisters in the Borneo States and Singapore, coming out of colonial bonds, felt drawn to us and made no secret of their wanting to come together in closer political association with us. We welcomed them with open arms, because they too are people of our own race with whom we had close religious, economic and social affinities. Furthermore, by accident of history as a result of colonial rule we have a similar system of administration, law and justice." (Reference 35) Dr. Ismail added "The independence of Sabah and Sarawak as component parts of Malaysia marked the ending of Western colonialism in South East Asia except for the Portuguese colony of Timor within the heart of the Indonesian islands." (Reference 36)

Independence Methods for Malaysia Same as for Malaya Earlier

As for the fact that the UK was concerned with the proposals Dr. Ismail said that since Sabah and Sarawak were British colonies Malaya had to negotiate with Britain regarding their independence. (Reference 21) He said "If we are not now regarded as independent because we achieved our independence through negotiations, then why was it not a source of objection when Malaya became independent in 1957? No one has attempted to suggest that there is any difference in the processes and methods involved in the independence of Malaysia and of Malaya." (Reference 36)

Indonesia Said to Have Been Fully Informed of Proposals for Malaysia

Malaysia stated at the same time that it was negotiating with Britain over the federation proposals, Malaya had also been aware of the necessity to keep Indonesia informed of the plans. "... we were not oblivious to the

soundness of the idea that we should keep our neighbors fully informed of our plans. As far as we remember, we kept Indonesia fully in the picture at every stage of the constitutional progress. Their Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur was even invited to attend meetings of the Malaysia Solidarity Committee which was composed of the duly elected representatives of the territories concerned." (Reference 21)

Indonesia Says It Was Prepared to Cooperate on Chinese Problem

The Indonesian representative in the Security Council did not dispute the fact that it had been informed about the Malaysia project as first enunciated by Tunku Rahman in Singapore. He said "... we knew Malaya -- or rather the Government of Tengku Abdurachman in Kuala Lumpur -- among other things wanted to solve, through the projected Federation of Malaysia, a Chinese problem they were faced with. And we, on our side, were certainly prepared to cooperate with them in solving the problem in the interest of the welfare and harmony of the peoples in South East Asia." (Reference 13)

The Chinese problem emphasized by Indonesia was not mentioned at all by Malaysia, in its arguments before the Council. However, Malaysia and Indonesia both have a problem related to Chinese residency.

Chinese and Malaya

The Singapore setting for Prime Minister Rahman's 1961 proposal had significance in terms of this problem, which indeed had been also the case in 1957 when Malaya was created. At that time, Singapore, with its 1,231,000 Chinese, was not invited into the new State of Malaya. However, an isolated left-wing, Chinese-dominated Singapore proved not to be the best answer to the future of the area. The Tunku's 1961 new approach in Singapore recognized that the problems posed by the Singapore Chinese would have a better chance of settlement inside the new Malaysia than in isolation. The composition of Singapore at the end of 1963 was reported to be 1,315,000 Chinese, 253,600 Malay and 148,200 Indians and Pakistanis. (Reference 37)

Inside Singapore, the government in power favored merger but it was itself in danger because of defections from the People's Action Party of Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. In 1961, the Singapore Government

had a majority of only one in the 51 member Parliament, whereas, when the Government came to power in 1959 it had been supported by 43 members. The 17 former Government supporters had formed a left-wing opposition.

On 3 June 1961, a week after Prime Minister Rahman had voiced his proposals, Prime Minister Lee, speaking at Singapore's National Day celebrations, expressed support for the Malaysia concept (Reference 33) and a month later the Prime Ministers of Malaya and Singapore issued a communique expressing agreement in principle for a merger plan which would give Malaysia responsibility for defense, external affairs and security while leaving to Singapore local autonomy for labor and education. (Reference 38)

The Merger Agreement - Parliamentary Make Up

This merger agreement embodied concessions to Singapore's feeling regarding labor policies and the Chinese desire to ensure a traditional education for their children. A counter-concession was made by Singapore which gave up proportional representation in the federal parliament for a fixed number of seats. In the final arrangements for the 159 member federal House of Representatives, Malaya received 104 seats for its population of 7,700,000; Singapore, with a population of 1,800,000 received 15 seats; Sarawak 26 seats for its population of 810,000; and Sabah 14 seats for its population of 500,000. (Reference 38) (See Appendix A, The Constitution of Malaysia)

Malaya Compared to Malaysia

In Malaya, the Malays comprise 50 per cent of the total population. The Chinese account for 37 per cent, and Indians and Pakistanis, 12 per cent. In Malaysia, with a population of about 11 million, about 42 per cent are Chinese, 39 per cent are Malayan, 9 per cent are Indian or Pakistan, and 7 per cent are indigenous Borneo peoples. (Reference 39)

Indonesia's Chinese Problem

The Chinese population is regarded as a problem also in Indonesia. Indonesia has long harbored fears of Chinese domination and of the part which might be played in Indonesia proper by a combination of Peking collaboration with its own Chinese population of middlemen, merchants,

moneylenders, and brokers, which have occupied an important place in the Indonesian economy. These Indonesian fears led in the past to regulations forbidding Chinese middlemen to operate in the interior and to the requirement that in the towns the Chinese prominently display identity cards showing whether they are Indonesian citizens and, if not, whether their allegiance is to Peking or Taipei.

Cognizance of Indonesian behavior toward its Chinese population was taken by the Chinese Nationalist (Formosa) Representative in the Security Council. He said, "It is a matter of record that my predecessor in the United Nations intervened vigorously in the Security Council in support of Indonesian freedom and independence. He did this even when some 2 million Chinese nationals in Indonesia were suffering a great deal at the hands of Indonesian armed bands." (Reference 40)

Indonesia Says Singapore Not Enthusiastic About Malaysia

If Indonesia did not raise objections regarding the Chinese question in Malaysia, it did however suggest in the Council that the people of Singapore had reservations about joining Malaysia. Dr. Sudjarwo said "Singapore's attitude ... from the beginning, was rather specifically not too enthusiastic for some complex reasons and interests. About 85 per cent of Singapore's population is Chinese, and there was a strong socialist movement in Singapore." (Reference 41)

Malaysia Cites Singapore Referendum

In regard to Singapore and its Chinese population, the Malaysians took the position that, far from treating the Chinese as the Indonesians had done, they had abided by the results of a popular decision recorded in a voluntary referendum held on 1 September 1962.

The referendum had asked each Singapore voter to indicate his stand on three alternatives of entering into the merger which had been earlier agreed to in principle in the communique of the Prime Minister of Malaya and Singapore. (Reference 38)

The voting procedure adopted left the opposition parties in the position where, in a referendum that was compulsory, they could show their

opposition to Malaysia, or the terms offered, only by calling on their supporters to cast blank ballots.

The referendum result was 397,000 votes in favor of the merger proposed by the Government and 144,000 blank ballots; roughly 71 per cent in favor and 25 per cent who could be construed as opposed to merger.

Views Assessed in Sabah and Sarawak

At the beginning of September 1962, the referendum in Singapore had been tallied and the Malayan and British Governments also completed what they felt to be a full assessment of the views of the people of Sabah and Sarawak, finding these peoples in favor of participating in the Federation of Malaysia.

An enquiry into the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak, called for by the Anglo-Malaysia agreement, had been made public on 21 June 1962.

The Enquiry Commission was headed by Lord Cobbold and consisted of two more members nominated by the United Kingdom and two nominated by Malaya. Lord Cobbold served with the approval and as the choice of both the sides. The Commission received 2,200 letters and memoranda from people in the two territories; more than 4,000 people appeared before them during their investigation in the Borneo territories. (See Appendix B, The Cobbold Commission)

The Cobbold Commission's report concluded, "as a general approximation not very far wide of the mark", that "about one third of the population in each territory strongly favors early realization of Malaysia without too much concern about terms and conditions. Another third, many of them favorable to the Malaysia project, ask, with varying degrees of emphasis, for conditions and safeguards varying in nature and extent ... The remaining third is divided between those who insist on independence before Malaysia is considered and those who would strongly prefer to see British rule continue for some years to come ... There will remain a hard core, vocal and politically active, which will oppose Malaysia on any terms unless it is preceded by independence and self-government: this hard core might amount to near 20 per cent of the population of Sarawak and somewhat less in North Borneo." (Reference 42)

The Case of Brunei

The remaining British area in North Borneo is Brunei, whose Sultan on 18 July 1962 announced in the Legislative Council that Brunei accepted Malaysia in principle. (Reference 33)

This meeting of the Legislative Council had come about as the result of the implementation of one of the preambles to the Brunei Constitution of 1959, in which the Sultan declared his intention of governing in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the State and, by progressive steps thereafter, of introducing further representative institutions into the Government of the State. In accordance with this declared policy, elections were held in 1962 for the four District Councils and, indirectly, for 16 seats in a Legislative Council of 33. The Legislative Council met only once for formal business before the outbreak of the revolt led by A.M. Azahari, the leader of the party Ra'ayat, which held all the 16 seats for elected representatives. (Reference 43)

The rebellion had considerable significance in the developing dispute between Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur.

Azahari and the Brunei Rebellion

The Brunei Party Ra'ayat founded by A.M. Azahari, was registered in 1956. Azahari had already attended the congress of the Malayan Party Ra'ayat at which he was elected Brunei representative and had contacted most of the left-wing Malay Nationalists. In 1959, he announced his intention to work for the unification of the Borneo territories. In February, 1960, the Party held its first congress at which a resolution was passed advocating federation of the Borneo territories under the Sultan. During 1961 the Party under Mr. Azahari campaigned for elections.

In September, Mr. Azahari visited Singapore and attended the inaugural meeting of the Barisan Socialis. After the meeting a joint statement was issued to the effect that no Borneo territory should join Malaysia until complete independence had been obtained. Early in December, the Party sent a telegram to the Prime Minister strongly opposing the talks with the Malayan Prime Minister about Malaysia.

The Nationality Enactment came into force on 1 January 1962. The Sultan appointed Azahari as an unofficial member of the Legislative Council and Azahari also accepted the vice-chairmanship of the committee to consult public opinion on Malaysia. However, the Party Ra'ayat was active in opposition to Malaysia. Some time later, Mr. Azahari tabled a resolution pressing for independence and reunification of the three Borneo territories before Malaysia, to be debated in the Legislative Council.

The Azahari campaign enlisted the support of other parties in North Borneo and Malaya and, in September 1962, a petition signed by other party leaders, as well as by Azahari, was sent to the UN. The petition protested against the implementation of Malaysia without the exercise of the right of self-determination by the peoples in the territories and urged the union of the three Borneo territories with the Sultan of Brunei as ruler.

The UN Decolonization Committee took no action on the petition.

Late in October or early November, Azahari left for the Philippines, with two other Party officials. There he stated that the Party Ra'ayat favored the Philippine President's recent proposal for a greater confederation of Malaysia to include the Philippines.

A press statement on 27 November announced that the Party Ra'ayat would be introducing a motion in the Brunei Legislative Council calling on the British Government to return North Borneo and Sarawak to the Sultanate of Brunei and to form a federation of the Borneo territories. The Rebellion broke out on 8 December before the motion could be discussed in the Legislative Council.

Azahari Proclaims Himself North Borneo Prime Minister

Mr. Azahari announced on news of the rebellion that he was Prime Minister of a new revolutionary government of Northern Borneo - Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah. (Reference 44) The Brunei insurrection was coordinated with a call for a rising in Sarawak and Sabah, to be led by an underground guerrilla group known as the "North Borneo Army".

The Sultan of Brunei, acting in accord with the protectorate agreements, called in the British who quelled the revolt in Brunei in two weeks.

The British also restored the situation in Sabah and Sarawak, where the revolt received little support except in the areas immediately adjacent to Brunei.

The Azahari rising did not have the support of the organs of authority in North Borneo and Sarawak. On 11 December, the Legislative Council of North Borneo (with a majority of unofficial members) unanimously passed a resolution condemning the action of Azahari and the Party Ra'ayat for the revolt, and denouncing "as barefaced lies statements made by Azahari that he is Prime Minister of Sabah North Borneo and that he has the support of the people of Sabah."

On 12 December, the Council Negri in Sarawak (with a large unofficial elected majority) unanimously passed a resolution unreservedly condemning the armed rebellion in Brunei and the invasion of Sarawak territory, and repudiating "in the strongest terms Azahari's claim to speak for the people of Sarawak." The resolution was supported by members of the Sarawak United Peoples Party, which is the only party in North Borneo or Sarawak opposed to Malaysia, and in addition the chairman of the Party in a broadcast repudiated any connection with the revolt and said that while the party was pledged to seek political changes these must be made by constitutional means.

The revolt had received no support in North Borneo or Sarawak, apart from a handful of Brunei Malays in the areas immediately adjacent to Brunei itself.

Indonesian Attitudes Toward Rebellion

Outside of Borneo, the Philippines gave assurances to the British that although Mr. Azahari was in Manila at the time of the rebellion that country had nothing to do with it. (Reference 45) Indonesia, however, voiced public support for the rebellion, President Sukarno stating on 10 December that the insurrection was a manifestation of the emerging forces which Indonesia supported. (Reference 46) On 15 December, the Indonesian Parliament followed President Sukarno's statement by unanimously declaring full support for the rebels (Reference 47) while, in Malaya, on 11 December Prime Minister Rahman told his Parliament that the Brunei rebels had been provided with money, arms and weapons in the Indonesian part of Borneo. (Reference 46)

The Indonesian Government officially denied it had anything to do with the actual planning of the Brunei rebellion; however, it has honored Mr. Azahari, regarding the rebellion which he led as of the greatest importance.

Dr. Sudjarwo told the Security Council in 1964 that the revolt in Brunei had been the turning point in Indonesia's attitude toward Malaysia.

He said, "On 8 December 1962 -- months before the projected 'Federation of Malaysia' came into being -- a revolt led from Brunei broke out in Northern Borneo against British colonial rule and against the projected British 'Malaysia'. The freedom and independence of the State of Northern Borneo, comprising all three British colonial territories, was proclaimed and a government in exile was established." (Reference 48)

Brunei Revolt Supported by Indonesia

Of this revolt, Dr. Sudjarwo said, "My people and my Government could not but support this anti-colonial freedom struggle, since we have always supported as strongly as possible the struggle against colonialism all over the world, particularly in Asia and Africa. The revolutionary youth of my country began to prepare -- voluntarily -- to join their brothers as guerrilla fighters in North Borneo itself. It was then before the Malaysian Government was formed. The Indonesian Government, however, was quite cautious in this regard. It did not recognize the proclaimed independent State of Northern Borneo (Kalimantan), despite strong pressures from some quarters of our population. But obviously it could not refrain from lending support, moral or otherwise, to the independence movement in those colonial territories." (Reference 48)

The Indonesian representative characterized Mr. Azahari as "the leader of the exiled government of the proclaimed state of North Kalimantan" (Reference 49) and submitted that "it would only be fair and just if the leaders of this rebel government-in-exile could address the Council." (Reference 48)

Antara, on 14 December 1964, reported from Djakarta that on 11 December 1964, "the organization of Indonesian 1945 Revolutionaries in Djakarta has urged the Indonesian Government to speed recognition of the North Kalimantan Revolutionary Government of Prime Minister Azahari. The group

said this would fulfill the promise made by President Sukarno some time ago that Indonesia's recognition of the North Kalimantan state was only a matter of time." The Djakarta appeal was issued "on the occasion of the second anniversary of the proclamation of the Unitary State of North Kalimantan on 19 December 1962." (Reference 50)

Brunei Does Not Join Malaysia

While the Brunei rebellion did not result in changing of the Sultan's decision to become part of Malaysia, a desire he reaffirmed on 7 February 1962, ultimately he decided not to join. The Sultan of Brunei thus continued his relations with Britain which are based on the Treaty of 1959. The Treaty gives control of the internal affairs of the State to Brunei; external affairs, defense against external aggression, and internal security being the responsibility of Britain.

Brunei Opposed to Indonesia

Brunei however maintains close relations with Malaysia, a matter which was emphasized in a 1964 interchange with Indonesia. This letter, sent on 9 October, was in reply to a "personal representative of the President of the Indonesian Republic", General Djatikusumo. The General had proposed a Sukarno idea for a big Malay confederation which would not include Malaysia as an entity but would separately involve each unit comprising it, plus all other Malay-speaking territories. Toward this end, the General suggested that the time was appropriate for Brunei and Indonesia to recognize each other's sovereignty and "together to enter Maphilindo". The Brunei letter contained a rebuff to Indonesian overtures and asserted that:

The state of Brunei maintains the most cordial relations with those of its neighbors who now form part of Malaysia. His Highness and the Government of Brunei have from its very inception recognized the formation of the Federation of Malaysia and would wish to strengthen these cordial relations even more." (Reference 51)

Brunei, in fact, lives in a state of emergency. A proclamation dated 12 December 1964 declared the existence of a public danger threatening the security and economic life of the state. A Brunei Government spokesman said that "The new proclamation is in keeping with the security situation in the neighboring states of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak in view of Indonesian aggression." (Reference 52)

Brunei Cited as Proof of Free Choice

The fact that Brunei did not join Malaysia was cited by Dr. Ismail in the Security Council as proof that the North Borneo people and territories were not forced to join Malaysia. He said, "Whatever might have been the similarities and close affinities between the peoples of Malaya and those of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, there would have been no Malaysia if the people themselves had not willed it on the basis of true expression. Where the people did not wish to there was no compulsion, as in the case of Brunei." (Reference 35)

The agreement of the people of Sabah and Sarawak, as noted in the Cobbold Report, had been accepted by both countries as final proof of support for Malaysia (Reference 33)

Indonesia Predicts Conflict

Indonesia's opposition to the creation of Malaysia took a more belligerent form when on 11 February 1963 Dr. Subandrio, the Foreign Minister, called a press conference for foreign newsmen in Djakarta to announce that Indonesia was opposed to the creation of Malaysia, which he said could lead to armed conflict, "I do not mean war but incidents -- incidents of physical conflict." (Reference 53)

Malaya reacted two days later by announcing that it would immediately strengthen all its armed services because of the "threat to security" caused by Indonesia's new policy. (Reference 54) Indonesia's new policy was conveyed officially to the British Ambassador by Dr. Subandrio on 14 February. (Reference 55)

The Moves to the Summit

The Indonesian declared policy of opposition did not stop efforts to arrive at settlements less likely to cause the "incidents" of which Dr. Subandrio spoke. Meeting in May 1963 in Tokyo, President Sukarno and Prime Minister Rahman both reaffirmed their faith in the 1959 Treaty of Friendship between their two countries, and stated that their Governments

"would take every possible measure to refrain from making acrimonious attacks on and disparaging references to each other."

The joint communique of the two leaders stated they had "cleared the way for a meeting of Ministers to be held on 7 June in Manila amongst Indonesia, Philippines and Malaya which they hoped would lead to a meeting of Heads of Government of the three countries." (See Appendix D, Joint Statement of Indonesia and Malaya, 1 June 1963)

June Foreign Ministers Meeting Proposes UN Assessment in Borneo Territories

The meeting of Foreign Ministers raised the question of an invitation to the United Nations to be issued subsequently by the summit participants. They said that, "Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo Territories is ascertained by an Independent and Impartial Authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative" while Malaya "undertook to consult the British Government and the Governments of the Borneo Territories with a view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative to take the necessary steps in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of those Territories." (See Appendix E, Report of the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines) This proposal seemed to have in it the ultimate answer sought by all the parties.

Foreign Ministers Also Consider Confederation Proposals

The three Foreign Ministers also took up the Philippine proposal for an association of the three countries in a loose confederation (later to become known as Maphilindo -- a name derived from the first syllables of each of the three countries). The Maphilindo conception was, from the start, favored by the United States, since it gives its ally, the Philippines, a greater voice in South East Asia. The UK has not been an enthusiastic supporter of the concept.

On the Maphilindo proposal, the Foreign Ministers "supported President Macapagal's Plan envisaging the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working in the closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty." (See Appendix E)

Malaysia Takes Form

The new harmonious atmosphere which became apparent at the June Manila meetings coincided with completion of arrangements among the constituent territories of the Malaysia plan. June talks in London resulted in an agreement on the final details of Malaysia and settled questions such as the amount of Britain's contributions to the Malaysian defense budget, the portion of Singapore's tax revenue going to the Federation, and the provisions of development funds for North Borneo and Sarawak. These problems were finally resolved on 9 July in London when the Malaysia agreement was signed providing for its creation on 31 August.

Indonesia Proclaims "Crush Malaysia" Before Summit

The signing of this agreement in London shattered the harmony, although on the day following the signing of the London agreement, the Philippines announced that at the end of July, the three power Heads of Government meeting would begin. (Reference 56)

The following day, on 11 July, President Sukarno accused Prime Minister Rahman of a breach of faith in signing the Malaysia agreement in London before there had been a UN plebiscite on the wishes of the Borneo people, and he stated, "Now I have my doubts about the coming Maphilindo summit conference". (Reference 57) Prime Minister Rahman stated on 23 July that he did not understand these new Indonesian objections to Malaysia and that he would meet President Sukarno at any time or place to discuss them, but this did not satisfy the Indonesian President. (Reference 58) Three days before the summit conference opened, he enumerated his "Crush Malaysia" policy stating, "To crush Malaysia we must launch a confrontation in all fields. We cannot talk sweetly to the imperialists." (Reference 59)

July Summit Conference Apparently Brings Changed Attitudes

However hostile the atmosphere, the tripartite summit conference opened in Manila on 30 July 1963. Unexpectedly, the atmosphere once again warmed and when the Conference ended on 5 August harmony seemed once more to prevail.

In a declaration signed on 5 August the three Heads of Government stated that "they are determined, in the common interest of their countries, to maintain fraternal relations, to strengthen cooperation among their peoples in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote economic progress and social well-being in the region, and to put an end to the exploitation of man by man and of one nation by another" (See Appendix F, Manila Summit Statement and Declaration, 1963)

UN Assessment in Borneo is Asked by Summit

Significantly the three leaders followed the June initiative, inviting the United Nations Secretary-General to "ascertain prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak... by a fresh approach, which in the opinion of the Secretary-General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-determination ..." (See Appendix F, Manila Summit Statement and Declaration, 1963)

In taking this "fresh approach" the Secretary-General was asked to bear in mind the recent elections in Sabah and Sarawak and verify that Malaysia was a major issue, if not the main issue of the elections, that electoral registers were properly compiled, that the elections were free and that votes were properly polled and counted. He was also asked to verify the wishes of those who had not voted because they were imprisoned for political offenses or absent from Sabah and Sarawak. (See Appendix F)

UN Experience in Area

Other questions having been seemingly disposed of, the only outstanding item after the Tokyo Conference was apparently the UN assessment. The UN had previous experience in this subject and in this area.

U Thant's Chef de Cabinet, C.V. Narasimhan, had visited the area in February and April of 1963. Following these visits it had become clear that the UN Secretariat was satisfied, on the basis of Mr. Narasimhan's on-the-spot meetings and interviews, that the concept of Malaysia had the support of the people affected. Mr. Narasimhan's findings were not officially published but became well known.

The request of July of the three leaders for the assessment led the Secretary-General to appoint a nine-member Secretariat mission to the two territories. They visited the area between 16 August and 5 September. Meanwhile the creation of Malaysia was postponed from 31 August to 16 September.

The UN findings said that the majority of the people in Borneo wished to join Malaysia and U Thant reported on 13 September 1963 that:

... it is my conclusion that the majority of the peoples of the two territories, having taken them into account, wish to engage, with the people of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged Federation of Malaysia through which they can strive together to realize the fulfilment of their destiny.

With regard to the more specific questions referred to me, my conclusions concerning the recent elections in Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo), and after the examination and verification reported by the Mission, are:

- (a) Malaysia has been the subject of widespread and intensive public debate, and was a major issue in the recent elections in the two territories;
- (b) Electoral registers were properly compiled;
- (c) The elections took place in an atmosphere free enough to enable the candidates and political parties to put their case before the electorate, and the people were able to express themselves freely by casting their votes in a polling system which provided the basic safeguards for secret balloting, and measures for the prevention and correction of abuses;
- (d) The votes were properly polled and counted;
- (e) Persons otherwise eligible to vote but who were unable to do so because of detention for political activities, or imprisonment for political offenses, numbered somewhat less than 100 in Sarawak, and even less in Sabah (North Borneo) at the time of the elections. Testimony given by this group, especially in Sarawak, indicated that they would have opposed the Federation of Malaysia if they had participated in the election. The actual votes of this group would not have been sufficient to have had a material effect on the result. The Mission has given much attention to the possible effect which the absence of these persons, some of whom were officials of the anti-Malaysia party, might have had on the campaign. The Mission considered the similar question concerning some 164 persons whose activity was restricted to some extent, but who retained the right to vote. Noting that the anti-Malaysia party scored convincing electoral victories in many of the areas to which these persons belonged, I accept the Mission's conclusion that a substantial limitation of the campaigning potential of the group opposed to the Federation of Malaysia has not occurred, so as seriously and significantly to have affected the result of the election.

- (f) The Mission made special efforts to obtain reliable information regarding persons who were absent from the territories at the time of the election, particularly as a result of possible political or other intimidation. The evidence available indicated that the number of such persons, otherwise qualified to vote, did not exceed a few hundred, and that their number could not have affected the results of the election. I note that the principal officials of the party in Sarawak opposed to the Federation of Malaysia, agree with this assessment, and I accept it.

Bearing in mind the fundamental agreement of the three participating Governments in the Manila Meetings, and the statement of the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided that the support of the people of the territories was ascertained by me, and that in my opinion, complete compliance with the principle of self-determination ... was ensured, my conclusions, based on the findings of the Mission, are that on both these counts there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizable majority of the peoples of these territories to join in the Federation of Malaysia. (See Appendix G for full text, Final Conclusions of the Secretary-General Regarding Malaysia)

Philippines and Indonesia Take Issue with UN Findings

It had seemed that the views of the Secretary-General in favoring the creation of Malaysia would, in view of the early statements of the summit conference, and of the preparatory conferences, indicating that the Philippines and Indonesia would welcome Malaysia if the people wanted to join it, be sufficient to end all opposition.

This was not the case. Both Indonesia and the Philippines disputed the findings of the UN assessment. This dispute occurred despite the fact that before agreeing to make the assessment U Thant had stated "It is my understanding that neither the report of my Representative nor my conclusions would be subject in any way to ratification or confirmation by any of the Government's concerned." (Reference 60)

The Dispute on the UN Findings

The specific dispute on the UN findings centered on whether the assessment had been detailed enough, of sufficient duration, and free from pressure by the United Kingdom. The Indonesian objections to the UN survey based on these aspects were enumerated at the Security Council. Mr. Sudjarwo, referring also to the Philippine request for the assessment, said:

The assessment we jointly requested the Secretary-General to undertake had the agreed and clear purpose to assess the genuine political wishes of the people, including the many who were detained by British colonial authorities in Sabah and Sarawak because of their anti-Malaysian sentiments. But what happened actually made a mockery of the whole intent of our common, joint request. It was the British colonial authorities who arranged the meetings for the hearings by the United Nations team in Sabah and Sarawak; who arranged the schedule, the time, the place; who provided officials as the interpreters and who provided the guards at the meetings -- colonial soldiers with bayonets fixed.

The hearings were conducted publicly, in the open, at gatherings convened by the colonial authorities, guarded by colonial soldiers. With regard to the political detainees, no adequate opportunity was provided to the United Nations team to hear from them all. I believe that only about 4 per cent of the total number of detainees were heard by the team. One need not himself have had any experience with colonial systems to surmise that the use of such methods, under such circumstances, to ascertain the wishes of the people could not possibly constitute their ascertainment in the free and democratic manner requested by the Manila Agreement. Indonesia and the Philippines had observers present during the assessment, though their attendance at the hearings was only made possible during the last few days. The Philippine observers, as stated in their report, could not but call the whole affair "a guided tour", organized by British colonial authorities in Sabah and Sarawak. The cooperation of Britain, of the colonial authorities in Sabah and Sarawak, was required and requested, and this was the way the cooperation was rendered. Formally speaking, the United Nations team obtained the cooperation requested; it had to express its appreciation for the "cooperation;" and it produced its report. The Secretary-General could not disavow but had to sanction the final findings of the United Nations team he had set up, though he did so with some remarks with a view to reducing the shortcomings and weaknesses of the assessment. (Reference 61)

Observer Issue Arises

Another aspect of the dispute had concerned observers with the UN assessment mission. It had been agreed that all the interested parties, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines and the United Kingdom, would send observers to accompany the UN assessment, although the context was U Thant's statement "I wish to make it clear that the working teams working under the supervision of my Representative will be responsible directly and exclusively to me". (Reference 60)

The dispute centered on the number of observers and their status. The British agreed only to four observers from each country, accompanied

by clerical assistants, and charged that Indonesia wanted to delay the creation of Malaysia by insisting on more observers. (Reference 62)

In the end the UN assessment team began its work a week before the observers arrived and both Indonesia and the Philippines claimed that this hampered their observation and that they could not vouch for the part of the assessment that they had not watched.

U Thant's Views of the Observer Dispute

In his final conclusions on the assessment U Thant rejected assertions that the observer dispute had in any way impaired the assessment. He said "...I am pleased that an understanding was finally arrived at so that observers of all the Governments concerned could be present during at least part of the enquiry. It is a matter for regret that this understanding could not have been reached earlier, so that all observers could have been present in the territories for the entire period of the enquiry and that questions of detail pertaining to the status of the observers unnecessarily delayed even further their arrival. A more congenial atmosphere would have been achieved if the necessary facilities had been granted more promptly by the Administering Authority (British). The Mission, however, made records, including tape recordings of all its hearings, available for the use of the observer teams to enable them to inform themselves as fully as possible of what had occurred before their arrival..." (See Appendix G, Final Conclusions of the Secretary-General Regarding Malaysia)

Indonesia and Philippines Over-all Objections to UN Handling

Indonesia and the Philippines nevertheless put forward over-all objections to the assessment. Indonesia said that "the hearings merely took the form of samplings, not even on the level of a Gallup poll" and a Philippine memorandum said there was indication that "the colonial machinery of the United Kingdom Government in North Borneo and the very young politically naive native leadership of the country connived to mentally and emotionally condition the minds of the mass of the illiterate, politically naive electorate to acquiesce in the stand of the British toward Malaysia". (Reference 63)

Outside the UN, Indonesia had gone much further in its condemnation of the findings. The official Indonesian News Agency Antara reported that President Sukarno on 26 August had said that the UN Commission "had committed clear forgery". (Reference 64)

U Thant Validates Malaysia as "Self-Government" Process

U Thant's final conclusions validated the processes used, thus not subscribing to the views of the Philippines and Indonesia. Specifically the Secretary-General stated that "The emergence of dependent territories by a process of self-determination to the status of self-government, either as independent sovereign States or as autonomous components of larger units, has always been one of the purposes of the Charter and objectives of the United Nations."

Whatever the origins of the proposal of Malaysia may have been, it seems to me in the light of actual events, including the present exercise (the UN assessment), that we have witnessed in Sarawak and North Borneo the same process leading to self-government. I fervently hope that the people of these territories will achieve progress and prosperity, and find their fulfilment as component States of Malaysia. (See Appendix G)

Renewed Philippine Claim on Sabah

The UN assessment had ended in a dispute which brought into focus and revived other points, procedures for the settlement of which seemed to have been arrived at in the Manila accords. One of these touched on the claim of the Philippines to Sabah. The Manila declaration had stated:

...the three Heads of Government decided to request the British Government to agree to seek a just and expeditious solution to the dispute between the British Government and the Philippine Government concerning Sabah (North Borneo) by means of negotiation, conciliation and arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of the parties own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. The three Heads of Government take cognizance ... that the inclusion of Sabah (North Borneo) in the Federation of Malaysia does not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder. (See Appendix F, Manila Summit Statement and Declaration)

The Philippines, acting on the premise that the UN findings were not accurate or even the original work of the UN, being in certain cases copied word-for-word from British documents, maintained that it cannot be

said that the UN found that the people of Sabah voluntarily expressed a desire to join in Malaysia and that, consequently, their claim to Sabah was therefore not changed one way or the other by the United Nations conclusions.

The Base Question Revived

Aroused also by the dispute over the UN assessment was the question of the bases, dealt with in the Manila Accords. These had said:

...foreign bases - temporary in nature - should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers." (See Appendix F)

While this appellation of "temporary" in reference to the bases appeared to be a victory for President Sukarno, the Malaysian attitude is that with the defense agreements being subject to cancellation by either party, the bases remain only as long as Malaysia wants them.

On 4 November 1964, Dr. Ismail, speaking in Kuala Lumpur, said:

...Malaysia regarded the foreign bases within its territory as "a defensive measure necessary only on a temporary basis, to be terminated as soon as the country is able to maintain its own defense" (Reference 65)

Indonesia, in presenting its case to the Security Council, reopened the question of the military aspects of Singapore in relation to itself.

Dr. Sudjarwo pointed out:

Singapore, geographically and strategically, is like the point of a dagger deep in the side of Indonesia. (Reference 11)

He added that:

...the British military base in Singapore -- in independent and sovereign "Malaysia" -- is but the very center and stronghold of this "gunboat", this big, "gunboat", diplomacy in South East Asia, against the search for freedom in South East Asia. (Reference 66)

Singapore Base and Malaysia

The retention of the British military base at Singapore had been envisaged from the beginning of the Malaysia proposals. On 23 November 1961, when Kuala Lumpur and London jointly announced that Malaysia was a "desirable aim" and that a Commission of Enquiry (the Cobbold Commission) would ascertain the views of the people of Sarawak and Sabah, the two parties also stated that if Malaysia was formed "the existing Defense Agreement between Britain and Malaya should be extended to embrace the other territories concerned. It was, however, agreed that the Government of the Federation of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain bases at Singapore for the purpose of assisting in the defense of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defense and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia" (Reference 67) (See Appendix H, Defense Agreements Affecting Malaysia)

This language was sharply challenged at the Security Council by Indonesia, as furthering the perpetuation of British power over South East Asia. Indonesia said:

If we examine the defense arrangements for this British "Malaysia", drafted long before the Maphilindo agreement, we find that the British intended not only allegedly to assist in the defense of "Malaysia" but even more "to preserve peace in South East Asia". I repeat, in South East Asia, the very region in which Indonesia lives, and wants to live in freedom, genuinely independent from colonialism and imperialism. It was clear that this colonial policy was a flagrant challenge to the principle and spirit of the Maphilindo concept which provided that the three independent countries of South East Asia should jointly have "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area". The existing British concept constituted a direct challenge to the Maphilindo concept. We took up this challenge, despite the burdens it would entail. My Government and people decided to launch a policy of what we call "confrontation" in order to defend the concept of Maphilindo, our national independence, and our people's Revolution for a better life of freedom and justice. (Reference 68)

Malaysia Says Singapore is Part of its Defense

The British bases in Malaysia are seen as quite a different matter by Malaysia, which said:

Malaysia's defense agreement with the United Kingdom and the presence of military bases in Malaysia have been cited as a manifestation of neo-colonialism. But any nation enjoys the sovereign right to enter into military alliance with another nation or nations for defense purposes. And the Malaysian-United Kingdom defense agreement is for defense purposes only. (Reference 69)

Malaysia Cites Other Bases

Dr. Ismail said such a defense agreement was not contrary to the United Nations Charter or the Bandung Declaration and said:

If the defense arrangement, such as we have with the United Kingdom, and the existence of military bases in Malaysia are a manifestation of neo-colonialism, then I submit that there are many, many countries in the world today, in both the Western and Eastern world, who are by definition victims of neo-colonialism of one form or another. (Reference 69)

The basic reasons for the breakdown in the Summit Agreements evidenced in all these ways involved not only the UN assessment but the way by which Malaysia had been created, and this was a source of controversy even before the Summit Conference began.

Indonesia Says Rahman Breaks Agreements

On 10 July, the day the Philippines announced that the summit would take place, President Sukarno declared that Prime Minister Rahman had broken the agreements reached between the two of them in Tokyo. He cited the signing of the London agreement of 9 July for the creation of Malaysia before holding a referendum on the wishes of the Borneo peoples.

President Sukarno said "...I declare to the world that Tunku Abdul Rahman is a man who does not keep his word ... I declare here openly that we Indonesian people not only disagree with Malaysia but we oppose it at all costs..." (Reference 70)

Malaya Refutes Indonesian Charges

To this charge Malaya replied that it "flatly denied" Indonesian assertions that there was any agreement at Tokyo to defer a decision on the creation of Malaysia until after the summit conference and "the Indonesian Government could not plead ignorance of the Federation Government's

intention to finalize the London Agreement since the Tripartite Foreign Ministers themselves had to adjust the dates for the meeting at Summit level taking into account the dates of the London meeting. At neither the Sub-Ministerial nor the Ministerial Talks had the Indonesian representatives voiced any objections to, or doubts about, the Federation Government's intention to proceed with Malaysia." (Reference 71)

Date an Element of "Misunderstanding"

However there could be no doubt but that difficulties had arisen concerning the choice of a date. The Anglo-Malayan position was that an announcement of the date for the formation of Malaysia on 16 September had to be made on 29 August because section II of the Malaysia Act "makes it a statutory requirement to proclaim before 31 August the date for the establishment of Malaysia". (Reference 72)

U Thant, while affirming that the people of North Borneo wanted to join Malaysia, observed in his final conclusions:

During the course of the inquiry, the date of 16 September 1963 was announced by the Government of the Federation of Malaya with the concurrence of the British Government, the Singapore Government and the Governments of Sabah and Sarawak, for the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. This has led to misunderstanding and confusion and even resentment among other parties to the Manila agreement, which could have been avoided if the date could have been fixed after my conclusions had been reached and made known. (See Appendix G, Final Conclusions of the Secretary-General Regarding Malaysia)

The Philippines and Indonesia have maintained that the publication of the Secretary-General's findings were a pre-condition to the fixing of a date for the founding of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur has that the completion of the assessment was not an element one way or the other.

Malaysia Comes into Being: Indonesia and the Philippines Refuse Recognition

On 15 September 1963, the day before Malaysia came into being, both Indonesia and the Philippines announced that they would defer recognition of Malaysia. (Reference 73) On 16 September, when Malaysia came into being, Indonesia broke off diplomatic relations with Malaya. (Reference 74)

Malaysia Breaks Diplomatic Relations with Indonesia and the Philippines

Malaysia responded to the actions of Indonesia and the Philippines the following day, 17 September, by breaking diplomatic relations with the two countries. In the one case it said the Kuala Lumpur Government said it had no choice since Indonesia had already broken off relations. In the other it said Malaysia was but an enlarged form of Malaya and if the Philippines did not recognize Malaysia it could logically have no diplomatic representation in Kuala Lumpur. (Reference 72)

The disruption of diplomatic relations was also marked by acts of violence in the capitals of Malaysia and Indonesia.

British Embassy Burned and British Assets Seized in Indonesia

The Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was attacked and in Djakarta the British Embassy was burned to the ground. Indonesian trade unions took over British concerns throughout the country. On 20 September the Indonesian Government itself took over British concerns, including the Shell Oil Company, Dunlop Rubber estates and banks. (Reference 75)

Economic "Confrontation" Begins

On 21 September Indonesia broke off economic relations with Malaysia. Before this, Indonesian exports to Malaysia were running at about \$198 million a year while imports from Malaysia ran at only about \$9 million. However, these figures did not include the Singapore reshipment of rubber and oil. (Reference 76) It was at this Singapore entrepot trade that Indonesia's economic "confrontation" was aimed, and the policy had its effect. By 25 October Prime Minister Lee of Singapore acknowledged that about 2,000 people were unemployed or underemployed because of severance of the entrepot trade with Indonesia and stated that if Indonesia's policy continued between 10,000 and 15,000 people might be affected. (Reference 77)

By the end of 1963 Singapore estimated that it had lost about \$100 million because of Indonesian restrictions and total Malaysian international trade was off 3 per cent. (Reference 78)

Yet if Malaysia suffered from economic "confrontation", Indonesia also felt adverse effects since nearly half of its exports were deprived of traditional outlets and at least a quarter of its imports, normally passing through Singapore, were diverted and disrupted. (Reference 79)

US Aid to Indonesia Imperilled

As the economic confrontation program gathered momentum, Indonesia felt a new impact. Most economic aid from the United States was diminished in what was stated to be a direct consequence of Indonesia's severance of economic ties with Malaysia. On 24 September the United States Government announced that the Indonesian "confrontation" policy would damage the Indonesian economy so much that a proposed economic stabilization program could not succeed. The United States announced, therefore, that nothing would be gained by convening a special meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at which it had been expected that the United States and its allies would pledge about \$450 million in credits to cover Indonesia's balance of payments deficit. In addition, standby credits of the International Monetary Fund of \$50 million were withdrawn. (Reference 80)

United States and Britain Cut Off Military Aid to Indonesia

The United States and the United Kingdom also cut off military assistance to Indonesia after President Sukarno said on 25 September that his country would "fight and destroy" Malaysia. (Reference 81) However, this form of aid amounted to only \$15 million annually. However, the US did not cut aid, largely food, already committed.

United States aid to Indonesia in these fields still continued at a rate of about \$80 million a year. Malaysia expressed disappointment about what was thought to be less than a firm stand by the United States. On 17 November, Prime Minister Rahman said that this United States aid was "helping the enemy of Malaysia". (Reference 82) However, Foreign Minister Dr. Subrandio was reported by the official Indonesian news agency on 15 December 1964 to have said, "Indonesia does not get a farthing from the US of A." (Reference 83)

Sukarno Tells US "To Hell With Aid"

The cut-off of projected US aid was publicly not only accepted by President Sukarno but he greeted it with "Go to hell with your aid". President Sukarno repeated this assertion on 3 May 1964. (Reference 84)

At the same time President Sukarno was evidencing other signs of antagonism toward the United States, resulting from maneuvers of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean, redesignated "the Indonesian Ocean" by Djakarta.

On 19 December President Sukarno referred to press reports that these maneuvers were intended as a deterrent to his confrontation policy and asserted "We will never be afraid...We will never be afraid of the fleet. Let there be two or three such fleets. We will continue to crush Malaysia." (Reference 85)

Meanwhile, Indonesian increased its guerrilla activities in North Borneo, prepared for armed force landings on the Malaya peninsula and backed infiltration designed to create disorder in Singapore and other areas where Chinese and others in the disparate population make-up can be aroused to anti-Malaysian feelings.

Guerrilla Activities in North Borneo

Indonesia publicly acknowledged its part in training these guerrillas. The first official support for the Brunei rebellion was given in a broadcast by Radio Djakarta on 19 December 1962 using a statement by President Sukarno that "we have given our sympathies to the people of North Kalimantan (North Borneo) struggling for their freedom." Later, in February 1963, Antara, the official Indonesian news agency, quoted the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff, Major General Achmad Jani, as saying that the Army was awaiting the order to move in support of the people of North Borneo and that he had two divisions of volunteers waiting to enter that territory. In September 1963, the Indonesian Defense Minister, General Nasution, stated that his country had helped train "more than 6,000 anti-British, anti-Malaysian rebels in the North Borneo territories." (Reference 86)

While guerrillas had been operating in the Borneo territories since the Brunei rebellion in 1962, activities stepped up after the formation of Malaysia. On 17 November, the Minister of Internal Security in Malaysia said that several Indonesians had also entered Malaya and Singapore to direct subversive activities. Serious riots in Singapore in September 1964 were attributed to these efforts. (Reference 87)

Britain Gives Warnings to Indonesia

The stepping up of guerrilla activities led Britain to issue a warning to Indonesia on 26 November 1963 when the Foreign Minister, R.A. Butler, speaking before the Foreign Press Association in London said "We hope that Indonesia will realize our sense of purpose...come what may, we intend to support Malaysia in her struggle for independence and success. I hope this will not mean any confrontation with Indonesia...But nothing will prevent us from backing the growth and independence of Malaysia". (Reference 88)

Support from Commonwealth

Malaysia received support, more political than economic or military, from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in July 1964.

The Commonwealth final communique issued on 15 July, and ascribed to by the Governments of Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and the United Kingdom, read:

They will maintain their efforts to reduce the areas of international disagreement by all means in their power, while maintaining both the strength and resolution to resist aggression from without and subversion from within. In this connection they assured the Prime Minister of Malaysia of their sympathy and support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence and integrity of his country and to promote a peaceful and honourable settlement of current differences between Malaysia and neighbouring countries. (Reference 89)

This passage followed an earlier assertion in the communique of satisfaction over the creation of Malaysia in the following terms:

They expressed their satisfaction at the establishment of Malaysia which they had welcomed at their last meeting in 1962 and they greeted Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister of Malaysia. (Reference 89)

Among the Commonwealth members, British support for Malaysia was never in doubt. This constant support was also true in the case of Australia and New Zealand which at the meeting of the ANZUS treaty organization in Washington on 17, 18 July 1964 reaffirmed its continuing support for Malaysia asserting that "force must not be employed in violation of the territorial integrity of other nations". What seemed notable was the support given by the Afro-Asian members. Ghana later, however, appeared to support Indonesia, and Ceylon in August 1964 announced that British and US ships and planes carrying military supplies to Malaysia could not use Ceylonese ports and airfields.

New Zealand and Australia Increase Aid

Increased aid for Malaysia from Australia and New Zealand came almost as an inevitability since these two countries had repeatedly been singled out by President Sukarno as part of the "encirclement of Indonesia" which he is fighting. Australia and New Zealand now provide some armed forces for use in Malaysia, and in late November 1964, Australia took steps to strengthen its defenses on its common border with Indonesia in New Guinea and in Papua. Speaking in Canberra on 19 November, Premier Sir Robert Menzies said that a new augmented defense program is "completely necessary in face of the deteriorating position that we see overseas, the threats which exist in our neighborhood, and the basic fact that the security of Australia depends very, very largely upon how far we can have defense in depth and how far we can have the south-east Asian countries kept out of the hands of communists." (Reference 90)

He also said of Indonesia's attacks on Malaysia, "Do not forget that a nation which will not hesitate, in breach of all the rules of international conduct, to invade even in a small way a peaceful neighbor, will not have too many doubts about making some infiltration into our side of New Guinea, if they think this profitable." (Reference 90)

Labour Party Reaffirms Support

Britain's promises of strong and continuing support for Malaysia were reaffirmed by the Labour Government when it took power in October. Later,

on 14 December 1964, George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, told the House of Commons:

The Indonesian Government have stepped up their attacks on eastern Malaysia and have sent forces to make landings on the Malaysian mainland. Her Majesty's government deplore the situation created by these attacks on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a member of the Commonwealth, a member to whom this country has specific defense obligations. We shall continue to honor these obligations to the full.
(Reference 91)

US Increases Support for Malaysia

The Labour Government succeeded in December 1964 in gaining from the US Administration a step up in promises of military aid for Malaysia, which amounted to more than the US had been willing to make a few months before, when Prime Minister Rahman had visited Washington seeking military assistance.

The US had been reluctant to cut itself off from President Sukarno, viewing him as the alternative to a more than possible communist takeover, the consequences of which would be, at minimum, a sizable loss of large oil investments in Indonesia, at maximum, an involvement in a two-front war in South East Asia.

The joint communique following the Rahman-Johnson talks said only "The President agreed to provide military training in the United States for Malaysian personnel, and to consider promptly and sympathetically credit sales, under existing arrangements, of appropriate military equipment for the defense of Malaysia." (Reference 92)

US "Neutral" on Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute

This assistance offer, while not significant militarily, came at a time when the United States had cut off all military aid to Indonesia. But on the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute in general, the United States did not become more strongly involved than before. Prime Minister Rahman a week later in New York, on 31 July 1964, addressing United Nations correspondents, said that the US "does not want to be involved in our trouble with Indonesia and will remain neutral."

US Wishes Asian Solution

The United States, so heavily committed in Vietnam, sought to avoid becoming militarily involved in another war, adopting the policy of seeking a solution arrived at by Asian countries. (Reference 93) Attempts at such an Asian solution had continued since the creation of Malaysia, but without success.

Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno met in Manila between 7-11 January 1964, but recorded no progress toward the Macapagal goal of "solving Asian problems by Asians themselves in an Asian fashion". (Reference 94)

Against this background, the US in early 1964 took an initiative in the form of a mission undertaken by the Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, for President Johnson.

On 13 January, Washington announced that Mr. Kennedy would visit President Sukarno in Tokyo where the Indonesian President was staying after his Manila talks with President Macapagal.

The Kennedy Talks

In Tokyo, Mr. Kennedy stressed that his task was in line with United States policy and that he wanted to help Asians themselves find a solution. (Reference 95)

While a cease fire in Borneo and renewed talks followed the Kennedy effort, it left no lasting mark on the pattern of Indonesian sponsored guerrillas operating in Borneo.

New Talks on Withdrawal and Cease Fire

In line with the arrangements initiated by Mr. Kennedy, tripartite ministerial talks between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia began in Bangkok on 5 February.

At the talks, Malaysia continued to insist, as it had done since the first efforts of the Philippines in January to achieve a summit conference (See Appendix I, Joint Statement of Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno, 11 January 1964 and Malaysia's Statement in Reply), on recognition of its sovereignty and the withdrawal of all Indonesians from its territory.

Indonesia, for its part, demanded that British troops be withdrawn from the Borneo territories. The question of Indonesia's withdrawal of guerrillas had supposedly already been resolved. In Manila in January, Indonesia gave its oral assent to this to President Macapagal while in Bangkok Indonesia gave its written consent, but the withdrawals have not occurred.

The talks did result in the confirmation of a cease-fire in the Borneo territories and an agreement that there would be a supervision of the arrangements by Thailand. But this supervision never got under way since Malaysia insisted it would be ineffective without the withdrawal of the guerrillas from the Borneo territories, while Indonesia refused to countenance such a withdrawal except in the context of a general political settlement. (See Appendix J, Joint Communique of the Bangkok Ministerial Meeting, 11 February 1964)

The Indonesian position had been earlier forecast in a report published by the official Indonesian news agency, Antara, of a meeting of Indonesia's Supreme Council on 28 January, immediately following the US Kennedy initiative. Antara reported that the Council had unanimously decided that "the crush Malaysia spirit must be preserved (and) must not be slackened, but must continue as before regardless of the cease-fire order". (Reference 96)

Indonesia Announces Reequipment of Borneo Irregulars

On 22 February, Indonesia made its position even more clear when Dr. Subandrio stated that his country would immediately begin supplying its irregulars in Borneo by air drops. (Reference 97) The Indonesian position on the ceasefire was that it in no way entailed withdrawal of forces from their positions in the Borneo territories and that it continued to have the right to re-equip these forces so as to maintain the status quo.

Malaysia Calls for Withdrawal of All Indonesian Irregulars

The Malaysia stand was reemphasized on 24 February when a Cabinet statement was issued in Kuala Lumpur asking Thailand, the designated observer of the ceasefire, to call an emergency meeting of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia which "would be devoted exclusively to the consideration of ways and means of making the cease-fire fully effective by the

immediate withdrawal of all Indonesian forces, regulars and irregulars, from Malaysian territories". (Reference 98)

Philippines Attempts Mediation

In these circumstances the Philippines, which had been at no time a party to Indonesia's military confrontation, attempted to bring the parties together and President Macapagal flew to Indonesia.

In a joint communique issued on 28 February it was stated that "The two Presidents consider the cease-fire in North Kalimantan (Borneo) as an important factor in creating a favorable atmosphere necessary in order to facilitate a comprehensive and integrated solution of the Malaysia problem in all its aspects. In this connection, President Sukarno reassured President Macapagal that the Indonesian Government would observe the cease-fire, and expects the other parties concerned to do likewise." (Reference 99)

The Move Toward A Second Summit

The joint communique also stated again that the two Presidents "reiterated their faith in the wisdom of solving Asian problems by Asians themselves in an Asian fashion and trust that the constructive and brotherly Musjawarah is inherent in the Asian way of finding solutions to common problems. The two presidents, therefore, expressed determination to continue their effort towards a peaceful settlement of the problems of the region, without pre-conditions, at a place and date still to be determined and to prepare the necessary groundwork for the summit Musjawarah." (Reference 99)

The Question of Pre-conditions

Negotiations toward the meeting were held up by the now key dispute on pre-conditions, Indonesia holding that Malaysia was trying to set pre-conditions in its demand for withdrawal of the guerrillas and Malaysia asserting that Indonesia was setting pre-conditions in its demand that the guerrillas remain in Borneo until an over-all settlement was in sight.

Philippines Wins Indonesia Withdrawal Promise

President Macapagal undertook the effort to dispose of this controversy. Toward this end, Foreign Minister Salvador Lopez journeyed to Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur, and arranged in Bangkok to involve Thailand as an observer for the withdrawal of guerrillas. The effort seemed crowned with success when simultaneously in Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta, a communique was published saying "that Indonesia accepts the principle of withdrawal of her forces regular and irregular, from Sabah and Sarawak".

The joint communique, dated 15 June, set the terms for the withdrawal of guerrillas from the North Kalimantan border areas. According to these terms, Indonesia was to begin the withdrawal from an area in Sarawak through one checkpoint on the "Malaysian" side, across the border to another checkpoint on the Indonesian side. In line with this agreement, some withdrawals began to occur under the supervision of the Thai Government while hostilities ceased. (Reference 100)

The One Day Tokyo Summit

Against this background also, which included a major election victory inside Malaysia by Prime Minister Rahman and his party, the Heads of Government of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines met in a summit conference in Tokyo on 20 June 1964.

The meeting lasted only one day, breaking down on familiar obstacles. Prime Minister Rahman insisted that all Indonesian guerrillas should be withdrawn from Malaysia within four weeks. (Reference 101) A Malaysian draft communique embodying this proposal was rejected by Indonesia.

Philippines Proposes Afro-Asian Commission

In the face of the disagreement, President Macapagal proposed that a four member Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission be appointed "to study the existing problems between the three countries and to submit recommendations for their solution". The Commission members were to be composed of three members chosen respectively by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and a fourth chosen unanimously by the three countries. Indonesia accepted this proposal and President Sukarno "gave assurance that he would abide by the recommendations of the Commission".

Malaysia "agreed in principle to this proposal, with the proviso that all acts of hostilities against Malaysia must cease forthwith." (See Appendix K, The Tokyo Communique and the Malaysia Proposed Statement) This basic reservation by Malaysia was rooted in Malaysia's contention that, despite Indonesian agreement on the principle of withdrawal, it refused to end confrontation. The Indonesian Government maintained that "further withdrawals can only be dealt with in conformity with some progress in the political solution of the Malaysian problem." The impasse brought the Tokyo meeting to a close.

After the meeting, Dr. Subandrio was reported officially to have stressed "Confrontation goes on, crush 'Malaysia' continues to be Indonesia's policy," and in Dr. Subandrio's words, "will even be intensified. Indonesian volunteer guerrillas will continue their struggle in North Borneo as Indonesia's determined answer to neo-colonialist subversion and encirclement tactics." (Reference 102)

The Philippine attitude is that the agreement for withdrawal of guerrillas was to be implemented while discussions toward settlement proceeded. The Philippines, always with their claim to Sabah in the forefront, speak of North Borneo as disputed territory and consequently a subject for negotiations, arising from the dispute of the ownership of the Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak. The Malaysians do not accept this reasoning nor the additional Philippine view that since the Tokyo talks were not truly adjourned but only recessed, negotiations--and the subject of withdrawals--could be resumed at a future time. (Reference 32)

Sukarno Renews Armed Action to Dissolve Malaysia

The aftermath of the Tokyo meeting brought a renewed drive by guerrillas. Even before the Tokyo Summit, President Sukarno had committed himself to a conflict with Malaysia of increased intensity. On 3 May he had said "We the people of Indonesia, in carrying out our confrontation against Malaysia, which endangers the Indonesian revolution, have endeavored to solve the issue through consultations. After realizing that our endeavors have been met with humiliation and challenge, we now order the 21 million volunteers to increase the revolutionary vitality, and help the peoples of

Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah dissolve Malaysia and attain national independence." (Reference 103)

Intensified Support Sought

After Tokyo, both sides sought to rally support -- military, political and moral. Indonesia once again turned to the USSR and in June Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan went to Djakarta for discussions involving further military aid for Indonesia.

The communique issued in Djakarta at the time of Mr. Mikoyan's visit stated "Complete agreement was reached on various issues ... as well as in the framework of arms delivery to the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia." (Reference 104)

In 1961, the USSR's military assistance to Indonesia amounted to \$400 million and it had promised to continue that assistance. The assistance included jet fighters, submarines and cruisers.

After visiting Moscow between 15-23 November 1963, General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Indonesian Defense Minister had been able to say that even without Western arms supplies the basic military agreement with the USSR would fully safeguard Indonesia's security. (Reference 105)

Indonesia Says France Supplies Equipment

An Indonesian announcement of 21 July 1964 which told of USSR aid said that France would also supply equipment to Indonesia in the form of helicopters for anti-submarine detection. The announcement stated that a total of fifty-eight of these helicopters would be received from France and the USSR, but did not say what quantity would be received from each. (Reference 106)

French aid, however, is nominal, the important suppliers being the USSR and China.

Peking Aid Important

While Chinese aid to Indonesia has not yet assumed the proportions of Soviet help, China has from the beginning supported the Indonesian "Crush Malaysia" policy. Liu Shao Chi, Vice Chairman of the People's

Republic of China, who was visiting Indonesia, and President Sukarno issued a joint communique, in April 1964, declaring their opposition to Malaysia and their determination to work for its destruction. (Reference 107)

The role of China in South East Asia assumed greater importance when, on 16 October 1964, China exploded its first atomic bomb. With its expressed hostility to Malaysia undiminished, Peking's military potential and its consequent ability to help Indonesia had grown. President Mao of the People's Republic of China reiterated Chinese support of Indonesia against Malaysia after the bomb explosion.

Fighting Not Far from Declared War

By the end of 1964, guerrilla actions in North Borneo, naval forays in the Strait of Malacca and operations on the Malay Peninsula were all the order of the day. Indonesian initiatives in these areas were on land, sea and in the air. And while President Sukarno's promise of the year before that he would complete the destruction of Malaysia "by the time the cock crows on 1 January 1965", was not to be realized, Malaysia finished 1964 in a state not far from war. Indonesian operations, though still confined to small-scale actions, had resulted in "1,196 Indonesian infiltrators and agents known to have been in Malaysia; Malaysia and its allies have killed 282, captured more than 400 and wounded 70. There have been more than 70 acts of piracy recorded, mainly against fisherman and small coastal trading vessels such as junks". (Reference 108)

The Malaysian Government said that in 1964 killed or wounded totalled over 100.

The Cost of the Undeclared War

The confrontation undertaken by Indonesia has cost much money, not only in the form of cuts in aid from the US, but in many other direct ways. The result, freely admitted by Foreign Minister Subandrio is that Indonesia is in the midst of "economic and monetary difficulties". (Reference 109) However, President Sukarno has said Indonesia is quite willing to assume these burdens because of its goals.

For Malaysia the cost is high and mounting. By the end of 1964, the Malaysian army was to be double the strength it had been at the end of 1960. The navy had received more craft. "The 1965 budget calls for a deficit of about £63 million, nearly a quarter of the year's total expenditure going to defense and internal security." (Reference 110)

Economic Deterioration a Danger

A major factor of Malaysia's strength is its standard of living, second in Asia to that of Japan. Should defense costs continue to spiral, economic momentum might be impaired. Malaysia looks to Anglo-Saxon sources as its hope of bearing these defense costs without curtailing expenditures on education, health, housing and industrial development. All of these Malaysia views as essential if existing divisions in the multi-racial society are to be erased and the nation visualized by the Prime Minister created in fact.

Malaysia Dependence on Political Factors

Malaysia's success as a nation also depends on its ability to marshal political support on a widening basis. In the first instance, it is important to Malaysia to obtain this political support from other Asian countries.

Asian Line Up

India has given some degree of support to Malaysia from its inception, having welcomed Malaysia when it took Malaya's seat at the UN. Indian support can be ascribed, in part, to its desire for friends in the event of a conflict with China. Thailand is friendly to Malaysia, as is Japan. Ceylon, while in the Commonwealth, has taken a less than cordial attitude as has Pakistan. The Philippines, with political ideas somewhat similar to those of Malaysia and with a common Malay heritage, has not formally recognized its government, the Sabah claim being the reason.

Philippines Dilute Support

The Philippines has in fact weakened the degree of support given by it to Malaysia during the September Security Council. On 18 September in Manila, Foreign Minister Mauro Mendez declared that the Philippines would, were it

a member of the Security Council, have supported the Norwegian resolution. This resolution recognized Malaysia as sovereign throughout its territories (Including the Malaya Mainland and Sarawak and Sabah). (Reference 111)

However, when President Macapagal visited the US in early October, he expressed himself in terms which distinguish the "Malaya Mainland" from the North Borneo territories. Speaking of a resumption of talks between the parties, he said "In my estimate, such talks are not possible except under the minimum conditions that the Indonesians who landed on the Malaya mainland are withdrawn." (Reference 112)

The statement caused Malaysia to observe on 8 October, "Malaysia does not make any distinction between Indonesian aggression against the mainland Malaysia and aggression against Eastern Malaysia. The Malaysian Government therefore cannot support the contention that a so-called withdrawal from Pontian and Labis could constitute a minimum condition for talks. Withdrawal must take place from all Malaysian territories." (Reference 113)

Relations with African States

Support for Malaysia from the Philippines is therefore tied up with the Sabah claim. In Africa, where political support for Malaysia would be of the utmost value to Kuala Lumpur, the charges of neo-colonialism levied by Indonesia have impeded Malaysia's progress. Indonesia's influence as an anti-colonial leader was evidenced at the 1964 Non-Aligned Meeting in Cairo to which Malaysia was not admitted. Similarly, Indonesia is seeking to have Malaysia barred from the second Bandung meeting of Asian-African countries, scheduled to take place in Algiers in 1965.

However, the two African members of the Security Council, Morocco and the Ivory Coast, both supported Malaysia and voted for the resolution proposed by Norway which censured Indonesia.

The Ivory Coast, which with Morocco comprised the two African States serving on the Council, said:

The history of the anti-colonial struggle takes different forms, depending on the men, the country and the time involved, all of whom are equally wise, equally nationalistic and equally effective. And it is extremely difficult for the Government of the Ivory Coast not to recognize the same right, the same privileges and the same merits for all Asian, Latin American, African and European countries which, by one means or another, have freed their peoples from the yoke of colonialism.

By virtue of the sacred principle of tolerance, it is equally difficult for my Government to agree that a Member State of the United Nations can have the term of neo-colonialism applied to it. Such a label is so subjective that it may run the risk of containing a rather high proportion of errors which would be prejudicial to good harmony and peaceful coexistence of peoples and States; such harmony and peaceful coexistence are indispensable for the maintenance of peace.

Fortunately, we do have a Charter which sets forth doctrines and legal norms for us to follow and which also imposes certain obligations on us without which we would only too soon have drifted back to the law of the jungle: "let the strongest triumph". This law may be applicable in the Olympic Stadium at Tokyo, but in international relations it should certainly be left to the animals of the jungle alone.

Sovereignty and territorial integrity are not only a privilege, but also a right recognized to all, and my Government profoundly regrets the extension of the conflict to the non-contested part of the territory of a sovereign Member State of the United Nations.

The Ivory Coast considers itself to be a friend both of Indonesia and Malaysia. Are we not all three linked by the indivisible bond of Afro-Asian solidarity? However, the Ivory Coast feels that it must modestly shoulder its responsibility in matters of the maintenance of peace.

This was the case in the recent past when my country, together with the other members of the Council, condemned the shootings in Panama, the bombings in Yemen; in the same way, the day before yesterday, we deplored the events in the Indo-Chinese peninsula; in the same way yesterday, with other members of the Council, we urged a cease-fire in the Mediterranean and ordered the halting of bombings and over-flights of a Member State; in the same way today my country sincerely believes in all objectivity that the parachuting of foreign forces on the soil of a Member State is illegal and contrary to the principles and spirit of the Charter.

We therefore consider that the Security Council should, in the language which it customarily uses, and with the concern of the Security Council to avoid exacerbating passions, regret and deplore the incidents of 2 September 1964, which are the subject of the complaint contained in document S/5930 of 3 September 1964. (Reference 114)

Morocco, in supporting the resolution however, emphasized its close and friendly ties with Indonesia. (See Appendix L for resolution and vote)

Many African States have disputes about territories with neighbors and all are jealous of their sovereignty in so many cases, newly won. On these counts, African States, for the most part, have sympathized with Malaysia's situation, confronted by Indonesian aggressiveness.

Malaysia had at its inception been welcomed by Nigeria and has had diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic since it was created.

In late November 1964, Tun Abdul Razak, Malayan Deputy Prime Minister, visited North Africa. After his return, Kuala Lumpur stated that: "After his talks with heads of state or their representatives in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, diplomatic missions would be exchanged with each of those countries." It was further said that "Each publicly recognized Malaysia as a sovereign and independent nation." Finally, "All indicated either publicly or privately that they supported Malaysia's request to attend the African-Asian conference." (Reference 115)

Ghana Seeks to Become Mediator

During the October meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries, President Nkrumah stated that "in order to help Indonesia and Malaysia to settle their differences as brothers, the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations should lend its good offices through the medium of a mission or a conciliation committee." (Reference 116)

For Malaysia, a settlement satisfactory to it, brought into being by efforts of an influential Asian-African group of countries, whether outside or inside UN, would have great political value, since it would eliminate the colonialist and neo-colonialist arguments used by Indonesia, while consolidating relations for the future.

Neo-Colonialism Charges and Answers

The President of the 19th General Assembly, Mr. Alex Quaison-Sackey, himself an African from Ghana, on 5 April 1958 defined neo-colonialism. "By neo-colonialism we mean the practice of granting a sort of independence with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client-state, and controlling it effectively by means other than political ones." Speaking to the General Assembly on 17 December 1964, the Malaysian representative quoted this definition and said, "I accept that as a fair definition of the term and I am willing to declare here and now that my Government has no reservations in condemning such spurious independence. In so doing we echo the sentiments eloquently expressed on neo-colonialism at the recent Cairo Conference. ... But modern attempts at territorial expansions

under colour of taking up arms against neo-colonialism by a State which has accepted the obligations of the Charter as the condition precedent of its membership of the United Nations are not only unjustified but inexcusable." (Reference 117)

The Indonesian charges of neo-colonialism and the Malaysian counter charges of neo-imperialism will however not stop until some pacific solution is found.

In the Security Council, the Philippines placed great emphasis on the solutions it had proposed at the Tokyo meeting -- a settlement by Asian nations. This idea was opposed by none and in fact had been endorsed in July by the UN Secretary-General. Nothing further has come of it. (Reference 118)

All settlements and their possibilities are tied up with the developments which will occur.

Indonesia Leaves UN

Of utmost significance was the completely unexpected withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations. The first intimation of such a momentous decision came in a speech on literacy made by President Sukarno on 31 December. In that speech he suddenly inserted the dictum that Indonesia would leave the UN should Malaysia be seated as a member of the Security Council.

President Sukarno spoke, however, after the UN General Assembly had already ratified Malaysia as a member of the Security Council. This took place on 30 December and it was effected without a vote. Indonesia's representative, Mr. L.N. Palar, did not vote against Malaysia, informing the Assembly that his Government had not recognized Malaysia and was opposed to its election. The Assembly at that time was making decisions without formal voting, under the name of "consultation", to avoid a confrontation with the USSR because of its refusal to pay assessments for peace-keeping in the Congo and the Middle East.

Leaves Specialized Agencies Also

Subsequently on 7 January, President Sukarno amplified the withdrawal theme. The official report stated:

Turning to the UN affiliate bodies -- UNESCO, UNICEF and FAO -- the President questioned what benefit Indonesia had gained from these bodies. UNICEF had provided Indonesia with powdered milk but personally, the President said, he preferred "peujem" (fermented cassava). "UNESCO?" the President asked, and added: "Indonesia has succeeded in freeing herself from illiteracy without any help from UNESCO." He continued: "What benefit from FAO? They have sent us agricultural experts who had not the slightest notion of Indonesian agriculture." Also in this field, the President added, Indonesia had succeeded in stepping up production not because of the help of FAO but on its own efforts. (Appendix M, Withdrawal from UN, Indonesian Statements)

Indonesia's Reason for Leaving UN

The reasons for Indonesia's leaving the UN included not only Malaysia having been seated on the Security Council but (1) Indonesia's dissatisfaction with the lack of sympathy which it received in the September Security Council meetings, (2) President Sukarno's continued resentment and repudiation of the UN 1963 role in assessing the opinions of the people of Sarawak and Sabah -- He had labeled the Michelmores findings "a clear forgery" and he referred to the Secretary-General as "brash". President Sukarno, in fact suggested, after he had left UN, that it make another survey to the results of which he would "conform".

Charter Applies to Non-Members and Members

Less specific or official were other reasons, stated on 2 January by the Djakarta newspaper Indonesian Herald. The Herald stated that the decision to leave UN brings many advantages including the fact that Indonesia "is freed from all commitments made under the auspices of the UN." (Reference 119) However, the UN Charter applies to non-members as well as Members. Under it, Indonesia would still be liable to United Nations countermeasures if actions taken against Malaysia should be determined a threat to peace. The UN Charter specifies that the United Nations "shall insure" that nonmembers act in accordance with its principles "so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security". The words appear in Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter, which lays down the principle of refraining from "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

President Sukarno in an interview on 13 January with the Columbia Broadcasting System, however, declared that Malaysia would never be the first to attack.

Another of the advantages cited by the Indonesian Herald is that the withdrawal from UN obviates "holding of a plebiscite in West Irian in 1969". This area had been transferred from the Netherlands to Indonesia by UN action with the understanding that the inhabitants would have, finally, the right of decision as to their adherence to Indonesia. (Reference 119)

First to Leave UN

Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN was the first by any of its 115 Members. The Charter makes no provision for the resignation of a member. In the weeks following the Indonesian withdrawal, not one UN Member followed President Sukarno's lead nor did any member country endorse the Indonesian move. On the contrary, even countries closely identified with Indonesia in the non-aligned group such as the United Arab Republic and Ceylon expressed disagreement. On 7 January, Tanjug, the official Yugoslav press agency reported:

The Foreign Affairs Secretariat spokesman, Dusan Blagojevic, said at today's press conference that the news about Indonesia's decision to withdraw from the United Nations organization was received by the Yugoslav public with surprise and anxiety. Blagojevic went on to say that this was due to the fact that Yugoslavia always attached the greatest possible importance to the United Nations which, despite all weaknesses and shortcomings, remains an irreplaceable instrument of preserving world peace, and putting an end to all forms of dependence and inequality in international relations.

This is the attitude of non-aligned countries expressed in the documents adopted at the Belgrade and Cairo Conferences, and it is our hope that this decision of Indonesia, which is one of the active participants in the policy of non-alignment, is not final, Blagojevic said. (Reference 120)

Peking Endorses Indonesian Withdrawal -- Asks Rival Organization

While no Member of the UN endorsed the Indonesian withdrawal, praise for the action came immediately from Peking which characterized UN as a "paper tiger" and a puppet of the US. (Reference 121) On 25 January in Peking, Premier Chou En-lai went further, suggesting the creation of an organization to rival the UN.

Speaking at a banquet for the visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, Mr. Chou said: "The United Nations has committed too many mistakes. It has utterly disappointed the Afro-Asian countries. It must correct its mistakes. It must be reorganized." Countries like China, North Korea and North Vietnam, who made up more than one-quarter of the world's population, were not in the United Nations but getting along fine, he said, whereas several member countries such as the Congo had lost their independence and suffered aggression. "In these circumstances, another United Nations, a revolutionary one, may well be set up so that rival dramas may be staged in competition with that body which calls itself the United Nations, but which is under the manipulation of United States imperialism and therefore can only make mischief and do nothing good." (Reference 122)

President Sukarno had himself previously spoken of a new international line-up. He had on 6 October 1964 in Cairo, before the Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, stressed the necessity for the "New Emergency Forces (NEFO)" to confront the "Old Established Forces (OLDEFO)." On that occasion he had not called for a conference toward a new organization but he had done this earlier.

Sukarno Calls for International Conference of Emerging Forces (CONEFO)

Speaking in Djakarta on the national holiday of 17 August 1964, President Sukarno declared:

... the offensive of the NEFO in the political, economic, cultural as well as in the military fields, is scoring victories from one day to the next on the international scale. Indonesia's desire to convene a Conference of the New Emerging Forces, a CONEFO, is thereby raised to the level of becoming reality, no matter how hard the imperialists may try to prevent it! Nobody can stop the flow of History, not even the gods in heaven! (Reference 123)

At the time that President Sukarno uttered this call, he had recalled the Bandung Conference which was the first broad Asian African Conference. It took place in Indonesia from 18-24 April 1955. Premier Chou En-lai attended. The second Bandung meeting is scheduled for 1965, to take place in Algeria.

Indonesia as Sixth Atomic Power

Whether or not Indonesia proposes to form the NEFO organization on the tenth anniversary of the Bandung meeting is not known. However, in the interim the summit meeting on atomic disarmament, called for by Peking after it exploded its bomb, may take place. This may clarify Sino-Indonesian ideas, including the support Peking is prepared to give President Sukarno toward the creation of an Indonesian bomb, an ambition voiced frequently by President Sukarno.

UN Continues to Maintain Role

The question of a new international organization as well as of the proliferation of the atomic weapon has therefore arisen from the Indonesian withdrawal from the UN. However, the UN can, should its membership continue to stand firm, exert important restraints on Indonesia even though it is outside the organization.

Presence or Observer

Should Indonesia take military action against Malaysia which is adjudged as aggression by the UN, many avenues of pressure are open. UN has used a variety of devices in Laos, Congo, Lebanon, Suez and Yemen. Doubtless an extension of the Malaysian-Indonesian conflict will cause UN to act in these or other ways. However, the entry into the conflict in a more direct way of the People's Republic of China, which is of course also outside the UN, can frustrate any UN effort.

On the other hand, the possibility exists that Indonesia, which seeks always to play a leading role in Asian-African affairs, may -- lacking support from this group -- return to the UN. While this will not remove the incendiary possibilities of the conflict, it will make it possible to hold all parties responsible for their actions.

With powder-keg situations in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, India and Pakistan -- the avoidance of an intensified Indonesian-Malaysian conflict in South East Asia and its permanent abatement remain a main concern not only for the UN but for regional groups and individual countries seeking to avoid chaos and world war.

* * * * *

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PV/ = Provisional Verbatim, and the subsequent
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CHRONOLOGY

EVENTS SINCE THE MALAYSIA PROPOSALS OF 27 MAY 1961

- 1961
- 27 May Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, speaking in Singapore, says "Malaya today as a nation realizes that she cannot stand alone and in isolation. Sooner or later she should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is premature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be brought about but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic cooperation ..."
- 3 June Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, speaking at Singapore's National Day celebrations expresses support for a merger with Malaya in Malaysia.
- 31 July "Bangkok Declaration" is issued in a joint Malaya-Philippines-Thailand communique announcing the formation of the Association of South East Asia.
- 23 August Prime Ministers of Malaya and Singapore hold their first meetings on the question of merger. A joint communique states that both agree in principle to "pan-Malaysian" responsibility for defense, external affairs and security and to Singapore's local autonomy for labor and education. Prime Minister Lee says the merger is almost certain for 1963.
- 24 August First meeting is held in Jesselton, Sabah, of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee formed by members of the Legislatures of the territories involved in the Malaysia proposal.
- 6 September Prime Minister Rahman states that he wants Malaysia formed as soon as possible since "delay will give the communists time to make trouble". He says it must occur in 1963 since the constitutional status of Singapore, autonomous since 1959, comes up for review with Britain in that year and the left wing parties are pressing for complete independence then.
- 14 September A joint Malayan-Singapore Working Committee is appointed to work out the details of merger.

1961 (Continued)

- 16 October Malayan Parliament adopts a motion approving Malaysia in principle.
- 24 October Annual Conference of Native Chiefs of North Borneo (Sabah) approves a resolution in support of the Malaysia plan, 26 voting in favor and one abstaining.
- 4 November The General Assembly of the United Malay National Organization - the main government party of Malaya - resolves to give full support to the Malaysia proposal.
- 20 November Speaking in the UN General Assembly on the debate on West Irian the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio, states "we are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies, though they are of the same island (New Guinea) but -- more than that -- when Malaya told us of her intentions to merge with the three British Crown Colonies of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo, we told them that we have no objections and that we wish them success.... Naturally, ethnologically and geographically speaking, this British part (of Borneo) is closer to Indonesia than, let us say, to Malaya. But we still told Malaya that we have no objections to such a merger based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned."
- 23 November Joint Malaya-UK communique states that Malaysia is a "desirable aim" and that a Commission of Enquiry will ascertain the views of the people of Sabah and Sarawak. Communique also mentions agreement to extend the Malayan-British defense treaty to cover Malaysia.
- 13 December Diosdado Macapagal elected President of the Philippines.
- 22 December President Sukarno appeals for volunteers to take West Irian from the Dutch.
- 30 December The Indonesian Communist Party calls the proposal for Malaysia "neo-colonialist" and "an unacceptable colonial intrigue".

1962

- January "Socialist" parties of the Malaysian territories meet in Kuala Lumpur and oppose the Malaysian proposals of Prime Minister Rahman.
- 4 January Sarawak Government issues a White Paper on "Malaysia and Sarawak" stating that the "opportunity to attain independence by joining Malaysia is unlikely to recur and Sarawak may be left with no other alternative than a perilous existence as a small defenseless country in a large and predatory world."
- 31 January North Borneo Government issues a White Paper "North Borneo and Malaysia", stating that "the very real threat that communism is presenting to South East Asia" was such that "united, these territories (of Malaysia) would be in an immeasurably stronger position to contain and repel communism" and "there could only be a precarious future for North Borneo on its own, or even in association with Sarawak."
- 3 February Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee, after holding its fourth meeting since 24 August 1961, issues its report which is unanimously adopted by the members representing the Legislatures of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah. The report states the Committee envisages "an association of several sovereign states with a central organ invested with powers over the citizens of the member states and in certain defined circumstances over the member states themselves ... but from the viewpoint of international law, the collection of states forming the federation would be recognized as one sovereign state within the family of nations." The Committee concludes that foreign affairs, defense and security should be vested in the central government.
- 19 February Lord Cobbold and other members of the Commission of Enquiry into the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak (two from Malaya and two from UK) arrive in Kuching.
- 17 April Lord Cobbold leaves for London after completion of his enquiry into the views of the people regarding Malaysia.

1962 (Continued)

- 24 April Philippines House of Representatives asks that the President take "necessary steps" to recover Sabah.
- 21 June Cobbold report is published, reporting that the majority of people in Sarawak and North Borneo want to join Malaysia.
- 22 June The Philippines officially registers with the UK its claim to Sabah.
- July UN's decolonization committee, after hearing Prime Minister Lee and Opposition petitioners, decides that the Singapore referendum is a local affair and that it will take no action.
- 21 July Sultan of Brunei announces in the State Legislative Council that Brunei accepts the Malaysia plan in principle.
- 27 July President Macapagal proposes a confederation of the constituent parts of Malaysia and the Philippines.
- 1 August Joint statement by Malaya and UK announces that Malaysia will, subject to necessary legislation, be brought into being by 31 August 1963.
- 2 August Philippines gives Malayan Ambassador in Manila an aide-memoire expressing Philippine "satisfaction" over the Malaysian proposals" in so far as it represents a step forward in the direction of increased cooperation and unity among Asian peoples" stating it could ultimately lead to the confederation proposed on 27 July. However, it expresses "certain misgivings" over the inclusion of Sabah and asks that the Philippine claim to Sabah not be ignored.
- 15 August Malayan House of Representatives endorses the Malaya-UK agreement to form Malaysia.
- 30 August Preparatory meeting begins in Jesselton of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Malaysia on which the British, Malayan, Sabah and Sarawak Governments are represented.

1962 (Continued)

- 1 September Referendum is held in Singapore on the merger plan. Some 397,000 voters of 625,000 favor the plan put to them by the Singapore Government. The left wing Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) oppose the merger and call on their supporters to cast blank ballots. There are 144,000 blank ballots.
- 9 September Representatives of various parties in Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo petition UN decolonization committee stating that transfer of the territories into Malaysia without an act of self-determination would be contrary to UN resolutions on colonialism and charging that the Cobbold Commission report was "totally wrong" in its conclusions. The petitioners ask UN to intervene to prevent the transfer of sovereignty or to hold a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people. One of the signatories is A.M. Azahari, of the Party Ra'ayat of Brunei.
- 12 September Legislative Council of North Borneo adopts motion welcoming the creation of Malaysia by 31 August 1963.
- Sabah Legislative Council adopts a motion welcoming the Malaya-UK agreement on the formation of Malaysia.
- 26 September Sarawak Legislature welcomes the agreement to create Malaysia by 31 August 1963.
- 1 October UN takes over administration of West Irian prior to transfer to Indonesia.
- 3 October Malaya replies to the Philippines aide memoire of 2 August stating any dispute over Sabah must be with the UK and that Prime Minister Rahman would not attend the Manila meeting in November of the Association of South East Asia because of "undue excitement" over the Sabah claim in the Philippines.
- 8 December Revolt breaks out in Brunei and the Sultan asks Malaya and Britain for assistance to quell it. Rebels seize the Brunei Shell Company's installations. A.M. Azahari, who is in Manila, claims to be Prime Minister of the revolutionary government of Negara Kalimantan Utara (State of North Kalimantan) consisting of Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak.

1962 (Continued)

- 9 December British and Gurkha troops and Malayan police are sent from Singapore to crush the Brunei revolt. An official statement by the Brunei Information Office says the revolt is organized by the Party Ra'ayat of Brunei, which initiated the North Borneo National Army.
- 11 December Prime Minister Rahman in Malayan House of Representatives says Mr. Azahari wants to bring the three Borneo territories under foreign rule and says Mr. Azahari has links with the Socialist Front in Malaya and the Barisan Socialist Party in Singapore. Mr. Rahman says "Had Azahari gone to Indonesia he would be giving away the true position" but states he is convinced the Philippines had no prior knowledge of the rebellion. Prime Minister Rahman says the Borneo National Army which is leading the revolt was created about one month ago at Malinau in Indonesian Borneo. In Manila Mr. Azahari says he has ordered the National Army to launch an attempt on Kuching, the capital of Sarawak.
- 13 December Mr. Azahari in Manila says he has asked Indonesia and the UAR for volunteers.
- 14 December Sultan of Brunei at a press conference says he has no evidence that the rebels had received any aid from outside Brunei. Indonesia issues a government statement denying that it had anything to do with the Brunei revolt but states "the people's upheaval in North Borneo is a struggle for independence and happiness... against colonialism and imperialism and also neo-colonialism."
- 15 December Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, in reference to the Brunei revolt, accuses Prime Minister Rahman of persisting in an unfriendly attitude toward Indonesia and says "If the Tunku is determined to use any occasion to be hostile there is no alternative but to accept the challenge." He says that Mr. Rahman at the time of the rebellions in Indonesia of the late 1950's "gave help to the rebels by granting them visas and allowing them to shelter in Malaya".

1962 (Continued)

- 16 December British Far Eastern Command issues a statement saying that all major centers in Brunei have been cleared of rebels, that the first phase of the operation has been successfully completed and that Maj. Gen. W.C. Walker, who commanded Gurka forces in the guerrilla war in Malaya, will command the "new phase" in Borneo.
- 18 December Prime Minister Rahman issues a statement replying to that of Dr. Subandrio of 15 December and saying Malaya will make "a formal protest" to the Indonesian Government. Mr. Rahman says "at no stage has it (Malaya) made any statement against the Government of Indonesia implicating that government with the armed rebellion in Brunei. It has, however, drawn attention to the fact that certain elements and parties in Indonesia on their own admission had encouraged and even assisted Azahari and his clique in this abortive insurrection."
- 19 December The communist Chinese People's Daily and the Indonesian Communist Party Chief, D.N. Aidit, both express support for the "just struggle of the Brunei people for national independence and liberation".
- Radio Djakarta, monitored in Singapore, broadcasts a speech by President Sukarno stating that Indonesians who did not support the rebellion were "traitors to their own souls" and "we have given our sympathies to the people of North Kalimantan (North Borneo) struggling for their freedom."
- 21 December UK Foreign Office spokesman reveals that on 12 December UK had asked Indonesia for assurances that it was not supporting Brunei rebels after "certain indications which suggested" that some rebel forces might have received training in Indonesian territory. The spokesman said Indonesia "was told of assurances from the Philippine Government that they were not supporting Mr. Azahari's movement, and that we would welcome similar assurances from the Indonesian Government."

1963

- 1 January Indonesia takes over administration of West Irian from UN.
- 3 January Indonesia rejects as "abusive" the British request for assurances that it is not supporting the Brunei rebels.

1963 (Continued)

- 20 January Dr. Subandrio announces a policy of "confrontation" regarding Malaysia. He says "We cannot but adopt a policy of confrontation towards Malaya because at present they represent themselves as accomplices of neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist forces pursuing a policy hostile towards Indonesia."
- 22 January Spokesman for the Indonesian Foreign Office says "confrontation" is a "direct offensive" in the economic and social spheres but would not take military form. He says that except for military action the policy is the same as that used regarding West Irian.
- 24 January U Thant turns down an Indonesian request that the administration of West Irian be handed over before 1 May.
- 24 January Commenting on Indonesian charges that Malaysia is a British neo-colonialist creation Prime Minister Rahman says "They are under communist influence. Open that package and you will find another form of colonialism." He says he is asking for clarification of Dr. Subandrio's statement of policy of "confrontation" and has told Indonesia "keep your hands off Malaysia."
- 28 January British Far East Headquarters in Singapore announce that besides a troop alert of the strategic reserve, paratroops have been sent to Brunei.
- President Macapagal in a state of the nation message says the Philippines claim to North Borneo is "vital to our national security in the light of the continuing communist danger in South-East Asia". He also states Malaysia "appears to be a continuation of colonialism based only on an expedient of false security and that North Borneo's entry into Malaysia would be an arbitrary arrangement."
- Philippines-UK talks open in London. Philippines say the restoration of Sabah to the Philippines is in the best interests of the security of the area.
- 29 January U Thant at a press conference says the Brunei situation had danger of becoming "very serious" and he was watching the situation "with a view to devising some formulation which might ease tensions in the area."

1963 (Continued)

31 January

Mr. Azahari flies from Manila to Djakarta after being in the Philippines since 7 December, the eve of the Brunei revolt.

Philippines urges Britain at talks in London to support a plan for a South East Asia confederation linking the Philippines with Malaysia. Britain is reported to express sympathy but to state that the creation of Malaysia could not be delayed beyond 31 August.

1 February

Britain and Philippines make announcement on their London talks covering the defense of South East Asia against communism and prevention of illegal Chinese immigration to the Philippines from Singapore and North Borneo. Philippines is reported to fear North Borneo will become nest for Chinese seeking to go to Philippines. UK and Philippines agree to joint naval patrols on this matter.

Malaya accuses Indonesian gunboat of entering its waters and setting fire to a rubber-laden barge off the coast of Jahore. Malaya cancels order for 800 troops to go to the Congo to relieve its contingent there.

Major General Achmad Jani, Indonesian Army Chief of Staff, is quoted by Antara, the Indonesian news agency, as saying the Army is awaiting the order to move in support of the peoples struggling for independence in North Borneo and that two divisions of volunteers are awaiting the order to enter that territory.

3 February

Malayan Internal Security Council issues document stating that 111 left-wing politicians and trade unionists had been arrested in Singapore on 2 February. Prime Minister Lee says the arrests were made by a joint decision of the British, Malay, and Singapore governments and indicate that massive demonstrations in conjunction with increasing Indonesia hostility to Malaysia were expected. Included among the arrested is the Secretary-General of the Barisan Socialis.

5 February

Indonesia at the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference in Tanganyika asks the Conference to support the "revolutionary government" of

1963 (Continued)

- 5 February (continued) "Prime Minister" Azahari in Brunei and oppose the admission of North Borneo into Malaysia. The Indonesian delegate terms Malaysia a neo-colonialist scheme denying the people of North Borneo the right to self-determination and says it will bring "the aggressive war pact SEATO right on our frontiers."
- 7 February Sultan of Brunei, in Kuala Lumpur, announces that Brunei will join Malaysia.
- 11 February Dr. Subandrio holds press conference for foreign newsmen in Djakarta to state that Indonesia is opposed to the creation of Malaysia and that its creation could lead to armed conflict. "I do not mean war but incidents - incidents of physical conflict."
- 13 February President Sukarno states "Now I declare officially that Indonesia opposes Malaysia."
- On the same day, Malaya announces it will immediately strengthen its army, airforce and navy to counter the "threat to security" created by Indonesia's policy.
- 14 February Dr. Subandrio officially informs the British Ambassador of Indonesia's new policy of declared opposition to Malaysia. President Sukarno says the opposition is not because of communist influence but because Malaysia is neo-colonialist and that Indonesia supports the Brunei revolt as a "matter of principle".
- 18 February Chief of Staff of the Indonesia Armed Forces, Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, says Indonesia opposes Malaysia for two main reasons (1) Malaysia would pose a military threat because it could be used for foreign domination of South East Asia; and (2) Malaysia could be a "haven for economic subversion", involving extensive smuggling and illegal bartering across the common frontier. He says such illegal trade already deprives Indonesia of 20-30 per cent of its annual export income. He adds that while Indonesia has made no claims on North Borneo "we are anti-colonial... and therefore back fully the North Borneo revolution."

1963 (Continued)

- 27 February Report of the Malaya-Sabah-Sarawak-UK Inter-Governmental Committee is submitted to the respective Governments. It recommends that the constitution of Malaysia should, in its essentials, be based on the constitution of Malaya with special safeguards for the interests of Sabah and Sarawak.
- 28 February C.V. Narasimhan, chef de cabinet to U Thant, tells press in New York that after his return from South East Asia two days previously he had told the Secretary-General that there was a "serious situation" arising from the dispute between Malaya and Indonesia and that U Thant was keeping in touch with developments and "seeing how sources of tension can be removed."
- 8 March The Legislature of Sarawak adopts the Inter-Governmental report.
- 11 March President Macapagal revises his "Pan Malayan Confederation" of Malaysia and the Philippines to include Maphilindo.
- 13 March The Legislature of Sabah adopts the Inter-Governmental report.
- 4 April Joint Malaya-Philippine statement issued in Manila by Prime Minister Rahman and President Macapagal announces that a tripartite meeting with Indonesia will take place "in an honest endeavor to iron out difficulties and remove any misunderstandings which may exist, or are likely to arise, in order to pave the way toward harmony and cooperation among the three countries." The communique does not specifically mention Malaysia but at a press conference Mr. Rahman says the talks "would not rule out anything."
- 9 April - 17 April Sub-ministerial talks of the deputy foreign ministers of Indonesia, Philippines and Malaya in Manila. Agreement reached in principle on summit conference.
- 20 April Liu Shao Chi, Vice Chairman of the People's Republic of China, who is visiting Indonesia, and President Sukarno issue joint communique declaring their opposition to Malaysia and their determination to work for its destruction.
- 22 April Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front) organizes protest march in Singapore against 2 February arrests. A riot leads to the arrest of 8 people including 5 members of the Legislature.

1963 (Continued)

- 23 May Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno meet in Manila and issue a communique agreeing to a tripartite summit conference.
- 30 May President Sukarno and Prime Minister Rahman meet in Tokyo.
- 31 May US Government and Indonesia reach agreement on status of foreign-owned oil enterprises in Indonesia.
- 7 June - 14 June Tripartite foreign ministers meeting in Manila; proposes UN assessment of the wishes of the Borneo peoples on Malaysia; agreement is reached on a "consultative council", to be formed of the three heads of government. They also suggest that the forthcoming Heads of State meeting take the first steps toward joining into Maphilindo "confederation of nations of Malay origin".
- 14 June The Philippines announces -- in line with Maphilindo -- that a central secretariat of it, Malaya and Indonesia has been agreed upon to handle problems between the three countries.
- 27 June Malaya and Singapore representatives hold financial talks in London.
- 3 July Sultan of Brunei arrives in London for talks on Malaysia.
- 7 July - 9 July Prime Minister Rahman in London. UK, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak sign agreement in London on Malaysia. Brunei does not sign. Singapore agrees to a 15 year development loan without interest on two thirds of the sum requested. Loan is for five years.
- 10 July The Philippines announce that a four day conference of the Heads of Philippines, Malaya and Indonesia will begin in Manila on 30 July.
- President Sukarno accuses Prime Minister Rahman of breach of faith in signing the London agreement without a UN plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the North Borneo people. President Sukarno says "... I declare to the world that Tunku Abdul Rahman is a man who does not keep his word ... I declare here openly that we Indonesian people not only disagree with Malaysia but we oppose it at all costs...Now I have my doubts about the coming Maphilindo summit conference..."

1963 (Continued)

- 13 July The Philippines appeals to Malaya and Indonesia to resolve any differences of opinion during the Manila summit conference.
- 19 July The UK House of Commons approves the Malaysia Bill for the creation of Malaysia on 31 August 1963.
- 23 July President Rahman says he is prepared to meet President Sukarno at any time or place to discuss Indonesia's objections to Malaysia and asserts he does not understand Indonesia's new objections.
- 27 July President Sukarno says at a rally that Malaysia is "endangering the Indonesian revolution". He says "To crush Malaysia we must launch a confrontation in all fields. We cannot talk sweetly to the imperialists." At the same time he announces he will attend the Manila summit talks.
- 30 July - 5 August Manila summit meeting convened. U Thant is asked by the three Heads of State to ascertain whether the people of North Borneo and Sarawak wish to join Malaysia. Meeting ends in apparent harmony, validating three basic agreements -- the Manila accords earlier agreed to by their foreign ministers, the Manila Joint Statement and the Manila Declaration.
- 2 August Singapore Legislative Assembly formally approves the Malaysia merger.
- 8 August U Thant agrees to ascertain the views of the people of Sabah and Sarawak.
- 12 August UN names nine-member mission to ascertain wishes of North Borneo and Sarawak. The mission is to reach the area on 16 August and the Secretary-General states he "hopes that the mission will be able to complete its work in approximately four weeks."
- 16 August UN Mission arrives in Sarawak greeted by demonstrations against Malaysia.
- Ghurka Rifles unit clashes with what a British army spokesman says are "a group of about 50 Indonesian-based terrorists" on the Sarawak border.
- 22 August Observer dispute holds up UN assessment.
- 24 August Sarawak announces that "Indonesia-based terrorists" have fired on Gumbang, a mile inside the frontier. This is said to be the fifth attack on Gumbang since April and the third in four nights.

1963 (Continued)

- 26 August UN survey in Sarawak and North Borneo begins with Philippine and Indonesian observers still absent.
- 28 August President Sukarno says in nationwide radio talk "We will have to bow our heads and obey," if the Borneo people want to join Malaysia.
- 29 August Malaya announces that Malaysia will be formed 16 September instead of on the originally scheduled date, 31 August, since the UN survey will not be completed until 14 September.
- 2 September Indonesia's Defense Minister General Nasution said his country had helped train "more than 6,000 anti-British, anti-Malaysian rebels in the North Borneo territories". He says Indonesia has no territorial ambitions and if popular support for Malaysia is proved Indonesia will be "legally bound to halt its assistance to the underground movement".
- 3 September Indonesia sends protest to Malaya on the "reckless and premature decision" to set up Malaysia on 16 September as "a unilateral act contravening the letter and spirit of the Manila Summit agreements". This decision, Indonesia says "forestalls the outcome" of the UN enquiry.
- 5 September UN assessment team completes its work.
- 14 September UN assessment is published and U Thant says great majority of the people favor Malaysia.
- 15 September Indonesian Cabinet meets, decides Malaysia is illegal and cannot be recognized.
- Dr. Subandrio says Indonesia is withholding recognition of Malaysia until corrections are made to the UN report. He says UN survey was not conducted in accord with the Manila agreement and terms it "hasty".
- Malay Cabinet recommends break-off in diplomatic relations with Indonesia.
- Philippines informs Malaya it will defer recognition of Malaysia.
- 16 September Malaysia comes into being.
- Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur is stoned.

1963 (Continued)

- 16 September
(continued) British and Malaysian Embassies in Djakarta are stoned by 5,000 Indonesians and the British Ambassador's car is burned.
- Indonesia breaks diplomatic relations with Malaysia.
- 17 September Malaysia severs diplomatic relations with Indonesia and the Philippines because of their non-recognition of the Federation.
- Indonesian labor unions take over three British companies in Djakarta, including Dunlop Rubber Company.
- Indonesia announces is "greatly deplores" the stoning of the British and Malaysian Embassies and would take measures against the guilty but adds that it "appreciates the militant attitude of various groups of our society and the fact that our people has shown its indignation about the formation of Malaysia which is not in accordance with the Manila Summit Conference."
- 18 September Malaysia announces creation of a Defense Council and initial steps to call up its reserves for transport to Sabah and Sarawak.
- Britain states it is ready to help defend Malaysia's independence and integrity.
- British Embassy is burned in Djakarta by a mob of 10,000. Shell Oil Company offices are taken over by unions.
- 19 September 300 demonstrators in Kuala Lumpur occupy the home of the former Indonesian Ambassador and threaten to burn it.
- US makes complaint to Indonesia on the burning of the British Embassy. Department of State says Ambassador acting on instructions "made strong representations to President Sukarno over the outrageous incidents of the last few days, including the burning of the British Embassy."
- Indonesia issues statement deploring destruction of UK Embassy, but adding it "fully understood the flaming anger of the people toward the actions carried out by the side which became the mastermind of Malaysia" and was in reply to actions in Kuala Lumpur.
- Indonesian trade unions take over all British enterprise in Indonesia, including plantations and banks.

1963 (Continued)

- 20 September Indonesia announces take-over of all British companies "for their own protection".
- 21 September Indonesia breaks trade relations with Malaysia.
- 22 September David E. Bell, US Foreign Aid Administrator, says that aid to Indonesia is being reviewed in the light of the burning of the British Embassy and states "We have made it quite plain... to the Indonesian Government that...the US is able to assist other governments only when they behave sensibly in international affairs..."
- 24 September US announces it will withhold, at least for the time being, all new economic aid for Indonesia.
- 25 September President Sukarno says Indonesia will "fight and destroy" Malaysia. US suspends military aid to Indonesia running at \$15 million a year.
- 27 September Answering charges made by Indonesia in United Nations General Assembly, UK Foreign Secretary Lord Home maintains "Malaysia is a major act of decolonization in Asia."
- 25 October Philippines Acting Foreign Secretary, Librado Cayco says his country will follow an "independent position" on the question of recognizing Malaysia and would not be guided by the "Indonesian line".
- 10 November Prime Minister Rahman says "Let it be clear that our defense agreement with Britain is of our own free will. We live in an area which is full of trouble, especially from communism. We need this agreement to ensure our peace and security."
- 11 November President Sukarno says he has proof Malaysia was created by Britain to encircle Indonesia and the People's Republic of China.
- 15 November - 23 November Indonesian General Nasution visits USSR and receives assurances of military equipment for the armed forces under existing agreements "in accordance with their needs".
- 17 November Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak says that in regard to the Philippines "we are now close to a settlement of our differences" but as for Indonesia "there can be no settlement with them unless they withdraw their troops from the border of Borneo and end their confronta-tion policy."

1963 (Continued)

- 20 November Indonesia says it has caught "several hundred British spies masquerading as North Kalimantan refugees."
- 23 November - 30 November General Nasution visits US, the original invitation having been given by the late President Kennedy. On 29 November, President Johnson conveys to General Nasution the "deep disquiet" of the United States over Indonesia's attitude toward Malaysia. General Nasution tells press he told Johnson that Indonesia "will not start a clash from our side" but would defend itself if attacked and that Johnson expressed hope of "an Asian solution".
- 26 November UK Foreign Minister Butler, speaking to the Foreign Press Association in London says "We hope that Indonesia will realize our sense of purpose... come what may, we intend to support Malaysia in her struggle for independence and success. I hope this will not mean any confrontation with Indonesia...But nothing will prevent us from backing the growth and independence of Malaysia...."
- 2 December Indonesian Brigadier-General Sukowati says "the Indonesian Government would always be ready to train North Kalimantan youths if they requested it."
- 3 December Indonesia takes over five Malaysian-owned rubber remilling plants in South Sumatra following a 6 November decree of Sukarno that all businesses "wholly or partly belonging to Malaysian nationals having domicile in Malaysian territory" must be taken over.
- 4 December President Sukarno says he will agree to Malaysia if the UN undertakes a second survey and interviews imprisoned leaders.
- 6 December Dr. Subandrio says Indonesia deliberately willing to forgo development in the interest of nation building.
- 9 December President Macapagal, in written interview with its Antara News Agency says that a first step toward a solution of the Malaysia problem would be a meeting of the three Maphilindo states. He says negotiations are being conducted between Philippines and Malaysia through Thailand over the eventual restoration of diplomatic relations but declines further comment.

- 11 December Dr. Subandrio tells the Indonesian Parliament that Indonesia will concentrate on economic confrontation in its crush Malaysia policy. "We are now getting rid of the economic stranglehold on Indonesia which stands at the base of the setting up of Malaysia. This was further accomplished through severance of our trade relations with Malaysia". He says that expected aid in the amount anticipated had not come and therefore "State revenue is indeed below our former expectation" and had resulted in "a state deficit which is not little".
- 17 December General Nasution announces that Indonesia and France will resume military agreements and exchange of French and Indonesian officers. He also reveals that the UK has suspended implementation of arms agreements but says that even if all Western countries revoked their contracts, a basic agreement reached this year with Moscow would safeguard Indonesia's security should such a contingency arise.
- 18 December Malaysia and Singapore are reported as having lost £38 million in three months of "confrontation".
- 19 December Sukarno accuses the United States of trying to deter Indonesia from its opposition to Malaysia by sending the Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean. He says "...even if two, three, four or seven fleets want to deter Indonesia, we will continue to crush Malaysia."
- General Maxwell D. Taylor, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says that the Seventh Fleet is extending its operations from Taiwan to include the Indian Ocean. Ships in the Indian Ocean will be an aircraft carrier, three or four destroyers.
- 27 December It is announced that Presidents Sukarno and Macapagal will meet in Manila 7-12 January and it is reported that President Sukarno will raise the question of diverting Indonesian trade from Hong Kong to a Philippine port.
- 31 December Malaysia's delegate to the UN sees Secretary-General to accuse Indonesia of violating Malaysian airspace and carrying out an armed attack against Sabah. He charges seven violations of airspace between 13 November and 8 December by fighters, bombers and helicopters.

1964

- 2 January Dr. Subandrio accuses Malaysia of aggression consisting of aircraft violations of Indonesian territory.
- At the UN, Indonesian delegate rejects Malaysian charges of 31 December regarding Indonesian overflights. He says that between 18 November and 18 December 1963 three British aircraft had been shot down over Indonesia.
- 3 January Dr. Subandrio says he has asked the Indonesian delegate to inform the UN of the "many aggressions" by Malaysia and UK.
- 6 January President Johnson sends note to President Sukarno saying that the Malaysian crisis forms a major obstacle to US-Indonesia relations and that a further improvement in relations would be difficult under present circumstances. At the same time US says Seventh Fleet movements in the Indian Ocean have nothing to do with Indonesia.
- Britain and Malaysia issue joint communique after defense talks in Kuala Lumpur stating their determination to "continue to meet Indonesian aggression with resolution and in unity." At least 6,000 British troops are reported to be in Sabah, or nearly half the strategic reserve in Britain's Western commitment to Far Eastern defense. Britain is reported asking Australia and New Zealand for help.
- 7 January D.N. Aidit, Indonesian communist party chief, calls on Indonesia to oppose the coming of the US Seventh Fleet off Indonesia in a policy of encirclement conducted "with the full support of Nehru."
- 7 - 11 January Presidents Sukarno and Macapagal hold talks in Manila and issue a statement saying "they cherish the hope that a tripartite mushawarah would be convened to resolve existing differences amongst the three signatories to the (Manila) agreements."
- Indonesia at UN accuses Britain and Malaysia of repeated violations of its territory and airspace, in note delivered to the Secretary-General.

1964 (Continued)

- 13 January Prime Minister Rahman, commenting on the 11 January statement of Presidents Sukarno and Macapagal, says Malaysia had done everything possible to see that earlier agreements were carried out, including a UN assessment. He says any summit meeting must be preceded by clarification of whether Indonesia and the Philippines recognize Malaysia as an independent sovereign State and whether Indonesia will withdraw its troops from Malaysia.
- US announces that Robert Kennedy, Attorney General, will go to Japan to discuss Malaysia with President Sukarno.
- 16 January Dr. Subandrio, arriving in Tokyo for the talks with Robert Kennedy, says Indonesia might be compelled to consider a major shift in foreign policy if the West took a "general offensive" against it in the light of the Malaysia dispute. He says, of a Hong Kong decision to suspend exports of certain strategic goods to Indonesia, that "a British general offensive can completely change the foundation of Indonesia's foreign policy, which to date has consistently refrained from concluding military pacts with any power from any quarter." Indonesian spokesmen say the initiative for the Kennedy talks came from the US.
- On his arrival in Tokyo, Mr. Kennedy says that the Malaysia dispute must be resolved "by Asian countries, not by outsiders" but adds "we have in the United States a bond of friendship with Indonesia, and by expressing our concern that Indonesia, Malaysia and the other countries concerned settle their differences in a peaceful fashion, a major step forward would be accomplished in our judgment."
- 18 January Indonesian unionists attempt to take over the British-Dutch Unilever Corporation.
- 21 January Indonesian Government tells unionists that their action in trying to take over Unilever was illegal and that work should continue as usual. An Indonesian mediator rules that British management should retain its authority. B.W. Schwartz, director of Unilever in Indonesia terms the meetings "most successful".

1964 (Continued)

- 21 January (continued) Prime Minister Rahman agrees to meet President Macapagal in Cambodia to discuss Malaysia in mid-February. Prince Sihanouk arrives on a surprise visit to Kuala Lumpur and says he has come at President Macapagal's request and would also try to arrange a meeting of the two and Sukarno.
- Mr. Kennedy arrives in Kuala Lumpur to try to arrange a meeting of Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. Mr. Kennedy is reported to have proposed a 20 mile demilitarized zone on either side of the Borneo border.
- 23 January President Sukarno announces a cease-fire with Malaysia but states that the "crush Malaysia" policy will continue even though "tactics may change".
- President Sukarno and Robert Kennedy, in Djakarta, issue separate statements on their talks. Both call for cease-fire.
- 24 January Mr. Kennedy, arriving in London, says President Sukarno has "not given up his opposition to Malaysia" but "he has given up...military confrontation and military activities against Malaysia while (a) conference goes on."
- UK tells Mr. Kennedy it is prepared to go to war to uphold its commitments to Malaysia.
- 28 January Indonesian Minister of Cooperatives and Village Community Development says economic "confrontation" will be carried on despite the cease-fire and that the break in economic relations with Malaysia is "permanent" in order to free Indonesian economy from "imperialist shackles".
- 29 January Prime Minister Rahman says he has asked Australia, Canada, and New Zealand for military aid in the form of training and equipment. Regarding the cease-fire he says "so far so good". He announces he will go to Cambodia for talks with President Macapagal in February.
- President Sukarno says he will not accept a cease-fire which is interpreted as an order to surrender. Ruslan Abdulgani, Indonesian Minister of Education, says Malaysian pamphlets dropped to "Indonesian volunteers" in Sabah asking them

1964 (Continued)

- 29 January (continued) to surrender contradicted the cease-fire agreement. He says the "volunteers" should secure their positions while maintaining the cease-fire.
- Prince Sihanouk, in Indonesia, says Sukarno had shown "sympathetic interest" in his offer of Cambodia as a site for a tripartite summit conference.
- 30 January Indonesia drops leaflets to guerrillas in Borneo stating "keep your weapons in your hands and defend your present positions."
- 2 February One hundred eleven left-wing politicians and trade unionists are arrested in Singapore charged with aiming at making it a "Cuba style base".
- 5 - 11 February Tripartite talks are held at Foreign Minister level in Bangkok on cease-fire. The Ministers state agreement in principle to supervision of truce by Thailand and ask U Thant to designate Thailand in that role but the final communique reveals that there is a difference of understanding between Indonesia and Malaysia; the one insisting that a cease-fire does not mean withdrawal from Malaysian territory; Malaysia demanding this withdrawal as a pre-condition.
- 7 February U Thant agrees to designate Thailand to supervise the cease-fire.
- 12 February Malaysia and Philippines agree to consider establishment of consulates and an exchange of notes on the Sabah claim at a meeting between President Macapagal and Prime Minister Rahman in Cambodia.
- U Thant states he will limit his role in the cease-fire to taking note that the three countries concerned had designated Thailand as supervisor.
- 20 February Malaysia makes written request for British air defense against any Indonesian attempt to supply guerrilla forces on Malaysian territory.

1964 (Continued)

- 21 February President Sukarno says Indonesia can withstand withdrawal of economic aid. He says "Our enemies always threaten us with 'if the Indonesian people continue with confrontation against Malaysia economic aid will be withdrawn'...Indonesia does not fear these threats because Indonesia is rich in natural wealth, and manpower which now numbers 103,000,000 people."
- Indonesian naval spokesman says that scheduled Commonwealth navy exercises (Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, UK) in South East Asian waters, directed from Singapore is "another attempt at influencing the morale of the Indonesian people in carrying out their revolution...That Britain and her allies will launch a military maneuver in Far East waters was a thing we had expected earlier". He says that the 10,000 man strong exercise of 30 warships could be met, if need be, with a 55,000 man strong fleet in a short time.
- 22 February Malaysia states that there have been six encounters between security forces and guerrillas equipped and led by Indonesians since 30 January, the week following Indonesia's agreement to halt operations.
- Dr. Subandrio says that operations to re-equip the Indonesian irregulars in Borneo will begin immediately.
- 23 February Malaysia announces that any unidentified or unauthorized aircraft flying over Malaysian Borneo will be intercepted.
- 23 February Malaysia announces that four RAF Hawker Hunter jets have been based on Kuching and are flying patrol missions over Sarawak. Malaysia states there are some 200 guerrillas still in the jungles of Sabah and Sarawak.
- 24 February Prime Minister Rahman says Indonesia's confrontation policy could break out into open hostilities at any time now and says the Indonesian leaders have "no regard for peace or the integrity of neighboring nations" and that they are "callous and destructive".

1964 (Continued)

- 24 February (continued) Meeting in emergency session the Malaysian Cabinet sends an appeal to Thailand to convene an urgent meeting of representatives of Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines to bring about an effective cease-fire in Borneo.
- Cabinet statement repeats Malaysia's stand that it will not agree to continuation of Ministerial talks in Bangkok between the three countries, recessed on 10 February, as long as Indonesian guerrillas remain in Malaysia.
- President Sukarno criticizes Anglo-American intervention in Asian affairs at a mass rally in conjunction with the visit of President Macapagal.
- President Macapagal, speaking before President Sukarno, says that solutions to Asian problems must be found by Asians and could not be imposed by imperialists. The Maphilindo nations must first get along on equality before there is greater unity.
- 26 February President Sukarno reiterates that Indonesia is resolutely determined to crush what is presently constituted as Malaysia because it is a neo-colonialist project jeopardizing the identity, independence and unity of Indonesia.
- 28 February Sukarno-Macapagal joint communique is issued supporting the principle of Asian solutions for Asian problems and urging a reconvening of the Bangkok Ministerial talks.
- 1 March General Nasution says Indonesia would never invade Malaysia if British military bases were removed. These bases, he says, are a source of trouble preventing stability in South East Asia and that Britain's role in creating Malaysia was the same as that of creating a federation in South Arabia.
- 2 - 4 March Resumed Bangkok Ministerial talks break down on the cease-fire question with Malaysia insisting on the withdrawal of all Indonesian guerrillas from its territory.

1964 (Continued)

- 7 March Kuching announces that on 6 March about 60 Indonesian-based guerrillas had been found in Malaysian territory and that 3 Gurkhas had been killed.
- Prime Minister Rahman says he will take the guerrilla issue to the UN if border strife continues.
- 8 March Prime Minister Rahman says he favors a military call up to meet the danger of Indonesian aggression.
- 9 March Philippines is reported to agree to establishment of consular relations with Malaysia.
- 10 March Malaysia formally asks Thailand to send observers to the cease-fire area.
- Malaysia orders conscription for men 21-29 years old.
- 27 March Malaysia informs U Thant of fifty incidents between 16 January and 27 March with Indonesia. Malaysia asks U Thant to take any further initiative he deems desirable.
- 1 April Malaysia says Indonesia is putting pre-conditions on Maphilindo talks by insisting that its troops should remain in Malaysia territory.
- 8 April Prime Minister Rahman says Malaysia no longer considers the Borneo truce effective.
- Washington officials express hope that Rahman's statement does not mean that the cease-fire issue is irrevocably closed.
- 15 April U Thant replies to Malaysia's letter of 27 March stating "I shall continue to examine thoroughly all possibilities for the United Nations to help in preserving international peace and security in this area."
- 16 April Australia announces it will deploy more land, sea and air forces in support of Malaysian forces defending the Borneo territories against Indonesian intrusions. Defense Minister informs House of Representatives this action is being taken in response to an urgent request from Malaysia.

1964 (Continued)

- 16 April (continued) Australian Foreign Minister, Sir Garfield Barwick, says that any large scale hostilities would involve the United States through the Anzus Treaty.
- 18 April Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament says that "two units of volunteers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the 'crush Malaysia' campaign will soon arrive in Indonesia."
- 23 April Malaysia issues white paper accusing Indonesia of plotting the assassination of Prime Minister Rahman and other members of the Government.
- 25 April Prime Minister Rahman's party, in election, wins 89 of Malaya's 104 seats in the Malaysian Parliament, a gain of 15 seats. This gives Prime Minister Rahman a majority in the federal parliament without the need for the votes of allied parties in Sarawak and Sabah.
- 27 April Dr. Subandrio says in Parliament no pressure from any quarter "would prevent us from settling the Malaysia question by confrontation in any field. We shall keep carrying out our confrontation and our policy of crushing Malaysia."
- 1 May Malaysia Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that without the defense agreement with Britain, Malaysia would have been annihilated. He says "The problem of Indonesia is the problem of President Sukarno. It is a problem of how to stay in power... We must give hope to the millions in South East Asia, particularly those in Indonesia, who we hope will regain their independence."
- 3 May President Sukarno tells rally his patience with Prime Minister Rahman has ended and that he has ordered 21 million volunteers to help the people of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah dissolve Malaysia and attain national independence.
- Sukarno's order is styled an "action command" declaring "we now order the 21 million volunteers to increase the revolutionary vitality, and help the people of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah dissolve Malaysia and attain national independence." He repeats his "go to hell" statement regarding US foreign aid.

1964 (Continued)

- 3 May (continued) General Nasution says Indonesia gives "concrete aid" to Borneo guerrillas and "we are training them". He says "the chief task of the Indonesian armed forces is to crush Malaysia."
- Philippines and Malaysia issue joint communique saying that they have agreed to exchange consular missions which will be established in Manila and Kuala Lumpur on 18 May.
- 5 May William P. Bundy, US Assistant Secretary of State, says that if Indonesia continues or steps up its campaign in North Borneo it would be guilty of aggression.
- UK Foreign Secretary Butler, en route to Manila, says the Malaysian dispute is primarily a matter for Asians.
- 6 May Secretary-General of the Indonesian National Defense Council announces that a combat brigade of volunteers will soon be sent to the Borneo border, prepared to enter Malaysian territory at any time. He says this is a follow up to the action command of 3 May.
- President Macapagal and UK Foreign Minister Butler issue joint statement in Manila stating that the Philippines will attempt to bring about a peaceful solution to the Malaysia-Indonesia problem and that Britain supports Maphilindo as a long term solution. Mr. Butler states before leaving Manila "Britain does not intend to act as an Asian power. All we can do is look after the defense of Malaysia, to which we are committed by treaty. If we are asked our opinion we will give it."
- 9 May President Sukarno tells the US Ambassador in Indonesia that he will not deviate from confrontation policy.
- 20 May President Sukarno tells crowd of 100,000 that before the sun rises on next January, Indonesia will have completely crushed Malaysia.
- 13 June Ten Indonesian guerrillas are killed by Malaysians who say guerrillas were moving into Sarawak.
- 15 June Indonesia and Malaysia issue joint statement in Tokyo dealing with withdrawals and checkpoints.

1964 (Continued)

- 17 June Indonesia charges guerrillas who were killed on 13th were ambushed by Malaysian security forces, although attempting to withdraw. Indonesia says this endangers the guerrilla withdrawal agreement.
- 18 - 19 June Tripartite Ministerial talks in Tokyo prepare agenda for heads of government meeting.
- 21 June One day summit conference of President Sukarno, Macapagal and Prime Minister Rahman, in Tokyo, collapses on the issue of guerrilla withdrawal. Philippines propose a four-power Asian-African conciliation commission. The proposal is accepted by President Sukarno. Prime Minister Rahman accepts with the proviso that all acts of hostility against Malaysia cease forthwith, which is unacceptable to President Sukarno.
- 22 June In a six hour battle in Sarawak five Gurkha soldiers are killed in action against 100 guerrillas.
- 22 June - 2 July Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan visits Indonesia. Mikoyan says "We, the Soviet Union wish to crush neo-colonialism as embodied in Malaysia. We have given a lot of aid in modern weapons in Asia, weapons whose quality is much better than those possessed by the British in Malaysia." Final communique says "Complete agreement was reached on various issues ... as well as in the framework of arms delivery to the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia..."
- 24 June Dr. Subandrio says that after the Tokyo summit there is no alternative but to intensify the command to crush Malaysia.
- 26 June President Sukarno says the UN survey in the Borneo territories was "utterly undemocratic...a few groups of people were asked - while they were surrounded by fully armed British soldiers - their opinions..." "I do not agree with the pronouncement of U Thant...U Thant apparently did not see through the undemocratic ways and actions of the survey."
- 28 June UK says it will send Bloodhound anti-aircraft missiles to its South East Asia forces.
- 30 June Indonesian General says "We will give physical aid to the fighting people of North Kalimantan and in this connection we are prepared to wage a long-term guerrilla war."

1964 (Continued)

- 2 July Malaysia announces conscription of men between 21 and 29 years for military training beginning 1 August.
- 3 July Prime Minister Rahman says Chinese youths from Singapore and Malaya are receiving military training in Indonesia before returning to conduct warfare in Malaysia.
- 6 July Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman says that the USSR had "pledged to send new and modern arms to Indonesia to face the British inspired neo-colonialist Malaysia Federation."
- 8 July Chief Minister of Sarawak says more than 1,000 Chinese communists in Sarawak have joined the Indonesian forces.
- 8 - 15 July Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London. In the final communique, issued on 15 July, the Prime Ministers state "they assured the Prime Minister of Malaysia of their sympathy and support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence and integrity of his country and to promote a peaceful and honorable settlement of current differences between Malaysia and neighboring countries."
- 10 July President Sukarno says Indonesia is ready to join a federation of "free" Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak.
- 10 - 16 July Dr. Subandrio in Moscow. Joint USSR-Indonesia communique issued on 16 July says that both are against the "neo-colonialists' project of Malaysia."
- 21 July Indonesia announces it will get rocket speedboats and guided missiles-equipped vessels from USSR as a result of Dr. Subandrio's visit to the USSR. It also states it will get 58 helicopters for anti-submarine detection from USSR and France.
- 22 - 24 July Riots involving Malays and Chinese break out in Singapore; 18 people are killed.
- 24 July - 4 August Prime Minister Rahman visits Washington. Joint communique issued after talks between President Johnson and Prime Minister Rahman states the US "agreed to provide military training in the United States for Malaysian personnel, and to

1964 (Continued)

- 24 July - 4 August
(continued) consider promptly and sympathetically credit sales, under existing arrangements, of appropriate military equipment for the defense of Malaysia." In New York as part of 12-day visit to US, Prime Minister Rahman tells UN correspondents that although the US has offered Malaysia arms it "does not want to be involved in our trouble with Indonesia and will remain neutral." He also says "though the time may come in the trouble when we will seek UK intervention at the moment we are not in any need of it."
- 17 August Malaysia reports armed Indonesian unit of about 40 armed raiders land on the west coast of Johore state on the Malayan mainland. Landing is reported to UN.
- 18 August In Djakarta Indonesia officially denies knowledge of any raid on Malaysia.
- 19 August Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio describes reports of Indonesian landings on Malayan mainland as "mere fabrications of Kuala Lumpur.
- 2 September Indonesian aircraft flies over South Malaya mainland dropping about 30 armed paratroopers.
- 3 September Malaysia requests "urgent meeting of Security Council" to consider "Indonesian aggression" evidenced in paratroop drop on Malayan mainland.
- Malaysia put under state of emergency by central government.
- 3 September -
8 September Rioting in Singapore causes 13 deaths and arrest of 800.
- 9 September -
17 September Security Council meets under Soviet President. After six meetings, Norwegian draft resolution in effect deploring Indonesian action in dropping paratroopers over Malaya receives 9 votes in favor. Voting against are Czechoslovakia and the USSR whose negative vote vetoes the resolution.
- 16 September Anniversary of first year of Malaysia.

1964 (Continued)

- 5 - 11 October Heads of 47 non-aligned countries meet in Cairo, Malaysia not seated. President Nkrumah of Ghana suggests mediation of conflict.
- 6 October President Macapagal, visiting the US, deplors Indonesian aggression on Malayan mainland but omits mention of Malaysian sovereignty over North Borneo territories, where the Philippines claims Sabah.
- 16 October People's Republic of China announces explosion of atomic bomb.
- N.S. Khrushchev removed from offices in USSR.
- Labour Party victorious in the UK.
- 3 November Lyndon B. Johnson elected President of US.
- 11 November Australia outlines big step-up in military preparations to face "increasing risks" over Indonesian attacks on Malaysia.
- 1 December 19th Session of the General Assembly opens.
- 7 December Prime Minister Harold Wilson in US for talks with President Lyndon B. Johnson. Subjects include South East Asia.
- 30 December UN General Assembly, under formula of non-voting, chooses Malaysia to serve on Security Council. Indonesia, while voicing opposition, does not cast negative vote.
- 31 December In Djakarta President Sukarno, speaking to an illiteracy gathering, announces that Indonesia is withdrawing from the UN in protest of the seating of Malaysia in Security Council.

1965

- 6 January People's Republic of China journal "Renmin Ribao" says 'Malaysia has, as a result of careful scheming by the United States, been pushed into the seat of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. This is an outright move of provocation and hostility against Indonesia. Driven beyond the limit of its forbearance, Indonesia has unequivocally decided to withdraw

1965 (Continued)

- 6 January (continued) from the United Nations. The Chinese people resolutely support this just step taken by the Indonesian Government." Also says, "The United Nations under US control has long ceased to reflect the will of the world's people, and is now a corrupted organ in the service of old and new colonialism and a dirty place where a few big nations divide their spoils among themselves."
- 7 January President Sukarno formally announces Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in an address at a rally in Djakarta held to condemn foreign military bases. "On 7 January 1965, at 22.30 hours (15.30 G.M.T.) I declare as follows: In my announcement a few days ago I said that if Malaysia became a Security Council member I should order Indonesia to walk out of the United Nations. Now, since Malaysia has become a Security Council member, I declare that Indonesia has walked out of the United Nations." He also said Indonesia's withdrawal included from UN specialized agencies. He says, "We can afford to operate without the United Nations specialized agencies. This is good for our nation to stand on its own feet. I have said: 'Go to Hell with your aid.' Yes, we will have nothing more to do with the United Nations agencies."
- 21 January At UN Headquarters, Indonesian representative delivers formal letter, dated 20 January, of withdrawal from UN. (For text, see Appendix M)
- 24 January In Peking, Premier Chou En-lai greets Indonesia's Foreign Minister Subandrio and calls for new UN. Says, "A revolutionary United Nations may well be set up so that rival dramas may be staged in competition with that body which calls itself the United Nations but which, being under the manipulation of United States imperialism, is capable only of making mischief and can do nothing good."
- 28 January People's Republic of China, in communique issued at end of Dr. Subandrio's visit to Peking, says it will "absolutely not sit idly by" if Britain and the US dare "oppose war on the Indonesian people." Also announces \$100 million development loan to Indonesia, \$10 million of which is in cash.

* * * * *

**APPENDIX A: EXCERPTS FROM OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT OF
MALAYSIA ON TRANSITION OF MALAYA INTO MALAYSIA
ALSO EXCERPTS FROM CONSTITUTION
Kuala Lumpur, September 1963**

The Federation of Malaya as its name implies was until today a Federation of eleven States and was governed by a written constitution.

Article 1 of the constitution stated:

- (1) "The Federation shall be known by the name of Persekutuan Tanah Melayu (in English the Federation of Malaya).
- (2) The States of the Federation are Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor and Trengganu (formerly known as the Malay States) and Malacca and Penang (formerly known as the Settlements of Malacca and Penang)."

Article 2 (a) of the Constitution stated:

"Parliament may by law admit other States to the Federation".

Article 159 of the Constitution providing for Amendment of the Constitution stated *inter alia*:

- (1) Subject to the following provisions of this Article, the provision of this Constitution may be amended by Federal Law.
- (2)
- (3) A Bill for making any amendment to the Constitution (other than an amendment excepted from the provision of this clause) shall not be passed in either House of Parliament unless it has been supported on Second and Third Readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of that House."

By Section 4 of the "Malaysia Act" passed by both Houses of Parliament on the 20th August, 1963 with the requisite majorities as stated in Article 159 above, Article 1 of the Constitution was substituted by the following Article:

- (1) "The Federation shall be known, in Malay and in English, by the name of Malaysia.
- (2) The States of the Federation shall be:
 - (a) the States of Malaya, namely, Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Penang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor and Trengganu; and
 - (b) The Borneo States, namely, Sabah and Sarawak; and
 - (c) the State of Singapore.
- (3) The territories of each of the States mentioned in Clause (2) are the territories comprised therein immediately before Malaysia Day."

In the result therefore two things have happened:

- (1) The Federation has been enlarged by the addition of three more States as permitted and provided for in Article 2 of the Constitution;

Appendix A (continued)

(2) The name 'Federation of Malaya' has been changed to 'Malaysia'.

Accordingly, in no sense is it a new State that has come into being but the old State has continued in an enlarged form and with a new name.

Among other provisions of the constitution of Malaysia are the following:

Religion

"Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religion may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation". Article 3 (1)

Head of State

The Head of State (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) is elected by the Conference of Rulers. The election is for five years. Eligible for Head of State are the Sultans of the Malay peninsula states of Pahang, Trengganu, Kedah, Johore, Negri-Sembilan, Kelantan, Selangor, Perak, and Perlis. The other states of the peninsula - Penang and Malacca - as well as Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, have Governors, not Rulers, and therefore do not participate in the election of the Head of State.

Parliament

The Parliament consists of two houses, the Senate and House of Representatives. The Senate has 28 elected and 22 appointed members. Each of the 14 constituent states elects 2 members, and the other 22 Senators are appointed by the Head of State.

Power however rests in the House of Representatives. This consists of 159 elected members of which 104 are from the 11 states of Malaya, 15 from Singapore, 26 from Sarawak and 14 from Sabah.

The actual rule of the country, as in Britain, is based on the Cabinet system of a Prime Minister and Ministers.

APPENDIX B - THE COBBOLD COMMISSION

The terms of reference of the Cobbold Commission were:

"Having regard to the expressed agreement of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya that the inclusion of North Borneo and Sarawak (together with other territories) in the proposed Federation of Malaysia is a desirable aim in the interests of the peoples of the territories concerned -

"a) to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak on this question; and

"b) in the light of their assessment of these views, to make recommendations."

The Commission was appointed on 16 January 1962 and was composed of Lord Cobbold, Chairman who was agreed on by the 2 parties; two members nominated by the United Kingdom, Sir Anthony Abell and Sir David Watherston; and two members nominated by Malaya, Dato Wong Pow Nee, and Enche Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie. The Commission arrived in Kuching, Sarawak, on 19 February 1962.

According to the Commission's report all persons who wished to submit written memoranda were invited to do so and some 2,200 were received - about 600 in Sabah and 1,600 in

Appendix B (continued)

Sarawak – from town boards, district councils, political parties, chambers of commerce, trade unions, religious leaders and individuals. At the same time an open invitation was given to anyone wishing to give oral evidence. The Commission held 50 hearings while in the territories from 19 February to 18 April at which more than 4,000 persons attended in about 690 groups, varying in size from 1 to more than 50. The 50 hearings were held at 35 different centers, 20 in Sarawak and 15 in Sabah.

APPENDIX C: TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN MALAYA AND INDONESIA, 1959

On 17 April 1959 Malaya and Indonesia signed a treaty of friendship. This is the only such treaty Malaya has entered into with any country. The text of the treaty is:

Aware of the existing ties of history, race and culture, which from time immemorial have bound together the people of both countries,

prompted by the desire to restore the relations, which have interrupted by accidents of history and to bring about and strengthen close mutual co-operation on matters exclusively affecting both countries consistent with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles as enunciated at the Asia-African Conference in Bandung in 1955.

The Federation of Malaya and The Republic of Indonesia

have decided to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and to this end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

THE HONOURABLE DATO' ABDUL RAZAK BIN DATO' HUSSEIN,
PRIME MINISTER, FEDERATION OF MALAYA

H.E. DR H. DJUANDA KARTAWIDJAJA,
PRIME MINISTER, REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA.

Who, having examined each other's credentials and having found them good and in due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. The two High Contracting Parties shall respect the independence and sovereignty of each other and shall strive to maintain the traditional, cultural and historical ties that have bound them together.

Article 2

2. The two High Contracting Parties agree to maintain and continue between them diplomatic and consular relations in accordance with international principles and usage and agree that the diplomatic and consular representatives of either Party shall enjoy, on a reciprocal basis, all the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities accorded to officers of their status and rank in conformity with the generally accepted principles of international law and usage.

Article 3

3. The two High Contracting Parties, recognising that, subject to consideration of security, public order, public health and immigration control of their respective countries, their nationals should be subject to the minimum of restrictions when

- (a) travelling between and within; and
- (b) residing

Appendix C (continued)

in the two countries, agree to examine any restrictions imposed on, and inconvenience now suffered by, their nationals so travelling and residing with a view to the conclusion of agreements alleviating such inconvenience or modifying or removing such restrictions on a reciprocal basis.

Article 4

4. The two High Contracting Parties agree that in case any dispute on matters directly and exclusively affecting them should arise they shall endeavour to settle such dispute through usual diplomatic channels in a true spirit of friendship and goodwill. If a settlement cannot be found through such channels within a reasonable time, they shall endeavour to settle them by other ways and means in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles enunciated at the Asia-African Conference in Bandung in 1955.

Article 5

5. The two High Contracting Parties, in order to bring about closer cooperation, agree to examine questions relating to consular relations, trade, communications, the surrender of fugitive offenders and all other matters of common interest with a view, wherever and whenever possible, to the conclusion of agreements on a reciprocal basis.

Article 6

6. The two High Contracting Parties, conscious of the fact that the Malay and Indonesian languages have a common origin, shall strive through cooperation, collaboration and consultation to achieve the greatest possible uniformity in their use and development.

Article 7

7. The two High Contracting Parties, desiring to achieve the maximum cooperation in the cultural intellectual, scientific and educational fields, agree subject to considerations of security and public order in their respective countries:

- (a) to promote the exchange of educationists, scientists, teachers, students, study groups, artists and representatives of social, and cultural organisations;
- (b) to promote the exchange of the findings and results of scientific and general research;
- (c) to promote the exchange through official channels of educational and cultural publications, films, newspapers, reviews and radio broadcasts in order to increase knowledge and mutual understanding;
- (d) to promote the exchange of objects of archaeological, historical and cultural interest;
- (e) to assist each other in the promotion of training in the educational, scientific, technical and industrial fields;
- (f) to encourage and facilitate the holding of concerts, and of art, scientific and literary exhibitions;
- (g) to encourage their students to study in the universities and educational institutions of each other;
- (h) to encourage and promote activities in the field of sports between their two countries; and
- (i) to protect the cultural and archaeological property of each other in so far as this is not covered by general agreements of an international character.

Article 8

8. This Treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the Instruments of Ratification which shall take place as soon as possible in Djakarta.

Article 9

9. Each High Contracting Party reserves the right to terminate this Treaty by means of a notification to the other High Contracting Party and such termination shall have effect at the expiration of six months from the date of such notification.

Article 10

10. This Treaty is drawn up in the Malay, Indonesian and English languages which have equal value. Any divergent interpretation of the three texts shall be settled by negotiation.

IN FAITH THEREOF the Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have signed the Treaty and have hereto affixed Their Seals.

Done in Kuala Lumpur on the Seventeenth Day of April in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-nine.

For the Federation of
Malaya

DATO' ABDUL RAZAK BIN
DATO' HUSSEIN

(Seal)

For the Republic of
Indonesia

DR. H. DJUANDA KARTI-
WIDJAJA

(Seal)

This is to certify that the text reproduced herein is a true and complete copy of the treaty and it includes all reservations made by the parties thereto."

APPENDIX D: JOINT STATEMENT OF INDONESIA AND MALAYA, 1 JUNE 1963

President Sukarno and Prime Minister Rahman met in Tokyo 31 May-1 June 1963 to hold talks regarding the creation of Malaysia and cleared the way for a summit conference between themselves and President Macapagal. After their meeting they issued the following joint statement:

"The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr. Sukarno, and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, having agreed that there was need for them to meet and clarify matters regarding problems arising from the proposal for the formation of Malaysia, held discussions on 31 May and 1 June, 1963 in Tokyo. Their amicable and frank exchange of views over the two days has achieved this purpose.

"2. The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their faith in the Treaty of Friendship between Indonesia and Malaya concluded in 1959 and agreed that any outstanding differences on matters directly and exclusively affecting them the two countries should seek to settle them in a spirit of neighbourliness and goodwill through every available channel as envisaged in the Treaty of Friendship.

"3. The two Heads of Governments recognising the desirability of restoring and maintaining friendly relation and historical ties which have bound the two countries, decided

Appendix D (continued)

that their respective Governments would take every possible measure to refrain from making acrimonious attacks on and disparaging references to each other.

"4. The President and the Prime Minister have also cleared the way for a meeting of Ministers to be held on 7 June in Manila amongst Indonesia, Philippines and Malaya which they hoped would lead to a meeting of Heads of Governments of the three countries. They would strive towards the achievement of a closer understanding between the three countries in matters of common concern and mutual interest.

"5. The President and the Prime Minister wish to thank the Prime Minister and the Government of Japan for their kind hospitality, in particular the Foreign Minister of Japan who so generously made available his house for the purpose of this historical and eventful occasion."

APPENDIX E: REPORT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF INDONESIA, MALAYA AND THE PHILIPPINES (THE MANILA ACCORD) - 31 July 1963

Following the Tokyo meeting of President Sukarno and Prime Minister Rahman in May-June 1963, the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines met in Manila from 7-11 June 1963.

The report of the three Ministers was subsequently approved and accepted by Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno and Prime Minister Rahman at their summit meeting on 31 July 1964 and became known as "The Manila Accord."

The report is as follows:

"The Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines, prompted by their keen and common desire to have a general exchange of views on current problems concerning stability, security, economic development and social progress of the three countries and of the region and upon the initiative of President Diosdado Macapagal, agreed that a Conference of Ministers of the three countries be held in Manila on 7th June, 1963, for the purpose of achieving common understanding and close fraternal cooperation among themselves. Accordingly, Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya; Dr. Subandrio, Deputy First Minister/Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia; and Honourable Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice President of the Philippines and concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, met in Manila from 7 to 11 June, 1963.

"2. The deliberations were held in a frank manner and in a most cordial atmosphere in keeping with the spirit of friendship prevailing in the various meetings held between President Soekarno of the Republic of Indonesia, and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra of the Federation of Malaya, and President Diosdado Macapagal. This Ministerial Conference was a manifestation of the determination of the nations in this region to achieve closer cooperation in the endeavour to chart their common future.

"3. The Ministers were of one mind that the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities, and to ensure the peaceful development of their respective countries and of their region, in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.

Appendix E (continued)

"4. In the same spirit of common and constructive endeavour, they exchanged views on the proposed Confederation of nations of Malay origin, the proposed Federation of Malaysia, the Philippine claim to North Borneo and related problems.

THE MACAPAGAL PLAN

"5. Recognising that it is in the common interest of their countries to maintain fraternal relations and to strengthen cooperation among their peoples who are bound together by ties of race and culture, the three Ministers agreed to intensify the joint and individual efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace, progress and prosperity for themselves and for their neighbours.

"6. In this context, the three Ministers supported President Macapagal's plan envisaging the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty. This calls for the establishment of the necessary common organs.

"7. The three Ministers agreed to take the initial steps towards this ultimate aim by establishing machinery for frequent and regular consultations. The details of such machinery will be further defined. This machinery will enable the three governments to hold regular consultations at all levels to deal with matters of mutual interest and concern consistent with the national, regional and international responsibilities or obligations of each country without prejudice to its sovereignty and independence. The Ministers agreed that their countries will endeavour to achieve close understanding and cooperation in dealing with common problems relating to security, stability, economic, social and cultural development.

"8. In order to accelerate the process of growth towards the ultimate establishment of President Macapagal's plan, the Ministers agreed that each country shall set up its own National Secretariat. Pending the establishment of a Central Secretariat for the consultative machinery, the National Secretaries should coordinate and cooperate with each other in the fulfilment of their tasks.

"9. The Ministers further agreed to recommend that Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers meet at least once a year for the purpose of consultations on matters of importance and common concern.

MALAYSIA AND NORTH BORNEO

"10. The Ministers reaffirmed their countries' adherence to the principle of self-determination for the peoples of non-self-governing territories. In this context, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative.

"11. The Federation of Malaya expressed appreciation for this attitude of Indonesia and the Philippines and undertook to consult the British Government and the Governments of the Borneo territories with a view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative to take the necessary steps in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of those territories.

"12. The Philippines made it clear that its position on the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia is subject to the final outcome of the Philippine claim to North Borneo. The Ministers took note of the Philippine claim and the right of the Philippines to continue to pursue it in accordance with international law and the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes. They agreed that the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia

Appendix E (continued)

would not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder. Moreover, in the context of their close association, the three countries agreed to exert their best endeavours to bring the claim to a just and expeditious solution by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the Bandung Declaration.

"13. In particular, considering the close historical ties between the peoples of the Philippines and North Borneo as well as their geographical propinquity, the Ministers agreed that in the event of North Borneo joining the proposed Federation of Malaysia the Government of the latter and the Government of the Philippines should maintain and promote the harmony and the friendly relations subsisting in their region to ensure the security and stability of the area.

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

"14. The Ministers agreed to recommend that a Meeting of their respective Heads of Government be held in Manila not later than the end of July 1963.

"15. The Ministers expressed satisfaction over the atmosphere of brotherliness and cordiality which pervaded their Meeting and considered it as a confirmation of their close fraternal ties and as a happy augury for the success of future consultations among their leaders.

"16. The Ministers agreed to place on record their profound appreciation of and gratitude for the statesmanlike efforts of President Macapagal whose courage, vision and inspiration not only facilitated the holding of this historic Meeting but also contributed towards the achievement for the first time of a unity of purpose and a sense of common dedication among the peoples of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines.

"Approved and Accepted,

MANILA.
July 31, 1963

SOEKARNO,
President of the Republic of Indonesia

DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL,
President of the Philippines

TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ,
Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya"

APPENDIX F: MANILA SUMMIT STATEMENT AND DECLARATION 1963

Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno and Prime Minister Rahman held a summit conference in Manila from 30 July to 5 August 1963 and issued three basic agreements - the Manila Accord earlier agreed to by their Foreign Ministers (Appendix E), the Manila Joint Statement and the Manila Declaration.

The Joint Statement

"The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines, and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya met at a summit conference in Manila from July 30 to August 5, 1963.

Appendix F (continued)

"1. Moved by a sincere desire to solve their common problems in an atmosphere of fraternal understanding, they considered, approved and accepted the report and recommendations of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries adopted in Manila on June 11, 1963 (hereafter to be known as the Manila accord).

"2. In order to provide guiding principles for the implementation of the Manila accord the Heads of Government have issued a declaration known as the Manila declaration, embodying the common aspirations and objectives of the peoples and governments of the three countries.

"3. As a result of the consultations amongst the three heads of Government in accordance with the principles enunciated in the Manila declaration, they have resolved various current problems of common concern.

"4. Pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Manila accord the United Nations Secretary-General or his representative should ascertain prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak within the context of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (15), principle 9 of the annex, by a fresh approach, which in the opinion of the Secretary-General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements embodied in principle 9, taking into consideration:

- (I) the recent elections in Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak but nevertheless further examining, verifying and satisfying himself as to whether
 - (a) Malaysia was a major issue, if not the main issue;
 - (b) Electoral registers were properly compiled;
 - (c) Elections were free and there was no coercion; and
 - (d) Votes were properly polled and properly counted; and
- (II) the wishes of those who, being qualified to vote, would have exercised their right of self-determination in the recent elections had it not been for their detention for political activities, imprisonment for political offences or absence from Sabah (North Borneo) or Sarawak.

"5. The Secretary-General will be requested to send working teams to carry out the task set out in paragraph 4.

"6. The Federation of Malaya, having undertaken to consult the British Government and the Governments of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak under paragraph 11 of the Manila accord on behalf of the three Heads of Government, further undertake to request them to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to extend to him the necessary facilities so as to enable him to carry out his task as set out in paragraph 4.

"7. In the interest of the countries concerned, the three Heads of Government deem it desirable to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task to be undertaken by the working teams and the Federation of Malaya will use its best endeavors to obtain the cooperation of the British Government and the governments of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak in furtherance of this purpose.

"8. In accordance with paragraph 12 of the Manila accord, the three Heads of Government decided to request the British Government to agree to seek a just and expeditious solution to the dispute between the British Government and the Philippine Government concerning Sabah (North Borneo) by means of negotiation, conciliation and arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. The three Heads of Government take cognizance of the position regarding the Philippine

Appendix F (continued)

claim to Sabah (North Borneo) after the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia as provided under paragraph 12 of the Manila accord, that is, the inclusion of Sabah (North Borneo) in the Federation of Malaysia does not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder.

"9. Pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Manila accord and the fifth principle of the Manila declaration, that is, that initial steps should be taken towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo, it is agreed that each country shall set up a national secretariat for Maphilindo affairs and as a first step the respective national secretariats will consult together with a view to coordinating and cooperating with each other in the study on the setting up of the necessary machinery for Maphilindo.

"10. The three Heads of Government emphasized that the responsibility for the preservation of the national independence of the three countries and of the peace and security in their region lies primarily in the hands of the governments and the peoples of the countries concerned, and that the three governments undertake to have close consultations (MUSHAWARAH) among themselves on these matters.

"11. The three Heads of Government further agreed that foreign bases - temporary in nature - should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.

"12. President Sukarno and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman express their deep appreciation for the initiative taken by President Macapagal in calling the summit conference which, in addition to resolving their differences concerning the proposed Federation of Malaysia, resulted in paving the way for the establishment of Maphilindo. The three Heads of Government conclude this conference, which has greatly strengthened the fraternal ties which bind their three countries and extended the scope of their cooperation and understanding, with renewed confidence that their governments and peoples will together make a significant contribution to the attainment of just and enduring peace, stability and prosperity in the region."

Manila Declaration

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, assembled in a Summit Conference in Manila from July 30 to August 5, 1963, following the Meeting of their Foreign Ministers held in Manila from June 7 to 11, 1963:

Conscious of the historic significance of their coming together for the first time as leaders of sovereign States that have emerged after long struggles from colonial status to independence;

Desiring to achieve better understanding and closer cooperation in their endeavour to chart their common future;

Inspired also by the spirit of Asian-African solidarity forged in the Bandung Conference of 1955;

Convinced that their countries, which are bound together by close historical ties of race and culture, share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective na-

tional identities and to ensure the peaceful development of their respective countries and their region in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples; and

Determined to intensify the joint and individual efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace, progress and prosperity for themselves and their neighbors in a world dedicated to freedom and justice;

DO HEREBY DECLARE:

First, that they reaffirm their adherence to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as enunciated in the United Nations Charter and the Bandung Declaration;

Second, that they are determined, in the common interest of their countries, to maintain fraternal relations, to strengthen cooperation among their peoples in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote economic progress and social well-being in the region, and to put an end to the exploitation of man by man and of one nation by another;

Third, that the three nations shall combine their efforts in the common struggle against colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and manifestations and for the eradication of the vestiges thereof in the region in particular and the world in general;

Fourth, that the three nations, as new emerging forces in the region, shall cooperate in building a new and better world based on national freedom, social justice and lasting peace; and

Fifth, that in the context of the joint endeavours of the three nations to achieve the foregoing objectives, they have agreed to take initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo.

MANILA,

August 5, 1963.

SOEKARNO,

President of the Republic of Indonesia

DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL,

President of the Philippines

TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ,

Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya

APPENDIX G: FINAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REGARDING
MALAYSIA

SG/1583, 13 September 1963

"In response to the request made by the Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia, and the Republic of the Philippines, on 5 August 1963, I agreed to ascertain, prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo), and Sarawak. As foreseen in my communication of 8 August 1963, a Mission was established, comprising two teams, one for Sarawak and the other for Sabah (North Borneo), working under the supervision of my personal representative. The Mission has now completed the inquiry assigned to it, and has reported to me.

"I wish, first of all, to express my gratitude to the three Governments for the confidence they placed in me by requesting that I should undertake the task of ascertaining the wishes of the population of Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) prior to the establishment of Malaysia. I also wish to express my appreciation to the Government of the United Kingdom and to the authorities of the two territories for having given their agreement to the inquiry and their full co-operation to the Mission.

"It was always understood that the ascertainment would be completed within a limited period of time, and my communication of 8 August noted that every effort would be made to complete the task as quickly as possible. I later informed the Governments concerned that I would endeavour to report my conclusions to them by 14 September. During the course of the inquiry, the date of 16 September 1963 was announced by the Government of the Federation of Malaya with the concurrence of the British Government, the Singapore Government and the Governments of Sabah and Sarawak, for the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. This had led to misunderstanding and confusion and even resentment among other parties to the Manila agreement, which could have been avoided if the date could have been fixed after my conclusions had been reached and made known.

"There was no reference to a referendum or plebiscite in the request which was addressed to me. I was asked to ascertain the wishes of the people 'within the context of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), Principle IX of the Annex, by a fresh approach' which in my opinion was necessary 'to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements embodied in Principle IX', taking into consideration certain questions relating to the present elections. The Mission accordingly arranged for consultations with the population through the elected representatives of the people, leaders of political parties and other groups and organizations, and with all persons who were willing to express their views, and every effort was made to ascertain the wishes of the special groups (political detainees and absentees) mentioned in the Manila Joint Statement. The Mission gathered and studied all available documents, reports and other material on the governmental institutions, political organization, electoral processes in the two territories, and other matters relevant to its terms of reference.

"The Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines deemed it desirable to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task, and the Government of the United Kingdom decided that it also wished the same facility. Although I did not consider the arrangements for observers to be part of the Secretary-General's responsibility, I endeavoured to help the Governments concerned to reach agreement, and I am pleased that an understanding was finally arrived at so that observers of all the Governments concerned could be present during at least part of the inquiry. It is a matter for regret that this understanding could not have been reached earlier, so that all observers could have been present in the territories for the entire period of the inquiries and that questions of detail pertaining to the status of the observers unnecessarily delayed even further their arrival. A more congenial atmosphere

Appendix G (continued)

would have been achieved if the necessary facilities had been granted more promptly by the Administering Authority. The Mission, however, made its records, including tape recordings of all its hearings, available for the use of the observer teams to enable them to inform themselves as fully as possible of what had occurred before their arrival.

"The basic assessment which I was asked to make has broader implications than the specific questions enumerated in the request addressed to me by the three Governments. As mentioned previously, I was asked to 'ascertain, prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak within the context of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), Principle IX of the Annex, by a fresh approach, which in the opinion of the Secretary-General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements embodied in Principle IX'.

"Concerning the integration of a non-self-governing territory with an already independent state, Principle IX provides:

"Integration should have come about in the following circumstances: (a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so that its peoples would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes;

(b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations could, when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes.'

"I have given consideration to the circumstances in which the proposals for the Federation of Malaysia have been developed and discussed, and the possibility that people progressing through the stages of self-government may be less able to consider in an entirely free context the implications of such changes in their status, than a society which has already experienced full self-government and the determination of its own affairs. I have also been aware that the peoples of the territories are still striving for a more adequate level of educational development.

"Having reflected fully on these considerations, and taking into account the framework within which the Mission's task was performed, I have come to the conclusion that the majority of the peoples of Sabah (North Borneo) and of Sarawak, have given serious and thoughtful consideration to their future, and to the implications for them of participation in a Federation of Malaysia. I believe that the majority of them have concluded that they wish to bring their dependent status to an end and to realize their independence through freely chosen association with other peoples in their region with whom they feel ties of ethnic association, heritage, language, religion, culture, economic relationship, and ideals and objectives. Not all of these considerations are present in equal weight in all minds, but it is my conclusion that the majority of the peoples of the two territories, having taken them into account, wish to engage, with the peoples of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged Federation of Malaysia through which they can strive together to realize the fulfilment of their destiny.

"With regard to the more specific questions referred to me, my conclusions concerning the recent elections in Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo), and after the examination and verification reported by the Mission, are:

"(a) Malaysia has been the subject of widespread and intensive public debate, and was a major issue in the recent elections in the two territories;

"(b) Electoral registers were properly compiled;

"(c) The elections took place in an atmosphere free enough to enable the candidates and political parties to put their cases before the electorate, and the people were able to express themselves freely by casting their votes in a polling system which provided the basic safeguards for secret balloting, and measures for the prevention and correction of abuses;

"(d) The votes were properly polled and counted;

"(e) Persons otherwise eligible to vote but who were unable to do so because of detention for political activities, or imprisonment for political offences, numbered somewhat less than 100 in Sarawak, and even less in Sabah (North Borneo) at the time of the elections. Testimony given by this group, especially in Sarawak, indicated that they would have opposed the Federation of Malaysia if they had participated in the election. The actual votes of this group would not have been sufficient to have had a material effect on the result. The Mission has given much attention to the possible effect which the absence of these persons, some of whom were officials of the anti-Malaysia party, might have had on the campaign. The Mission considered the similar question concerning some 164 persons whose activity was restricted to some extent, but who retained the right to vote.

Noting that the anti-Malaysia party scored convincing electoral victories in many of the areas to which these persons belonged, I accept the Mission's conclusion that a substantial limitation of the campaigning potential of the group opposed to the Federation of Malaysia has not occurred, so as seriously and significantly to have affected the result of the election.

"(f) The Mission made special efforts to obtain reliable information regarding persons who were absent from the territories at the time of the election, particularly as a result of possible political or other intimidation. The evidence available indicated that the number of such persons, otherwise qualified to vote, did not exceed a few hundred, and that their number could not have affected the results of the election. I note that the principal officials of the party in Sarawak opposed to the Federation of Malaysia, agree with this assessment, and I accept it.

"Bearing in mind the fundamental agreement of the three participating Governments in the Manila meetings, and the statement by the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided that the support of the people of the territories was ascertained by me and that, in my opinion, complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), Principle IX of the Annex, was ensured, my conclusions, based on the findings of the Mission, is that on both of these counts there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these territories to join in the Federation of Malaysia.

"In reaching my conclusions, I have taken account of the concern expressed with regard to the political factors resulting from the constitutional status of the territories and about influences from outside the area on the promotion of the proposed Federation. Giving these considerations their due weight, in relation to the responsibilities and obligations established in Article 73 and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in respect of the territories, I am satisfied

Appendix G (continued)

that the conclusions set forth above take cognizance of, and are in accordance with, the requirements set forth in the request addressed to me on 5 August 1963 by the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Indonesia, the Federation of Malaya and the Republic of the Philippines.

"Before concluding, I would like to pay a tribute to my Personal Representative, Mr. L. Michelmore, my Deputy Representative, Mr. G. Janacek, and to all the members of the United Nations Malaysia Mission who accomplished a sensitive and difficult task in a relatively short period, but at the same time in a thorough and wholly adequate manner. In a sense, it was a pity that the work of the Mission had to be accomplished within certain deadlines. But I do feel that, while more time might have enabled the Mission to obtain more copious documentation and other evidence, it would not have affected the conclusions to any significant extent.

"From the beginning of this year I have been observing the rising tension in South-East Asia on account of the differences of opinion among the countries most directly interested in the Malaysia issue. It was in the hope that some form of United Nations involvement might help to reduce tension that I agreed to respond positively to the request made by the three Manila Powers. I would hope that the exercise in which my colleagues and I have been involved in this regard will have this effect, and that the coming into being of Malaysia will not prove to be a continuing source of friction and tension in the area.

"The emergence of dependent territories by a process of self-determination to the status of self-government, either as independent sovereign States or as autonomous components of larger units, has always been one of the purposes of the Charter and the objectives of the United Nations.

"Whatever the origins of the proposal of Malaysia may have been, it seems to me in the light of actual events, including the present exercise, that we have witnessed in Sarawak and North Borneo the same process leading to self-government. I fervently hope that the people of these territories will achieve progress and prosperity, and find their fulfilment as component States of Malaysia."

APPENDIX H: DESCRIPTION OF DEFENSE AGREEMENTS AFFECTING MALAYSIA

The fundamental defense arrangement affecting Malaysia is the 12 October 1957 "Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance between the Government of the Federation of Malaya and the Government of the United Kingdom" which by the 1963 agreement between Malaya, United Kingdom, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore has been extended to cover Malaysia.

The 1957 agreement provides

that the UK can maintain a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in the territories involved (Article III);

that the United Kingdom "shall at the request of the Government of the Federation of Malaya vacate any base or part thereof..." (Article IV);

that "the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and of the United Kingdom will consult together on the measures to be taken jointly or separately to ensure the fullest cooperation between them for the purpose of meeting the situation (threat of armed attack or to the preservation of peace in the Far East) effectively" (Article VI);

and that the United Kingdom "shall obtain the prior agreement of the Government of the Federation of Malaya before committing United Kingdom forces to active operations involving the use of bases in the Federation of Malaya." (Article VIII)

The 1963 agreement in Article VI states that any reference to the 1957 arrangements "shall be deemed to apply to Malaysia, subject to the proviso that the Government of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain bases and other facilities at present occupied by their Service authorities within the State of Singapore and will permit the Government of the United Kingdom to make such use of these bases and facilities as that Government may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defense of Malaysia and for Commonwealth defense and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia..."

The defense agreement is also inter-locking with a defense agreement between Malaya, Australia and New Zealand which also, within certain circumstances, can have applications affecting ANZUS (the defense agreement between the latter two countries and the United States) and SEATO.

**APPENDIX I: JOINT STATEMENT OF PRESIDENTS MACAPAGAL AND SUKARNO,
11 JANUARY 1964, AND MALAYSIA'S REPLY OF 13 JANUARY 1964**

The Presidents of the Philippines and Indonesia met in Manila from 7-11 January and issued the following statement:

In fulfillment of the provisions of the Manila Agreements, namely, the Manila Accord, the Manila Declaration and the Manila Joint Statement, the first signed in Manila on the 31st day of July, 1963, and the last two on the 5th day of August, 1963, by the two leaders and the then Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman,

Considering the grave situation that has developed in the region during the last six months after the signing of the Manila Agreements and following the incorrect and improper implementation of the Agreements as exemplified by the premature announcement of the establishment of the "Federation of Malaysia" before the termination of the United Nations ascertainment of the wishes of the inhabitants of Sarawak and Sabah (former British North Borneo), as well as by the failure of the "Federation of Malaysia" to assume the responsibilities undertaken by the then Federation of Malaya with regard to the Philippines' claim to Sabah, as stipulated in the Manila Agreements, and

Recalling that the then Federation of Malaya, a co-signatory to the Manila Agreements, broke off diplomatic relations with the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines,

Have, as loyal adherents to the Manila Agreements, agreed to meet and consult with each other, in the spirit of *Mushawarah*, for the purpose of:

- (A) Reviewing the events and developments that have occurred since the Summit Meeting in Manila, especially as they affect the peace, security and stability of the area;
- (B) Informing each other of the steps they have thus far taken in the implementation of the Manila Agreements;
- (C) Exploring further ways and means to give more substance to the ideals of *MAPHILINDO* for the benefit of the region as a whole.

Appendix I (continued)

For this purpose, President Sukarno made an official working visit to the Philippines from the 7th to 11th January, 1964. During the visit, a series of talks were held in the spirit of Mushawaharah as the fundamental method of MAPHILINDO.

PART A

1. The two Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to the principles of the Manila Agreements and reiterated their faith in MAPHILINDO as an effective vehicle for devising Asian solutions to Asian problems by Asians themselves.

2. Accordingly, the two Presidents considered it essential to strengthen MAPHILINDO as a living reality, in the firm belief that within its framework constructive and equitable solutions can be found for many of the serious problems of the region, including those arising from the formation of the "Federation of Malaysia", the promotion of regional security, and the development of regional economic cooperation. MAPHILINDO as a living reality has helped to prevent a final and irreparable disruption of normal and friendly relations among the three partners, the present difficulties amongst them being temporary in nature.

3. The two Presidents noted with regret that the present Mushawaharah included only two of the three signatories to the Manila Agreements, but expressed the hope that the next Mushawaharah will witness the participation of all. They made it clear that the present meeting has been devoted to peaceful and constructive ends in an effort to forge anew a lasting unity amongst the three members of MAPHILINDO.

4. In this context, the two Presidents remain convinced that the present crisis over "Malaysia" can be solved by firm adherence to the spirit and principles of the Manila Agreements. They cherish the hope that a tripartite Mushawaharah could be convened to resolve existing differences amongst the three signatories to the agreements.

5. President Sukarno elaborated upon the meaning of the Indonesian policy of confrontation as follows:

"It is not a policy of aggression, much less a policy of territorial expansion. Its main purpose is to oppose the neocolonialist policy of an outside power which, by distorting the procedures laid down in the Manila Agreements for the ascertainment of the wishes of the peoples concerned regarding the establishment of 'Malaysia', is bent on wrecking MAPHILINDO. This divide and rule policy, backed by preponderant military force, can only be checked by a firm defensive policy of confrontation, lest the national independence and security of the countries of this region succumb to foreign domination."

6. President Macapagal, bespeaking the sentiments of the Filipino people, expressed the hope that in keeping with the basic purpose of MAPHILINDO all the signatories to the Manila Agreements, in the face of the present crisis, shall exercise moderation and restraint in order that an early settlement of the differences amongst them may be reached through peaceful means.

7. President Sukarno reassured President Macapagal of the support of Indonesia for the Philippine claim to Sabah within the framework of the principle of self-determination. President Macapagal expressed appreciation for this reassurance.

8. The two Presidents noted with satisfaction that the principles and purposes of MAPHILINDO are gradually being understood and appreciated by nations outside the MAPHILINDO area. They share the confident hope that MAPHILINDO will find ever increasing acceptance amongst the peoples of the region, in line with the world-wide trend towards closer cooperation

Appendix I (continued)

among neighbouring countries animated by a common desire for peace, prosperity and security under the aegis of freedom and justice.

PART B:

9. In order to strengthen the economic relations between the two countries, discussions were held on problems relating to trade and economic matters. Using as basis the Philippine-Indonesian Trade and Economic Agreements signed in Djakarta on May 27, 1963, meetings were held to review the implementation thereof. It was agreed to extend the agreements to the end of 1965.

10. Regarding trade, agreement was reached to expand the volume of trade for the year 1964 above the levels previously agreed upon. Problems connected with trade were discussed and obstacles removed, particularly those governing payment arrangements and sea communications.

11. Regarding economic cooperation, the conversations explored further and in detail joint cooperation in the exploitation of forestry and fisheries resources. Arrangements were discussed for the processing of raw materials from Indonesia and the Philippines in the Philippine and Indonesian industries having unused capacities.

12. On scientific and technical cooperation, the two countries agreed to expand the program for the exchange of trainees, particularly in the fields of agriculture and forestry.

13. The remaining administrative difficulties in the Philippines to the granting of limited traffic rights to Garuda Indonesian Airways were also resolved.

14. It was agreed that the Philippine-Indonesian Coconut Commission will formally be in operation as of today, January 11, 1964. This Commission, entrusted with the continuing research, development and promotion of the coconut industry, is open to other coconut-producing countries.

15. Agreement was also reached to establish the administrative machinery:
- A) For the promotion and expansion of commercial and economic relations between the two countries; B) For the preparation of the groundwork for processing arrangements; and C) For the continued implementation of the provisions of the agreements.

16. The two countries agreed on regular consultations with respect to the full implementation of the Philippine-Indonesian trade and economic agreements.

President Sukarno expressed his deep appreciation for the cordial reception and hospitality extended to him and the members of his party by President Macapagal. The two Presidents noted with gratification the fruitful results of the first Mushawarah since the inception of MAPHILINDO which provided tangible evidence of its validity and its usefulness to its members and to the region as a whole.

On 13 January the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, made the following statement on the joint Philippines-Indonesia communique:

"The Joint Communique issued by President Macapagal and President Sukarno contained a number of points which are not considered by us to be a fair surmise on the events leading to the rupture of diplomatic relations namely:

- (1) "The incorrect and improper implementation of the agreements as exemplified by the premature announcement of the establishment of Malaysia before the termination of the United Nations ascertainment of the wishes of the inhabitants of Sarawak and Sabah."

Appendix I (continued)

- (2) "The failure of Malaysia to assume the responsibilities undertaken by the then Federation of Malaya with regards to the Philippine claim to Sabah as stipulated in the Manila Agreements."
- (3) "Malaysia broke off diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of Indonesia."

On the first point there is no need for me to stress that we have fulfilled our part of the bargain. We have done everything possible to adhere to the principles of the Manila Accord. We agreed to the ascertainment of the wishes of the Borneo peoples by the United Nations Secretary General when in fact we had already known of their desire to join Malaysia as expressed through conclusions of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee, the Cobbold Commission, the Inter Governmental Committee, the meetings at all levels of the various local councils and finally the elections held in these two territories. We have also postponed the date of the establishment of Malaysia in order to await the findings of U Thant's assessment. We were quite prepared to postpone it even further if U Thant could not have completed his task and made his report by that date when so called "premature" announcement was made as a matter of constitutional requirement as the date for the establishment of Malaysia had already been fixed prior to the summit meeting at Manila.

On the second point raised that Malaysia had failed to assume responsibilities regarding the Philippine claim to Sabah, I would prefer the Philippines Government to refer to what has been agreed to in Article 12 of the Manila Accord which in short says that the claim be resolved by "peaceful means such as negotiations, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the Bandung Declaration." No claim was ever made on us prior to the rupture of diplomatic relations between this country and the Philippines with the result that we had no opportunity to look at such a claim, least of all to study it.

With regard to the third point about breaking off diplomatic relations, this was done through the acts of the Governments of Philippines and Indonesia as shown by the fact that Indonesia refused to recognise our Ambassador and followed by the Philippines which withdrew the Ambassadorial status of her representation and suggested its replacement by a Consulate.

Under these circumstances Malaysia had no alternative but to recall her Ambassadors from Jakarta and Manila. It follows therefore that it was not Malaysia who had not adhered to the spirit of the Manila Agreement but it was Indonesia and the Philippines who failed to do so. Otherwise they would not have withdrawn their diplomatic representation without first satisfying themselves with the facts and circumstances leading to the establishment of Malaysia. They could have done so by calling a meeting of Maphilindo and seeking clarification.

On the suggestion that we should meet and resolve the existing difficulties through another Tripartite Summit, the Malaysian Government would naturally like to seek clarification regarding certain points:

- (1) Does this meeting mean that the two countries recognise Malaysia as an Independent Sovereign State?
- (2) Does it mean that Indonesia agree to withdraw her policy of confrontation so that the meeting could be held in an atmosphere of peace and goodwill?
- (3) Does it mean that Indonesia is prepared to withdraw her troops massed along the borders of Sarawak and Sabah?

- (4) Does it mean that Indonesia agrees to withdraw her troops now engaged in operations deep in Malaysian territory of Sabah and Sarawak?
- (5) If so, would Indonesia agree to accept a neutral nation acceptable to Malaysia and Indonesia to act as a referee to ensure that all the terms of the truce are strictly and scrupulously carried out?

If we could be assured of all those points nothing would make us happier than to attend such a conference anywhere and at any time.

APPENDIX J: JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE BANGKOK MINISTERIAL MEETING, 11 February 1964

On 11 February the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia issued the following communique on their talks in Bangkok:

"1. On the invitation of H.E. Thanat Khoman, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, a meeting between Dr. Subandrio of Indonesia, Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia and Mr. Salvador P. Lopez of the Philippines was held at Bangkok from the 5th to the 10th February 1964, to discuss and resolve their present differences on the basis of the principles and spirit of the Manila Agreements.

"2. In frank and free informal discussions, which were also attended by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, the three Ministers had a full exchange of views on the problems affecting the relationship between their respective countries.

"3. In the spirit of Mushawarah Maphilindo, the three Ministers reviewed the implementation of the Manila Agreements with a view to enabling the three Governments to reaffirm their adherence to the principles and objectives of the said agreements.

"4. They were satisfied to note the degree of progress made towards a better understanding of each other's positions and in their efforts to find a common approach for the solution of their differences and common problems.

"5. The three Ministers shared the conviction that their present differences could best be solved on the basis and within the framework of the principles and spirit of the Manila Agreements.

"6. They welcomed the ceasefire with regard to the fighting in Sabah and Sarawak as a means of creating a favorable atmosphere of Mushawarah Maphilindo and they agreed on certain detailed arrangements for making it effective, as set out in the appendix attached hereto, together with the reservation made by the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia. They also agreed to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations to designate Thailand to supervise the ceasefire.

"7. The three Ministers decided to study further proposals for resolving the main political issues, in consultation with their respective Governments, and in this context they agreed that, prior to the Summit Meeting, another meeting at the Ministerial level should be convened, on a date and at a place to be agreed upon.

"8. The three Ministers wished to express their appreciation to H.E. Thanat Khoman, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, for the impartial and constructive assistance he had

Appendix J (continued)

given in the meeting. The three Ministers would also like to express their gratitude to the Government and people of Thailand for the very warm hospitality they have extended to them and their delegations.

APPENDIX

Terms of the ceasefire:

1. The Governments concerned have agreed that they will exert their best efforts, in cooperation with the Government of Thailand, to observe the ceasefire.
2. The Governments concerned have agreed that, in the event that an incident breaks out, they will immediately issue orders to their respective forces to halt the fighting.
3. The Governments concerned have agreed to appoint their respective military liaison officers in Bangkok to assist the Thai Government in supervising the ceasefire arrangements.
4. The Governments concerned have agreed to accept teams of Thai observers in their respective territories and to provide the necessary facilities to enable them to carry out their duties in connection with the implementation of the ceasefire.

Note: In connection with the above terms, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia reserved the position of his Government as follows:

"It is the sincere desire of the Malaysian Government to adhere to the ceasefire arrangement. However, as there are members of the Indonesian armed forces, regulars as well as irregulars, on the Malaysian side of the border, their presence will provoke incidents. The Malaysian Government therefore, considers that the ceasefire would not be fully effective unless the Governments concerned agree to limit the activities and movements of their armed forces, regulars as well as irregulars, within their respective territories."

APPENDIX K: THE TOKYO SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE AND PROPOSED MALAYSIAN COMMUNIQUE

After a one-day meeting of Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno, and Prime Minister Rahman, in Tokyo, on 20 June, the following communique was issued:

- "(1) The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines and the Prime Minister of Malaysia met at a Summit Conference in Tokyo on the 20th June 1964. The Conference was preceded by a meeting of their respective Foreign Ministers who held two sessions on the 18th and 19th June 1964.
- "(2) President Macapagal proposed the establishment of an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission of Four Members, three of whom shall be chosen respectively by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and a fourth to be chosen unanimously by the aforesaid three members. This Commission shall be requested to study the existing problems between the three countries and to submit recommendations for their solution.

- "(3) President Sukarno expressed his agreement to this proposal and gave assurance that he would abide by the recommendations of the Commission.
- "(4) Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman agreed in principle to this proposal with the proviso that all acts of hostilities against Malaysia must cease forthwith.
- "(5) The three Heads of Government agreed to instruct their Foreign Ministers to continue the study of this proposal bearing in mind the view expressed by their respective Heads of Government so that the latter could meet again at an appropriate time.
- "(6) The three Heads of Government express their thanks to His Excellency Prime Minister Ikeda, the Government and the People of Japan for their hospitality, generosity and kind attention in providing necessary facilities for the meeting.
- "(7) The three Heads of Government would like to place on record their deep appreciation for the cooperation and assistance rendered by the Thai Government in verifying the withdrawal of troops.
- "(8) The President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of Malaysia also wish to acknowledge the important role played by President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines in bringing together the Three Heads of Government to this Summit Conference."

Malaysia had proposed an alternative communique which Indonesia did not accept.

This alternative read:

"The three Heads of Government of the Republic of Indonesia, the Republic of the Philippines and Malaysia met at a Summit Conference in Tokyo on the 20th June.

"The Conference was preceded by a meeting of their respective Foreign Ministers who held two sessions on the 18th and 19th June, 1964.

"The three Heads of Government:

Conscious of their responsibility towards their respective peoples and for the maintenance of peace, stability and security of the Region

Convinced that they should seek to settle any differences on matters directly and exclusively affecting them in the spirit of *Mushawarah*, neighbourliness and goodwill and the Charter of the United Nations as confirmed by the Tripartite Manila Declaration.

And recognising the desirability of restoring friendly relations between the three countries

Decided that:

- (I) All forms of confrontation against each other shall cease forthwith,
- (II) The withdrawal of Indonesian Forces, regulars or irregulars, from Malaysia which began with the commencement of the Foreign Ministers meeting and carried out in earnest and with genuine efforts, resulting in the possibility of this Summit Conference, shall continue and be concluded within four weeks, the time limit being subject to the agreement of the Thai Government which is responsible for the verification of the withdrawal.

- (III) The proposal by the President of the Philippines for the appointment of an Asian Conciliation Commission for the purpose of normalising relations between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines was agreed to by Malaysia in principle. The three Heads of Government have decided that their respective Foreign Ministers shall meet to consider the terms of reference, the composition, the operative dates and procedural matters for the commission after the withdrawal has been completed as envisaged in paragraph (I) above.
- (IV) In order to give effect to this proposal the three Heads of Government agree that a favourable climate should be created to enable the Commission to carry out their task smoothly and effectively.

"The three Heads of Government further agree that henceforth their respective governments shall:

- (A) Respect the Sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other's country.
- (B) Uphold the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.
- (C) Refrain from hostile acts against each other, and
- (D) Take every possible measure to avoid making acrimonious attacks on and disparaging references to each other.

"The three Heads of Government express their thanks to His Excellency Prime Minister Ikeda, the Government and the People of Japan for their hospitality, generosity and kind attention which contributed towards the success of this meeting. The three Heads of Government would like to place on record their deep appreciation for the cooperation and assistance rendered by the Thai Government to verify the withdrawal. The President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of Malaysia also wish to acknowledge the important role played by the President of the Republic of the Philippines in bringing together the three Heads of Government to this Conference."

APPENDIX L: RESOLUTION INTRODUCED BY NORWAY AND VOTE.
Security Council 17 September 1964

Document S/5973

The Security Council,

Taking note of the complaint of Malaysia contained in document S/5930,

Taking into consideration the statements of the parties and of the members of the Council expressed during the discussion,

Deeply concerned by the fact that the armed incidents which have occurred in that region have seriously aggravated the situation and are likely to endanger peace and security in that region,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of the parties to seek a peaceful solution of the differences between them,

Recalling the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter,

Appendix L (continued)

1. *Regrets* all the incidents which have occurred in the whole region;
2. *Deplores* the incident of 2 September 1964 which forms the basis of the complaint contained in document S/5930;
3. *Requests* the parties concerned to make every effort to avoid the recurrence of such incidents;
4. *Calls upon* the parties to refrain from all threat or use of force and to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of each other, and thus to create a conducive atmosphere for the continuation of their talks;
5. *Recommends* to the Governments concerned thereupon to resume their talks on the basis of the joint communique issued by the Heads of Government following the meeting which took place in Tokyo on 20 June 1964. The Reconciliation Commission provided for by that joint communique, once established, should keep the Security Council informed concerning the development of the situation.

In favour: Bolivia, Brazil, China, France, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Against: Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Not adopted because a permanent member voted against resolution.

APPENDIX M: WITHDRAWAL FROM UN, INDONESIAN STATEMENTS, AS REPORTED IN ANTARA, THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY 5, 6, 11 January 1964

PRESIDENT SUKARNO'S STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWING INDONESIA FROM THE UNITED NATIONS

Last Thursday night in the course of proclaiming Indonesia free from illiteracy, President Sukarno announced on 31 December 1964 that the Republic of Indonesia will withdraw from the United Nations if the federation of "Malaysia" becomes a member of the United Nations Security Council. The President's statement, extracted from the proclamation, is as follows:

"Recently, brothers and sisters, 'Malaysia' has been working hard in order to become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations. We have stated our stand already. We oppose it. We do not want 'Malaysia' to become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Once again I say so.

"We were assisted by a number of countries, including Albania, but they, however, kept on trying. And now I will make a statement, brothers and sisters.

"Newsmen, note this down correctly. . .Don't get any words wrong regarding 'Malaysia' and the United Nations Security Council - write this down.

"If, in spite of our explanation in the United Nations, 'Malaysia', nevertheless, is made into a member of the United Nations Security Council, we will leave the United Nations.

"Write that down. Are you finished, newsmen? In brief, if 'Malaysia' is made into a member of the Security Council of the U.N., we, Indonesia, will quit the United Nations."

(Continuation of President Sukarno's speech on December 31, 1964, announcing Indonesia's withdrawal from the U.N. on "Malaysia's" seating in the Security Council):

President Sukarno said that the structure of the United Nations at present must be reorganized, for it is no longer in harmony with the present world situation.

The President repeatedly stated that Indonesia will withdraw from the U.N., if the neo-colonialist project of "Malaysia" becomes a member of the Security Council.

Indonesia, he stressed, is not a nation to be trampled upon by other nations. The Chief Executive further said that the crown of genuine freedom and liberty does not lie in the membership of the United Nations. The crown of liberty for the Indonesian people is self-reliance, he stated.

The President reminded that Indonesia had withdrawn from the International Olympic Committee. Indonesia is absolutely opposed to actions taken by the IOC, a body monopolized by the imperialists.

He noted that Indonesia had given its clearcut stand concerning its attitude towards the neo-colonialist project of "Malaysia." If the authorities concerned did not pay due attention to Indonesia's wish, namely that she is definitely opposed to the entry of "Malaysia" into the United Nations' Security Council, Indonesia will withdraw from the world organization.

U.N. still reflects world situation of 1945

President Sukarno said that the present structure of the United Nations needs all-out revamping. At the moment the U.N. does not reflect the present situation of the world. It still reflects the situation of the world back in 1945. At that time only a few Afro-Asian and Latin American nations had obtained independence. At that time there were only a few nations struggling for national liberty.

At present, as we know, the situation has undergone a radical change. But the United Nations is still the same as then, no changes have taken place in its structure. For this reason the UN has to undergo a radical change too, before it can be in harmony with the present world situation.

President Sukarno termed as "revolutionary" Indonesia's decision to withdraw from the UN if "Malaysia" — the puppet federation — becomes a member of the Security Council.

.....

President Sukarno on 7 January announced to the world that the Republic of Indonesia as from that moment on had positively and definitely withdrawn its membership in the United Nations Organization.

"As it turns out that the puppet state of 'Malaysia' has been made a member of the United Nations Security Council, I hereby declare on behalf of the entire Indonesian people, from Sabang (at the western tip of Sumatra) to Merauke (on the eastern border of West Irian), that as from this moment on Indonesia has withdrawn its membership from the United Nations Organization," the President declared. He was speaking amid the tumult of thousands of Djakarta citizens assembled at a mass rally against foreign military bases and for the success of the Dwikora (the people's command to crush "Malaysia" and strengthen the Indonesian revolution) campaign.

The President's announcement came exactly one week after he had warned that Indonesia would quit the United Nations if the puppet state of "Malaysia" was seated in the United Nations Security Council.

President Sukarno emphasized that Indonesia's withdrawal from the U.N. extended also to all United Nations specialized agencies. "From this moment on therefore," he stressed, "the Republic of Indonesia is no longer a member of the United Nations and has to face these difficulties...Only a nation that is constantly facing challenges, a nation that is able to climb and pass through deep ravines — only such a nation could become a great nation."

The Indonesian nation, the President added, is convinced that the crown of independence is not a membership in the United Nations Organization but the ability to stand on its own feet as an independent nation.

Turning to the U.N. affiliate bodies — UNESCO, UNICEF and FAO — the President questioned what benefit Indonesia had gained from these bodies. UNICEF had provided Indonesia with powdered milk but personally, the President said, he preferred "peujem" (fermented cassava). "UNESCO?" the president asked, and added: "Indonesia has succeeded in freeing herself from illiteracy without any help from UNESCO." He continued:

"What benefit from FAO? They have sent us agricultural experts who had not the slightest notion of Indonesian agriculture." Also in this field, the President added, Indonesia had succeeded in stepping up production not because of the help of FAO but on its own efforts.

On the subject of foreign bases the President said they were aimed at suppressing and thwarting the rise of the Afro-Asian and Latin American nations. The imperialists had set up their military bases everywhere outside their own countries' boundaries, he said, and added that the elimination of these bases was an absolute part of the struggle against imperialism.

The Chief Executive pointed out that these bases were set up at places which were regarded as being "safe" for them.

President Sukarno then recalled the rash action taken by United Nations Secretary-General U Thant in justifying the formation of "Malaysia" prior to the sounding out of the wishes of the North Kalimantan (Borneo) people in a democratic way having been completed. He also referred to the bad faith of "Malaysian" Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in trampling on the Manila Agreements reached between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya in the summer of 1963.

The President reiterated that in the eyes of Indonesia "Malaysia" does not exist. He concluded by calling on the nation to march on forward.

Letter dated 20 January 1965 from the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Addressed to the Secretary-General UN Document A/ 5857

On 31 December 1964, the Head of our Permanent Mission in New York conveyed to Your Excellency the content of President Sukarno's statement on that date, to the effect that Indonesia would withdraw from the United Nations if neo-colonialist "Malaysia" be seated in the Security Council. Pursuant to that statement I have to inform you that on 7 January 1965, after the seating of "Malaysia" as member of the Security Council, our Government, after very careful consideration, has taken the decision to withdraw from the United Nations.

My Government was fully aware of the great weight and impact of such a decision, but in the circumstances which have been created by colonial powers in the United Nations so blatantly against our anti-colonial struggle and indeed against the lofty principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, my Government felt that no alternative had been left for Indonesia but withdrawal from the United Nations. Summing up and balancing all the considerations in their negative and positive aspects we have come to the conclusion that our decision may become the catalyst to reform and retool the United Nations in spirit and in deed, lest the present atmosphere of complacency shown by the neo-colonial Powers may undermine the lofty principles of the United Nations and consequently the decline of the United Nations as an international body for collective security and harmonious co-operation may become irrevocable. These feelings have already been reflected by many Members of the United Nations and most of them already felt that something had to be done soon.

Appendix M (continued)

Already in 1960, in his address before the General Assembly on 30 September, President Sukarno reminded the United Nations of its shortcomings both politically and organizationally; the need for retooling was strongly felt. Yet, at that time Indonesia had no intentions to leave the United Nations, imperfect as it might be. For us the problem of "Malaysia" within the United Nations was just the further proof of this international body being manipulated by colonial and neo-colonial Powers.

"Malaysia" which formation was rejected by two out of the three signatories to the Manila Agreement, was then forced into the United Nations by deliberate avoidance of any voting on 17 September 1963. It was a successful manoeuvre of neo-colonial Powers in the United Nations. Indonesia voiced its disapproval of such a manoeuvre. But we were patient enough until another absurd colonial manoeuvre occurred namely the pushing of this "Malaysia" into the United Nations Security Council. This makes a mockery of the sense of the Security Council itself, according to Article 23 of the Charter, the election of a non-permanent member of the Security Council should be guided by the importance and contribution of the candidate-country in the maintenance of peace and security in the world. What happened was, that this "Malaysia" only a few months old at the end of 1963, this feeble and highly controversial new "state," opposed and not recognized by its neighbours, this real tool of British neo-colonialism in South-East Asia, was moved as a candidate of the Security Council and pushed into it by manipulation and pressures of colonial Powers in the United Nations. What contribution for the maintenance of peace and security in the world has this "Malaysia" really rendered? Its very birth has caused trouble and insecurity in the region of South-East Asia! Thus, this practice and policy in the United Nations was not only a violation of the Charter, but it made a mockery of the function and purpose of the United Nations Security Council. And indeed, against the opposition of Indonesia and many other anti-colonial Powers, this "Malaysia" was recently seated in the Security Council. Indonesia could have challenged the legality of its election due to its non-voting procedure, but Indonesia did not. Indonesia could have insisted on a voting procedure in that election as required by the Charter, but it did not. Indonesia wanted to be co-operative, both with the President of the General Assembly, Ambassador Quaison Sackey from Ghana, as well as with the majority of Members of the United Nations, in particular with the Afro-Asian group with a view to the election of other non-permanent members to the Security Council. Indonesia had no intention to obstruct the work of the United Nations and much less to wreck the United Nations; but it felt obliged to point out in the strongest way what the United Nations indeed should not have done.

This decision of my Government is of course a revolutionary one, unprecedented as it may be. This however, was taken for the good of the United Nations itself, which in our view need a strong reminder from time to time. It might even be, that this decision of my Government could well entail a beneficial effect for the speedy solution of the problem of "Malaysia" itself. Arrogance displayed so far for a settlement based on previous agreements might be dissolved, in the general desire for the just solution of burning and acute problems in South-East Asia as a whole.

As to your personal appeal, Mr. Secretary-General, that Indonesia should not withdraw from its co-operation with the United Nations, I want to assure you that Indonesia still upholds the lofty principles of international co-operation as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. This, however, can be implemented outside as well as inside the United Nations body.

Indonesia has been active in the field of international co-operation for a better world and it will continue to do so. However, due to the serious reasons I mentioned above, Indonesia has decided at this stage and under the present circumstances to withdraw from the United Nations and in addition also from specialized agencies like the FAO, UNICEF and UNESCO. A separate letter will be sent to those specific agencies.

While our actual withdrawal from the United Nations has been already carried out in New York as of 1 January 1965, I would suggest that, due to the technical winding up of the

Appendix M (continued)

Indonesian Permanent Mission in New York and reciprocally your Office in Indonesia, officially our respective offices would be closed on 1 March 1965. I would appreciate it highly if you would be helpful in having the office of the Indonesian Mission in New York maintain its official status till 1 March 1965, which would also be the case with your United Nations office in Djakarta.

For the Government of the Republic of Indonesia,
The First Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Foreign Affairs,

(Signed) Dr. SUBANDRIO



MAP NO. 1480 UNITED NATIONS
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- Algerian-French Conflict
- Algerian Developments Thru 1959
- Apartheid in South Africa
- Arab-Israel Conflict and the UN
- Arab Refugees in the Middle East
- Arms Race: Satellites . Nuclear
- Atom Tests and Radiation Hazards
- Berlin and Germany
- China: Representation in UN
- Colonialism and the United Nations
- Common Market: Political Impacts
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- Congo: The First Year (Vol. II)
- Congo: The Second Year (Vol. III)
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- Cuba: Invasion, October Crisis (Vol. II)
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- Disarmament: New Proposals Thru 1959
- Disarmament: Postwar Decade
- Goa
- Hungary and the UN
- Kuwait-Iraq Dispute
- Latin America: US Strains, UN Record
- Malaysia-Indonesia
- Middle East: Unification Among Arab States
- Middle East Crisis: Lebanon . Jordan . Iraq
- Outer Space
- Tunisia-French Dispute
- U-2 and Open Skies

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- Trade, Aid and Economic Development
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